Alternativen, MH90 u. NH90 TTH/CSAR |
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Alternativen, MH90 u. NH90 TTH/CSAR |
29. Mar 2008, 00:20 | Beitrag
#1
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Oberleutnant Beiträge: 1.624 Gruppe: Members Mitglied seit: 20.07.2002 |
Ist da was dran?
ZITAT Die nächste Station unserer MH-90-Reise ist das “Jahresendgespräch 2007”, welches Wolfgang Legien mit dem Inspekteur der Deutschen Marine, Vize Admiral Wolfgang Nolting, geführt hat (“Wehrtechnik” IV/2007, S. 90). Nolting antwortet zur Frage nach dem MH-90 ganz codiert: “Ich hoffe, dass die parlamentarische Billigung für ein neues Luftfahrtzeugmuster im nächsten Jahr erfolgen kann. Dieses setzt allerdings voraus, dass ein voll funktionsfähiges, den Bedürfnissen der Marine entsprechendes Muster auf dem Markt verfügbar ist.” Auf den von EUROCOPTER (EC) beizubringenden MH-90 treffen die Nolting-Kriterien eindeutig nicht zu (dagegen behauptet www.nhindustries.com , dass eine italienische Navy-Version des NH-90 schon 2005 geflogen sei, und im August 2007 die niederländische Version). Der weltweit führende Hubschrauber-Hersteller unter dem Dach der EADS zwingt die deutsche Marine-Führung, sich nach Alternativen umsehen zu müssen. Dazu kommt, dass der (politisch) entscheidende XXL des BMVg den MH-90 als “Goldrandlösung” bereits definitiv begraben hat. oder ist das eine geopowers-Ente? Von hier: http://www.geopowers.com/Machte/Deutschlan...2008.html#MH-90 Praetorian kann da doch bestimmt was zu sagen Die angesperochene EH101 wäre ja nett, habe jedoch keinen Schimmer, ob das Ding jemals in den Hangar der Fregatten passen würde. Der Beitrag wurde von brainwarrior bearbeitet: 29. Mar 2008, 00:23 |
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18. Aug 2008, 22:38 | Beitrag
#2
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Oberleutnant Beiträge: 2.420 Gruppe: Members Mitglied seit: 03.01.2006 |
Bei den Briten ist es wohl eher Not als Tugend( Nicht nur die Deutschen bauen Mist :
ZITAT The Ministry of Defence has spent more than £500 million on eight Chinook helicopters that have never been flown as a result of “one of the most incompetent procurements of all time”, an audit has concluded. The Times June 4, 2008
The helicopters have been sitting in a special air-conditioned shelter for the past seven years because of a “gold-standard cockup” that meant the machines’ software could not be accessed. While commanders in Afghanistan have been crying out for extra helicopters, the Chinooks – which were supposed to fly missions for Special Forces – have been lying idle in hangars in the Wiltshire countryside. A report by the National Audit Office (NAO) says that by the time the helicopters enter service the cost of making them airworthy as well as taking interim measures to fill the capability gap will have risen to more than £500 million. The original purchase price of the eight Chinooks was £259 million. Related Links Chinook purchase programme is embarrassing £252m Chinooks remain grounded Ministers kept in dark over £259m Chinooks The procurement nightmare involving the unflyable eight Chinook Mk3s, bought from Boeing in 2001, has already been the subject of one NAO report, published in 2004. Then it was described by Edward Leigh, chairman of the Commons Public Accounts Committee, as “one of the most incompetent procurements of all time”. The major difficulty with the purchase arose when the MoD discovered that it had neglected to include in the contract a clause that would provide access to the source codes for the highly complex software. Without them, RAF specialists were unable to check whether the adapted helicopters passed Britain’s strict airworthiness criteria. Boeing was reluctant to hand over the codes since no request had been made for them in drawing up the contract. So the RAF said that the Chinooks could not be flown except in the most clement weather. The sky had to be cloudless and the pilots would have to operate from at least 500ft so that they could navigate by landmarks. For a helicopter that was supposed to be used by the SAS and the Special Boat Service (SBS) in covert missions in all-weather conditions, night and day and at hedge-hopping altitudes, the decision by the RAF in effect grounded all eight Chinooks. They were put into climate-controlled, dehumidified aircraft shelters at Boscombe Down, Wiltshire. Since 2001 they have been inspected once a week and moved out every two years for more detailed checks, at a total cost of £560,000, according to the NAO. “Today, nearly seven years since they were delivered, the Chinook Mk3s are still languishing in climate-controlled hangers, despite the fact that they are desperately needed on operations in Afghanistan,” Mr Leigh said. “The MoD’s programme to make airworthy the eight Chinook Mk3 helicopters . . . has been a gold-standard cockup,” he said. After the shock of discovering that it was too risky to fly the Chinooks in cloud, the MoD negotiated with Boeing in 2004 to upgrade the eight helicopters, including modifications to the cockpit, costing £215 million. It took 30 months for the programme to be agreed, however, and in 2006 the MoD announced that thousands more troops would be sent to Afghanistan and more helicopters were desperately needed, especially Chinooks. The MoD decided to cancel the Chinook Mk3 upgrade project and convert the special-forces helicopters into ordinary troop-carrying utility helicopters. But the NAO said that the MoD failed properly to analyse the costs and risks of this decision. The costs rose by 70 per cent from £53 million to £90 million. Extra funds were also spent to provide an improved night-vision capability on the older Chinook Mk2s for the SAS to use. But the NAO discovered that the “night enhancement package” obscured the pilot’s forward view. Mr Leigh said it potentially endangered the safety of the helicopter. The first of the converted Chinook Mark 3s will now come into service next year. Baroness Taylor of Bolton, Minister for Defence Equipment and Support, said that the decision to revert the helicopters to utility aircraft would allow the delivery of more Chinooks to Afghanistan “in the shortest time-frame”. The NAO said that as a result of the “protracted” decision-making process at the MoD, “the shortage of helicopters to support operations has been exacerbated”. Nick Harvey, the Liberal Democrats’ defence spokesman, said: “This is a dismal tale of dithering, bad planning and a gross waste of public funds . . . yet penny-pinching on other MoD equipment has cost lives.” |
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20. Aug 2008, 17:35 | Beitrag
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Unteroffizier Beiträge: 75 Gruppe: Members Mitglied seit: 30.03.2005 |
Die Briten haben sich lange Zeit schwer getan, vernünftige Konzepte zur Rettung von Personen aus feindlich beherrschtem Gebiet zu entwickeln. Man war jahrelang der Aufassung, das recht aufwändige CSAR-Konzept der USAF kopieren zu müssen. Man begann mit drei Sea King HC4 und einer Handvoll SAR-Crews zu trainieren, was mangels Personal, Expertise und Ausrüstung (IFF, COMSEC, DAS, ballistischer Schutz) schnell wieder aufgegeben wurde.
Heute spricht man bei den britischen Truppen lieber von Combat Recovery (CR) bzw. Personnel Recovery (neuerdings Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR)), weil das auch die Rettung von Nicht-Kombattanten einschliesst und vom Umfang etwas günstiger zu leisten ist. JPR-Missions wurden im Irak von Chinook HC2/HC2A, später Merlin HC3 allein, selten in Kombination mit zusätzlichen Kräften geflogen. Der EH101 Merlin hat sich im Einsatz als ideale Plattform für SAR/CSAR erwiesen, wenn auch mit der Einschränkung, dass er etwas zu schnell für die begleitenden Kampfhubschrauber ist. Dennoch wurde er als heisser Kandidat für das CSAR-X Programm gehandelt, auf beiden Seiten des Atlantiks. Hat ja leider nicht geklappt. In letzter Zeit haben die Bestrebungen nach einer eigenen JPR/CSAR Kapazität allerdings etwas nachgelassen. Das sei dem Haushalt und der unklaren Zukunft des heimischen SAR-Dienstes geschuldet. Lesenswerte Quelle dazu: AFM May 2008, pages 52-57, "Behind enemy lines" Der Beitrag wurde von Nordstern bearbeitet: 20. Aug 2008, 17:49 |
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