Irans Armee - ein logistischer Alptraum? Einstellungen

[axis of evil]

Erst mal ein paar Bilder zur Einstimmung.

Ausserdem haben sie zb. an Panzerfahrzeugen mindestens noch M60, M113, M47/48, T62, Typ59, Typ69, BMP2, BTR60 benutzen 8 verschidene Kaliber Rohrartillerie. Was weiß ich wieviel Kaliber Raketenartillerie.
Mindestens 4 Maschinenkanonenkaliber.
An automatischen Handwaffen sieht man regelmäßig G3, Ak47, MP5 und nun taucht auch noch ein Selbstgebautes Sturmgewehr das wohl im Kaliber 5,56x45mm ist auf.
Und das alles soll mit einer ähnlich uneinheitlichen und noch dazu vollkommen veralteten LKW Flotte versorgt werden.

Kann ein Armee mit solchen Voraussetzungen je nennenswerte offensive Operationen gegen einen ernstzunehmenden Gegner durchführen?
Ich mein das jetzt nicht konkret in Bezug auf einen Konflikt mit US-Truppen im Irak, bei denen würde das schon an der totalen us Luftherrschaft scheitern, sondern generel.

[Dave76]

Das Hauptproblem der Iraner ist nicht so sehr das heterogene Waffenarsenal sondern eher der allgemeine Zustand der Streitkräfte:


Ich habe im Netz einen sehr interessanten Bericht zu den Kapazitäten des iranischen Militärs gefunden.

Download hier: http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/041208_IranDevMilCap.pdf

Ich poste  einige Auszüge die ich für informativ halte. Fette Hervorhebungen sind von mir!


Iranian Conventional Forces

Iran is a far less modern military power in comparative terms than it was during the
time of the Shah, or during the Iran-Iraq War.
Most of Iran?s military equipment is aging or second rate and much of it is worn.
Iran lost some 50-60% of its land order of battle in the climatic battles of the Iran-Iraq
War, and it has never had large-scale access to the modern weapons and military
technology necessary to replace them.
It also has lacked the ability to find a stable source
of parts and supplies for most of its Western-supplied equipment, and has not have access
to upgrades and modernization programs since the fall of the Shah in 1979.
Iran has, however, been able to rebuild some of its conventional capabilities
during 1988-2003, and make progress towards acquiring weapons of mass destruction
and long-range missiles. Iran faced major financial problems until the mid-1990s and
could not obtain resupply or new weapons from most Western states. It has since,
however, been able to acquire more significant numbers of weapons, particularly land-based
weapons.
This level of arms imports, however, is only about 35% to 50% of the level of
imports necessary to recapitalize and modernize all of its forces. It also helps explain why
Iran lacks advanced new C 4 I systems, and has not been able to modernize its air forces,
ground based air defenses, or develop major amphibious warfare capabilities. Iran is
seeking to compensate in part through domestic military production, but as yet, its
present defense industry is not producing either the quality or quantity necessary to solve
its problems.
Iran?s problems in military modernization have been compounded by a number of
factors.
The vast majority of the combat-trained manpower Iran developed during the
Iran-Iraq War left military service by the mid-1990s. Iran now has a largely conscript
force with limited military training and little combat experience.
The deep divisions
between ?moderates? and ?hard-liners? in Iran?s government inevitably politicized the
armed forces, which remain under the command of the supreme religious leader, the
Ayatollah Khamenei. Iran retained divided armed forces, split between the regular forces
that existed under the Shah, and the Revolutionary Guards created under the Ayatollah
Khomeini.
This split was compounded by a highly bureaucratic and ?stovepiped?
command structure, which made limited progress in joint warfare.

Nevertheless, Iran is still a significant conventional military power by Gulf
standards. It has some 540,000 men under arms, and over 350,000 reserves. These
include 120,000 Iranian Revolutionary Guards trained for land and naval asymmetric
warfare. Iran?s military also includes holdings of 1,613 main battle tanks, 1,500 other
armored fighting vehicles, 3,200 artillery weapons, 306 combat aircraft, 50 attack
helicopters, 3 submarines, 59 surface combatants, and 10 amphibious ships.

The Iranian Army

The Iranian Army is large by regional standards.
It has some 350,000 men (200,000+
conscripts), organized into four corps, with four armored divisions, six infantry divisions, two commando divisions, an airborne brigade, and other smaller independent formations. These latter units include independent armored, infantry, and commando brigades? six artillery groups, and army aviation units.
In practice, each Iranian division has a somewhat different organization. For example,
only one Iranian division (the 92nd) is equipped well enough in practice to be a true
armored division and two of the armored divisions are notably larger than the others.
Two of the infantry divisions (28th and 84th) are more heavily mechanized than the
others.ii The lighter and smaller formations in the regular army include the 23rd Special
Forces Division, which was formed in 1993-1994, and the 55th paratroop division.
According to one source, the 23rd Special Forces Division has 5,000 full-time regulars,
and is one of the most professional units in the Iranian Army.
The airborne and special forces are trained at a facility in Shiraz.iii The regular army
also has a number of independent brigades and groups. These include some small
armored units, 1 infantry brigade, 1 airborne and 2-3 special forces brigades, coastal
defense units, a growing number of air defense groups, 5 artillery brigades/regiments, 4-6
army aviation units, and a growing number of logistic and supply formations. The land
forces have six major garrisons and 13 major casernes. There is a military academy at
Tehran, and a signal-training center in Shiraz.

Tank Strength
The IISS estimates that Iran's inventory of main battle tanks now includes some 150 M-47/M-48 and 150-160 M-60A1, 100 Chieftain Mark 3/5s, 250 T-54/T-55s, 150-250 T-59s, 75 T-62s, 480 T-72/T-72S, and 100 Zulfiqars.
Its T-72 strength has increased from 120 in 2000. (Other estimates indicate that Iran may
have as many as 300 Type 59s and/or 150-250 T-69IIs.)
Only part of Iran?s tank inventory is fully operational. It is uncertain how many
Chieftains and M-47/M-48s are really operational, although its Chieftains include the
remainder of 187 improved FV4030/1 versions of the Mark 5 Chieftain that were
delivered to Iran before the fall of the Shah. Smaller problems seem to exist in the rest of
the force, and some experts estimate that Iran's sustainable operational tank strength maybe fewer than 1,000 tanks. Furthermore, Iran?s Chieftains and M-60s are at least 16-20years old, and the T-72 and Zulfiqar are Iran?s only tanks with advanced fire control systems, sights, and armor-piercing ammunition.Iran?s T-72Ss are export versions of the Soviet T-72B. Some have been built under
license in Iran, and are armed with a 125 mm 2A46M smoothbore gun. They have a
relatively modern IA40-1 fire control system and computer, a laser range finder, and a
night and day image intensifying sighting system. The T-72S is powered by an 840
horsepower V-84MS diesel engine, has an upgraded suspension and mine protection, and
a combat weight of 44.5 tons. Russian sources indicate that Iran has ordered a total of
1,000 T-72s from Russia.
Iran has developed a main battle tank called the Zulfiqar, with a 125 mm smoothbore
gun and welded steel turret of Iranian design. According to one report, the Zulfiqar is
powered by a V-46-6-12 V-12 diesel engine with 780 horsepower and uses a SPAT 1200
automatic transmission. This engine is used in the Soviet T-72, but the tank transmission
design seems to be closer to that of the US M-60. It seems to have a relatively modern
fire control system and Iran may have improved its T-72s with a similar upgrade. The
Zulfiqar?s combat weight is reported to be 36 tons, and it is reported to have a maximum
speed of 65 kilometers per hour and a power to weight ratio of 21.7 horsepower per ton.
It has a 7.62 mm coaxial and a 12.7 mm roof mounted machine gun. It uses modern
Slovenia Fontana EFCS-3 computerized fire control system to provide a fully-stabilized
fire on the move capability. It may have a roof-mounted laser warning device and it
could use the same reactive armor system discussed earlier. Roughly 100 Zulifqars seem
to be in service.
Iran has extended the life of some of its T-54s, T-55s, and T-59s by improving their
armor and fire control systems, and by arming them with an Iranian-made M-68 rifled
105 mm gun similar to the one used on the M-60A1. This weapon seems to be made by
the Armament Industries Division of the Iranian Defense Industries Organization. The
Revolutionary Guard is reported to have a special conversion of the T-54 called the Safir-74.
Iran has developed explosive reactive armor add-ons for its tanks, although the
effectiveness of such armor and the extent of such uparmoring of any given model of
tank is unclear.
Iran?s 150 M-47/M-48s include Iran?s surviving upgraded M-47Ms. These M-47s
were upgraded by the American firm of Bowen-McLaughlin York between 1970-1972,
which also built a vehicle manufacturing plant in Iran. They have many of the
components of the M-60A1, including the diesel engine, automatic transmission,
suspension, and gun control and fire components. The conversion extended the operating
range of the M-47 from 130 to 600 kilometers, and increased space to hold 79 rounds by
eliminating the bow mounted machine gun and reducing the crew to four. A total of
about 150 conversions seem to have been delivered to Iran.
In spite of its tank deliveries and production since the Iran-Iraq War, Iran?s total
operational main battle tank holdings are only sufficient to fully equip 5 to 7 of its
divisions by Western standards, and Iran could only sustain about half this force for any period of extended maneuver warfare
. At present, however, they are dispersed in
relatively small lots among all of its regular Army and some of its IRGC combat units --
all the IRGC units generally only have small tank force cadres and it is unclear how
heavy these forces will really be in the future. The 92nd Armored Division is the only
Iranian division that has enough tanks to be a true armored division, even by regional
standards.

Iran is steadily improving its ability to support armored operations in the field, and to provide recovery and field repair capability. However, its exercises reveal that these capabilities are still limited relative to those of US forces and that a lack of recovery and field repair capability, coupled with poor interoperability, will probably seriously limit the cohesion, speed, and sustainability of Iranian armored operations.

Iran?s armored warfare doctrine seems to be borrowed from US, British, and Russian
sources without achieving any coherent concept of operations. Even so, Iran?s armored
doctrine is improving more quickly than its organization and exercise performance.
Iran?s
armored forces are very poorly structured, and Iran?s equipment pool is spread among far too many regular and IRGC units. Iran has only one armored division -- the 92nd
Armored Division -- with enough tanks and other armor to be considered a true armored unit.


Iranian Army Aviation
Iran pioneered the regional use of army aviation and attack helicopters during the
time of the Shah, but built up its holdings of helicopters far more quickly than it expanded its training and maintenance capability. As a result, it had a hollow force at the
time the Shah fell.
Its inability since that time to obtain adequate spare parts and help in
modernizing the aircraft has long made Iranian operational helicopter holdings uncertain. The Iranian Army seems to retain 50 AH-1J Sea Cobra attack helicopters, and 20 CH-47C, 110-130 Bell-214A, 30-35 AB-214C, 35-40 AB-205A, 10 AB-206, and 25 Mi-8/ Mi-27 transport and utility helicopters. These Western-supplied transport and support helicopters have low operational readiness, and they have little sustained sortie capability.



Iranian Army Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
(C4I)
Iranian Army communications have improved, as have Iranian battle management
and communications exercises. They are now capable of better coordination between
branches, the density of communications equipment has improved, and the functional
lines of communication and command now place more emphasis on maneuver, quick
reaction, and combined arms.
However, Iranian battle management and communications
capabilities seem to remain relatively limited.
Iran?s holdings still consist largely of aging VHF radio with some HF and UHF
capability. This equipment cannot handle high traffic densities and secure
communications are poor. Iran still relies heavily on analogue data handling and
manually switched telephone systems. It is, however, acquiring a steadily growing
number of Chinese and Western encryption systems and some digital voice, fax, and
telex encryption capability.


Other Aspects of Iranian Army Capability
Iran?s Army has improved its organization, doctrine, training, and equipment for land
force operations.
Iran still, however, is a slow moving force with limited armored
maneuver capability and artillery forces better suited to static defense and the use of mass fires that the efficient use of rapidly switched and well-targeted fire. Sustainability is limited, as is field recovery and repair capability. Overall manpower quality is mediocre because of a lack of adequate realistic training and a heavy reliance on conscripts.
The army has some capability for power projection and armored maneuver warfare,
but does not train seriously for long-range maneuver and does little training for
amphibious warfare or deployment by sea.
Its logistics, maintenance, and sustainment
system is largely defensive and designed to support Iranian forces in defending Iran from local bases.
It does not practice difficult amphibious operations, particularly ?across the
beach? operations.
It could, however, deploy into Kuwait and cross the border into Iraq.It can also move at least brigade-sized mechanize units across the Gulf by amphibious
ship and ferry if it does not meet significant naval and air opposition to any suchmovement. It lacks the air strength and naval air and missile defense capabilities to be
able to defend such an operation.



The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Pasdaran)
The Iranian Revolutionary Guards add some 120,000 additional men to Iran?s
forces. Roughly 100,000 are ground forces, including many conscripts. There is a large
naval branch, and a small air branch. Estimates of its equipment strength are highly
uncertain. The IISS estimates that it has some 470 tanks, 620 APCs, 360 artillery
weapons, 40 multiple rocket launchers, and 150 air defense guns, but these estimates are now several years old.

Sources differ sharply on the organization of the IRGC, and its combat formations
seem to be much smaller than the title implies, and to differ sharply from unit to unit.
The
IISS reports a strength of 2 armored, 5 mechanized, 10 infantry, and one Special Forces
division, plus 15-20 independent brigades, including some armed and paratroop units. In practice, its manning would support 3-5 real divisions, and many of its divisions have an
active strength equivalent to large brigades.

The IRGC plays a major role in internal security.
Nevertheless, it seems best to treat
the IRGC primarily as a military land force which parallels the Iranian regular army, and
which would operate with it in most contingencies. As has been discussed earlier, the
IRGC has been placed under an integrated command with Iran?s regular armed forces at
the General staff level. It retains an independent command chain below this level,
however, and generally continues to exercise as an independent force. It rarely exercises with the regular Iranian army -- and then usually in large, set piece exercises which do not require close cooperation.xxiii
It is difficult to estimate the proficiency of IRGC units. It seems likely, however,
that they vary sharply by unit and that only a portion of the IRGC land forces are
intended to participate in joint operations with the regular army in regular combat. These forces seem to have improved steadily in their training, organization, and discipline since
the early 1990s, and have also expanded their joint training with the regular army, navy,
and air force.
The IRGC would probably be capable of providing an extensive defense capability
in the event of any invasion of Iran. They are also light enough so that units could rapidly deploy as ?volunteers? to Iraq or any Southern Gulf country where they could obtain local support and access to a seaport or airport. It seems likely that they could move into a country like Iraq in significant force ? at least several brigade equivalents and possibly at the division level ? if they were invited to do so by some friendly faction. They could also infiltrate in significant numbers. It seems unlikely that the IRGC could deploy and sustain more than a force of several brigades if it were invited into a secure port by some Southern Gulf faction and were not opposed by air and sea. They could certainly mount a significant attack on any island or offshore facility in the Gulf and covertly or overtly introduce large numbers of free floating or bottom mines into any shipping channel.


The Quds (Qods) Forces
The IRGC has a large intelligence operations and unconventional warfare
component.
Roughly 5,000 of the men in the IRGC are assigned to the unconventional
warfare mission. The IRGC has the equivalent of one Special Forces ?division,? plus
additional smaller formations, and these forces are given special priority in terms of
training and equipment. In addition, the IRGC has a special Quds force which plays a
major role in giving Iran the ability to conduct unconventional warfare overseas using
various foreign movements as proxies.
This force is under the command of General
Ahmad Vahidi (Wahidi), who used to head the information department in the IRGC
General Command and had the mission of exporting the revolution.
The budget for the Quds forces is a classified budget directly controlled by
Khamenei, and is not reflected in the Iranian general budget. It operates primarily outside
Iran?s borders, although it has bases inside and outside of Iran. The Quds troops are
divided into specific groups or ?corps? for each country or area in which they operate.


The Basij and Other Paramilitary Forces
The rest of Iran's paramilitary and internal security forces seem to have relatively little warfighting capability.
The Basij (Mobilization of the Oppressed) is a popular reserve
force of about 90,000 men with an active and reserve strength of up to 300,000 and a
mobilization capacity of nearly 1,000,000 men. It is controlled by the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps, and consists largely of youths, men who have completed
military service, and the elderly.

Iran also has 45,000-60,000 men in the Ministry of Interior serving as police and border
guards, with light utility vehicles, light patrol aircraft (Cessna 185/310 and AB-205 and
AB-206s), 90 coastal patrol craft, and 40 harbor patrol craft.


The Iranian Air Force

The Iranian Air Force has some 52,000 men; 37,000 in the air force per se, and
15,000 in the Air Defense force, which operates Iran?s land-based air defenses.
It has
over 300 combat aircraft in its inventory (The IISS estimates 306). Many of these aircraft, however, are either not operational or cannot be sustained in air combatThis includes 50-60% of Iran?s US and French supplied aircraft and some 20-30% of its Russian and Chinese supplied aircraft. It has nine fighter-ground attack squadrons with 162-186
aircraft; seven fighter squadrons, with 70-74 aircraft, a reconnaissance unit with 4-8
aircraft, and a number of transport aircraft, helicopters, and special purpose aircraft. It
operates most of Iraq?s land-based air defenses, including some 150 IHawks, 45 HQ-21s,
10 SA-5s, 30 Rapiers, and additional forces equipped with light surface-to-air missiles.


Iranian Air Strength
As is the case with most aspects of Iranian military forces, estimates differ by
source.
The IISS estimates the air force has 18 main combat squadrons. These include
nine fighter ground-attack squadrons, with 4/55-65 US-supplied F-4D/E and 4/55-65 F-5E/ FII, and 1/27-30 Soviet-supplied Su-24. Iran had 7 Su-25K and 24 Mirage F-1 Iraqi
aircraft it seized during the Gulf War, and some may be operational.
Some reports
indicate that Iran has ordered an unknown number of TU-22M-3 ?Backfire C? long-range
strategic bombers from either Russia or the Ukraine.xxxvii Discussions do seem to have
taken place, but no deliveries or purchases can be confirmed.
Iran had seven air defense squadrons, with 2/20-25, -60 US-supplied F-14, 2/25-30
Russian/Iraqi-supplied MiG-29, and 1/25-35 Chinese supplied F-7. The Iranian air force had a small reconnaissance squadron with 3-8 RF-4E. It has 5 C-130H MP
maritime reconnaissance aircraft, 1 RC-130 and other intelligence/reconnaissance
aircraft, together with large numbers of transports and helicopters.
Most Iranian squadrons can perform both air defense and attack missions,
regardless of their principal mission -- although this was not true of Iran?s F-14 (air
defense) and Su-24s (strike/attack) units. Iran?s F-14s have not been able to use their
Phoenix air-to-air missiles since the early 1980s. Iran has claimed that it is modernizing
its F-14s by equipping them with I-Hawk missiles adapted to the air-to-air role, but it is
far from clear that this is the case or that such adaptations can have more than limited
effectiveness. xxxix
Russian firms and the Iranian government tried to reach an agreement over license-production
of the MiG-29, but repeated attempts have failed. Likely due to the difficulty
the regime has had in procuring new aircraft, Iran has been developing three new attack
aircraft. The indigenous design and specifics of one of the fighters in development, the
Shafagh, were unveiled at the Iran Airshow in 2002. Engineers hope to have a prototype
by 2008, though it is unclear what the production numbers will be and what the timetable
for deployment may be. Little is known about the other two fighters in development, the
Saeghe and the Azarakhsh, other than they have been reportedly derived from the F-5. xl


Iranian Land-based Air Defense
Iran seems to have assigned about 12,000-15,000 men in its air force to land-based
air defense functions, including at least 8,000 regulars and 4,000 IRGC personnel. It is
not possible to distinguish clearly between the major air defense weapons holdings of the
regular air force and IRGC, but the air force appeared to operate most major surface-to-air
missile systems. Total holdings seem to include 30 Improved Hawk fire units (12
battalions/150+ launchers), 45-55 SA-2 and HQ-2J/23 (CSA-1) launchers (Chinese-made
equivalents of the SA-2), and possibly 25 SA-6 launchers. The air force also had three
Soviet-made long-range SA-5 units with a total of 10-15 launchers -- enough for six sites.
Iran has developed and deployed its own domestically manufactured SAM dubbed the
Shahab Thaqeb. The SAM requires a four-wheeled trailer for deployment and closely
resembles the R440 SAM.xliv
Iran's holdings of lighter air defense weapons include five Rapier squadrons with 30
Rapier fire units, 5-10 Chinese FM-80 launchers, 10-15 Tigercat fire units, and a few
RBS-70s. Iran also holds large numbers of man-portable SA-7s, HN-5s, and SA-14s, plus
about 2,000 anti-aircraft guns -- including some Vulcans and 50-60 radar-guided and self
propelled ZSU-23-4 weapons.xlv It is not clear which of these lighter air defense weapons
were operated by the army, the IRGC, or the air force. The IRGC clearly had larger
numbers of manportable surface-to-air launchers, including some Stingers that it had
obtained from Afghanistan. It almost certainly had a number of other light air defense
guns as well.


Iran?s air defense forces are too widely spaced to provide more than limited air defense for key bases and facilities, and many lack the missile launcher strength to be fully effective. This is particularly true of Iran?s SA-5 sites, which provide long-range, medium-to-high altitude coverage of key coastal installations. Too few launchers are scattered over too wide an area to prevent relatively rapid suppression. Iran also lacks the low altitude radar coverage, overall radar  net, command and control assets, sensors, resistance to sophisticated jamming and electronic countermeasures, and systems integration capability necessary to create an effective air defense net. Its land-based air defenses must operate largely in the point defense mode, and Iran lacks the battle management systems and data links are not fast and effective enough to allow it to take maximum advantage of the overlapping coverage
of some of its missile systems -- a problem further complicated by the problems in trying to net different systems supplied by Britain, China, Russia, and the US. Iran?s missiles and sensors are most effective at high-to-medium altitudes against aircraft with limited penetrating and jamming capability.

Iranian Air Force Readiness and Effectiveness
In spite of Iran?s efforts, readiness and force quality remain major issuesThe Iranian air force still has many qualitative weaknesses, and it is far from clear that its current rate of modernization can offset the aging of its Western-supplied aircraft and the qualitative improvements in US and Southern Gulf forces. The air force also faces serious problems in terms of sustainment, command and control, and training. Iran has a pilot quality problem. Many of its US-trained pilots were purged at some point during the
Revolution. Its other US-trained pilots and ground-crew technicians are aging to the point
where many should soon retire from service, and have not had advanced air-to-air combat
and air attack training for more than 15 years.
While Iran practices realistic individual
intercept training, it fails to practice effective unit or force-wide tactics and has shown
only limited capability to fly large numbers of sorties with its US supplied aircraft on
even a surge basis. It has limited refueling capabilities
-- although it has four B-707
tanker/transports and may have converted other transports.
The Iranian air force lacks
advanced training facilities, and has only limited capability to conduct realistic training
for beyond-visual-range combat and stand-off attacks with air-to-surface munitions.
Ground crew training and proficiency generally seem mediocre -- although the layout of Iranian air bases, aircraft storage and parking, the deployment of equipment for
maintenance cycles, and the other physical signs of air unit activity are generally better organized than those of most Middle Eastern air forces.

The Iranian air force must also deal with the fact that its primary challenge now
consists of the US, British, and Saudi air forces. They are high technology air forces that
operate the AWACS airborne control system, have some of the most advanced electronic
warfare and targeting systems in the world, and have full refueling capability. They use
sophisticated, computer-aided aggressor training and have all of the range and training
facilities for beyond-visual-range combat and stand-off attacks with air-to-surface
munitions.
Iran has no airborne control system, although it may be able to use the radars
on its F-14s to support other aircraft from the rear.
Its overall C 4 I system is a totally
inadequate mix of different sensors, communications, and data processing systems. It has limited electronic warfare capabilities
by US standards, although it may be seeking to
acquire two Beriev A-50 Mainstay AEW aircraft, and has converted some aircraft to
provide a limited ELINT/SIGINT capability.
Iran is slowly improving its capability for joint land-air, and air-sea operations.
Iranian exercises and statements provide strong indications that Iran would like to
develop an advanced air defense system, the ability to operate effectively in long-range
maritime patrol and attack missions, effective joint warfare capabilities, and strike/attack
forces with the ability to penetrate deep into Iraq, the southern Gulf states, and other
neighboring powers. Iran?s exercises, military literature, and procurement efforts also
make it clear that its air planners understand the value of airborne early warning and C 4 I
systems, the value of airborne intelligence and electronic warfare platforms, the value of
RPVs, and the value of airborne refueling. Iran has even sought to create its own satellite
program.xlvi Further, the air force?s efforts at sheltering and dispersal indicate that it understands the vulnerability of modern air facilities and the stand-off attack capabilities of advanced air forces like those of the United States.