Flugabwehr in Sowjetunion und Russland, Technik, Gliederungen Einstellungen

[Alligator]

Cover me, need to reload Das Bild stammt wohl von der vor Kurzem gestarteten Militärübung in Russland, an der 3 Militärbezirke (südlicher, westlicher und zentraler) beteiligt sind:

Laut Plänen soll der Pantsir in (naher) Zukunft den Tor ersetzen, außerdem soll dieses Jahr die Serienfertigung des Buk-M3 beginnen:

Eine Luftabwehrdivision (6 Starterfahrzeuge) soll dann, dank eines besseren Kommandopostens und Radars, über 36 Zielkanäle verfügen (bei der M2 Version sind es 24, bei der M1 sind es 6).

Der Beitrag wurde von Alligator bearbeitet: 26. Aug 2016, 12:59

[Dave76]

Zitiert aus Arabs at War - Military Effectiveness, 1974-1991; Kenneth M. Pollack; S. 417ff

El Dorado Canyon, April 1986

[...] despite the extensive precautions taken by US military forces to keep the raid secret, the Italians detected the F-111s flying from bases in Great Britain through the strait of Gibraltar and across the Mediterranean Sea. Rome passed this information on to Malta, which in turn flashed it to Tripoli. These warnings - both the the strategic warning of US rethoric fingering Libya as the culprit behind the La Belle Discotheque bombing and the tactical warning from Italy and Malta - had no effect on the Libyans. Whether these informations were simply ignored, never made it to the right levels of the Libyan chain of command, or arrived too late for the Libyans to react is unknown. However, when the US jets began to roar into Libyan airspace, the Libyans were unprepared; their military facilities had all of their lights on and their air and air defense forces were not even on alert.

Consequently, there was little to impede the Americans. In Lisa Anderson's concise judgement, "Libyan defenses proved embarrasingly porous." The airstrikes took them completely by surprise and threw the entire military into a state of utter confusion. Many soldiers and airmen panicked and fled their posts, while their officers did little to resist the attack unless specifically directed by higher authority. Libyan SAM and AAA batteries were slow to respond. The SA-5 battery at Sirte - which was closest to Tripoli - either was unable to respond until after the raid or, after their experience in March, chose not to. Other sites, however, fired salvoes of SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, SA-6 and SA-8 surface-to-air missiles into the air. Because the US planes flew in at under 150 meters, below the the missiles' minimum engagement altitude, the SAM launches had no effect on the US aircraft. Moreover, around Benghazi, the US Navy again flew several decoy aircraft that caused the Libyans to activate their fire-control radars, which were then hit by a hail of forty-eight Shrike and High-speed Anti-radiation Missiles (HARMs). The Shrikes and HARMs wiped out several Libyan radars and convinced other radar operators to turn off their equipment lest they too "eat" a HARM. The batteries continued to fire off SAMs, but without radar guidance, the effort was futile. Most Libyan AAA batteries did not open fire until after the first US bombs began exploding. When the antiaircraft guns did join in, they did prove more of a hinderance to the Americans than the SAMs and may have even shot down one F-111 or caused it to crash into the sea. Other than this lone possible kill, even the AAA did little to actually impede the airstrikes, which went largely as planned. Finally, the LAF did not show at all. Not one interceptor was launched during the raid.