On Oct. 10, elements of two Russian field armies—together possessing 40,000 troops and thousands of vehicles—attacked the Ukrainian garrison in Avdiivka, just northwest of Russian-occupied Donetsk in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.

It was the first and main attack of Russia’s third annual winter offensive in its 22-month wider war on Ukraine.

(...) it has been failing. (...) the Russian 2nd and 41st Combined Arms Armies at best have stalled.

(...) the Russians can’t win a war of attrition if they continue to lose many more vehicles and troops than the Ukrainians lose.

(...) the battle for Avdiivka has been a disaster for Russia. It’s exactly the kind of fight the Kremlin can’t afford if its goal is to grind away Ukraine’s military strength. Around Avdiivka, it’s the Russians who are getting ground down. (...)

The Russian field armies have lost at least 411 tanks, fighting vehicles and artillery pieces trying, and failing, to capture Avdiivka. The Ukrainian brigades garrisoning Avdiivka (...) have lost just 30 pieces of heavy equipment.

Russian casualties—dead and maimed—exceed 13,000 in just this one sector. Ukraine’s own casualties likely have been much lighter. Perhaps a few thousand.

Yes, the Russian army in Ukraine (...) is larger than Ukraine’s own front-line force is. Yes, Russia can mobilize many more replacement troops than Ukraine can mobilize. Yes, Russian industry out-produces Ukrainian industry.

No, Russia’s resources are not limitless.

(...) In October, Russian attacks around Avdiivka were heavily mechanized, with tanks and fighting vehicles leading the way.

When the tanks and fighting vehicles ran afoul of Ukrainian mines, drones and artillery, Russian commanders pulled back their remaining vehicles—and sent in the infantry, on foot. When the infantry got massacred, the Russians deployed more explosives-laden drones in an effort to sever Ukrainian forces’ supply lines.

That didn’t work, either. (...)

The most recent Russian attacks on Avdiivka have included tanks and infantry. But in the most critical northern part of the battlefield, in and around Stepove, the conditions—for the Russians—are unforgiving.

It’s there in Stepove that the Ukrainian 47th Brigade, with its mix of American-made M-2 Bradley fighting vehicles and German-made Leopard 2 tanks, is killing Russians by the truckload.

(...) “Ukraine is using the railroad treelines to isolate Stepove from the rest of the battlefield,� analyst Donald Hill wrote in fellow analyst Tom Cooper’s newsletter.

“As Russian troops and vehicles move out from [neighboring] Krasnohorivka across the open fields, Ukrainian artillery and drones reduce their numbers,� Hill explained. “They remain under fire until the assault loses momentum and stops.�

“Ukraine then counterattacks, sometimes with Leopards—and often with Bradleys raking the treelines with 25-millimeter cannon fire. Bradleys also transport small assault teams that clear out Russian stragglers from time to time. Once Stepove and the treelines by the railroad are clear, or mostly clear, of Russian troops, Ukraine pulls back to their functional defensive positions and waits for the next Russian attack.�

“Constantly pushing the Russians back helps preserve the defensive positions Ukraine currently occupies,� Hill explained. “This tactic is much easier for the 47th Brigade to use because of the firepower of the Bradley, which can engage Russian armor and has done so, and its cannon fire is very effective against Russian infantry even when they are in cover.�

This is not a winning strategy for Russia. The Kremlin can build, and restore from long-term storage, at most 1,500 tanks and a couple thousand fighting vehicles a year.

Taking into account the need to backfill losses from 2022, Russian forces can afford to lose at most 50 tanks a month without depleting their overall armor holdings. The Avdiivka fight lately has pushed the Russians’ armor losses well above sustainable levels. (...)

Extreme losses—at least 315,000 killed or severely wounded in 22 months—have contributed to what the RAND Corporation, a California think-tank, described as a “ticking social time-bomb� in Russia (...)

Ukraine (...) also has lost a lot of soldiers: at least 70,000 killed and several times that number wounded. But in recent months the loss ratio—Russian losses compared to Ukrainian losses—greatly has favored Ukraine. Around Avdiivka, it might be 10 to one as those M-2 crews go about their bloody work.

(...) Russia cannot sustain the kinds of losses it has experienced in the battle for Avdiivka. Not over the long term.

And to be clear, Russia is counting on staying in the war for the long term. That’s its whole plan for victory. A plan that a few battalions of Ukrainian fighting vehicles have exposed as a farce.

Die Russen konnten in letzten Tagen bis 2,2 km bis zur Versorgungsstrasse vorrücken. Ukrainische Beobachter schlagen Alarm wegen drohender Einkesselung.

Hier spielt weniger die Entfernung und mehr die Details eine Rolle.

Zuerst konnten die Russen unentdeckt durch die Kanalisation UA Positionen umgehen und Ihnen in den Rücken fallen.
https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.zdf.de/nac...ssland-102.html
Dann noch einmal schlechtes Wetter ausnutzen und in die Stadt einsikkern


Die Frage ist wieviele Verteidigungslinien noch übrig sind bis man die Straße direkt beschießen kann

War es nicht von vornherein klar, dass die Stadt irgendwann fallen würde?

Danke sehr für die zusätzlichen Details! Das hilft ungemein bei der Einordnung. Bisher kamen Kanalisationen in der Berichterstattung praktisch nie vor, was mich immer ein wenig verwundert hat. Ein "Rattenkrieg" in den verzweigten Gängen sollte zumindest in den größeren Ansiedlungen ja eher die Norm sein, als die Ausnahme. Wobei es dann schon echt als schwach empfinde, wenn die Ukrainer sich derart unbemerkt umgehen lassen.

Nein. Scipio, du musst wirklich mal was an deiner depressiven Grundeinstellung arbeiten, außer du kommst aus der Zukunft und dann wäre es nett entweder nicht zu spoilern oder die Karten auf den Tisch zu legen. Und nein, ich verlange keinen Hurra-Patriotismus, denn der ist genau so fehl am Platz wie Defätismus. Von vornherein klar war allein, dass die Russen in einer vorteilhaften Position sind und die zahlenmäßig überlegenen Kräfte haben, während das bei den Ukrainern genau andersherum ist. Klar, die Zeichen stehen dann erstmal auf Niederlage, aber das ist weder vorgezeichnet, noch der einzige Ausgang, denn eine solche Betrachtung ignoriert alles andere drumherum: Führungseffizienz. Versorgungslage. Moral der Soldaten. Kriegsverlauf außerhalb des (Halb)Kessels und und und und. Von vornherein klar war allein, dass die Ukrainer es dort nicht leicht haben werden und Rückzugsvorbereitungen treffen sollten. Bitte fang an, in deinem eigenen Interesse, die Dinge etwas nüchterner zu betrachten.

Nicht alle Russen sind unmotiviert oder unkreativ.

Ähhhm, nein.
Große begehbare Kanalisationen sind, gerade in kleinen oder neueren Städten, die absolute Ausnahme.
Das kann man nicht mit Stalingrad oder dem Pariser Untergrundnetzwerk vergleichen.

Der Kanal, welcher jetzt genutzt wurde, war ein altes 90cm Rohr. Es lag voller Trümmer und war geflutet.

Ich gelte ja hier als überoptimistisch.
Aber deine Kritik geht hier IMO deutlich zu weit.

Dem Großteil der Kommentatoren war klar, dass, wenn ru deinen Fokus auf Adiivka aufrecht erhält und die gesamte Kriegslage in etwa gleich bleibt, man froh sein muss, wenn Adiivka bis in den Frühling zu halten ist.
Viele gaben der Stadt auch nur 2 Wochen bis einem Monat.

PS: und wenn du den Kontext in Adiivka nicht gekannt hast, dann kann ich dir ganz gute Infokanäle empfehlen.

Die Kanalisation war ein ca. 2km langes Rohr mit < 1m Durchmesser. Es war bekriechbar. Russen haben 150 mann durchkriechen lassen, die dann Ukrainer von hinten überrascht haben und dadurch die Verteidigungslinie durchbrochen haben.

Hab gerade keine Quellen parat, evtl. reiche ich es nach

Hier sind Bilder aus den Kanalisation. Doch breiter als ich es in Erinnerung hatte
https://t.me/milinfolive/114970?single

Nach Einschätzung von Deep State sind die russischen Truppen bis auf 250m an die Main Supply Route (MSR) vorgedrungen: https://twitter.com/J_JHelin/status/1756652968261157299

Bisher konnten die Ukrainer eigentlich immer gut ausweichen, den Russen fehlt einfach das Material und Personal um solche Rückzugsbewegungen auszunutzen. Eine Aufgabe der Fronttasche wäre jetzt nicht derart katastrophal, würde auch Truppen freimachen um eine besser Verteidigungslinie weiter westlich zu besetzten.

Eine Woche kann das Räumen des Kessels ca. dauern, viele Großgeräte oder Verwundete müssen ja nicht nach hinten transportiert werden.

Was wird der nächste Schritt? Gekesselter Fleischwolf oder Evakuierung? Das letztere scheint mir die klügere Wahl, denn die Verzögerung die mit der forgesetzten Verteidigung von Mariupol erreicht wurde, nutzt den Ukrainern gerade nichts, oder? Wie lange dauert sowas?

Eine Aufgabe Avdiivkas bewerte ich grundsätzlich nicht als negativ.

Wenn man aus dem SO rausgedrängt wird, dann rutscht diese wichtige Zugverbindung (und andere Ziele) aus der Artilleriereichweite raus.

Wann denkst du, müsste der Rückzug spätestens los gehen? Ich bin wirklich gespannt, was der Führungswechsel bringen wird.

[...]

Es gibt neben der asphaltierten MSR auch noch mindestens eine weitere Straße.
Ãœber diese sollte sich zumindest die Verteidigung der Hochhaussiedlung eine Weile machbar sein.

Fate of Avdiivka uncertain as Ukrainian forces defending it struggle with fortifications, resources
As artillery began pounding the cold-hardened ground ahead of them, two Ukrainian soldiers listened warily to shell impacts creep closer. [...] The two soldiers, Oleksandr, 42, and Anatoly, 31, sat quietly together, holding their breath. Oleksandr knew that the hole provided inadequate cover for the two men. And as he had feared, a Russian mortar landed right next to the pair on their fifth and last night at the position. Anatoly was struck in the back by shrapnel. [...] Of two other pairs of soldiers positioned nearby, three were killed and one wounded in the same artillery attack.

The account of Oleksandr, a soldier with an anti-tank platoon of the 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade, matches other testimony that there are almost no fortified positions on the very front line near Avdiivka – further threatening the lives of those tasked with defending the city. Many infantrymen and other soldiers deployed on the first line of defense have complained that their positions – often just holes like the one described by Oleksandr – appear to have been poorly prepared ahead of the major Russian offensive on Avdiivka. With Russian forces constantly on heavy assault, there is almost no time to build anything more.

The second line of defense, a few kilometers behind the front, is still being built, according to nearly a dozen interviewed soldiers. While Russia continued to strengthen its defense lines even as it launched an offensive on multiple axes over the winter, Ukraine appears to have done little to prepare for a long attritional battle during its summer counteroffensive.

Given the current intensity of the Russian attacks on front-line positions at Avdiivka, soldiers say they have to make do with what they have. This puts soldiers’ lives at heightened risk, leaving them without proper protection from Russia’s continuous attacks.

In comments to the Kyiv Independent, the Defense Ministry said that Ukraine has been constructing the fortifications near Avdiivka since 2014 and has been focusing on areas at highest risk since 2022. However, in November 2023, President Volodymyr Zelensky called for work on fortifying Ukrainian defenses on the major fronts to be accelerated. Ukraine then created a working group to organize the building of second and third defensive lines using private contractors – with the military organizing the first defense line.

[...]

Bakhmut flashbacks
For the soldiers currently fighting in the Avdiivka sector, Russia’s tactics – relying on massive numbers of troops to wear down defenses – are only too familiar. Many of them were deployed in Bakhmut over the brutal winter months of the previous year, and remember how Russian troops first squeezed defenses on the flanks before taking their offensive into the city.

Russia appears confident that its high-expense tactics will also work in the Avdiivka area, and is throwing everything – men and equipment in massive numbers – into battle, soldiers and experts say.

[...]

"There are just so many of them (Russian troops), and they are just advancing on quantity," said Vitalii, a night drone pilot with the Skala 425th Assault Battalion. He says he tries not to think about what might happen to the city. [...] Observing Russian troop movements from above, Vitalii said he felt that those deployed near Avdiivka were more experienced than the Wagner mercenaries he encountered in the Bakhmut area – with a level of training similar to that of the Ukrainians.

Resources shortage
Nearly two years into the full-scale war, long-lingering problems – including the lack of preparation of fortifications – are starting to become even more serious.

[...]

Among the most serious issues reported all along the front line is that Ukraine is facing a major personnel shortage – particularly in the infantry. To reinforce infantry units after heavy losses, Ukraine has transferred soldiers from units specialized in artillery or logistics to infantry positions, according to the soldiers interviewed by the Kyiv Independent. This means soldiers deployed on the first defensive line may not even know the basic survival skills of an infantryman, which results in even more casualties.

Serhii, a 20-year-old artilleryman with the 59th, said that his originally 64-man artillery group had sent 15 men to the front line. He said most of them had been killed in their first days there. He attributes it to the fact they "knew almost nothing" about being in the infantry. Only four out of 15 survived.

[...]

Kyiv Independent

The second line of defense, a few kilometers behind the front, is still being built, according to nearly a dozen interviewed soldiers.

Hier sind Bilder aus den Kanalisation. Doch breiter als ich es in Erinnerung hatte
https://t.me/milinfolive/114970?single