Flugabwehr in Sowjetunion und Russland, Technik, Gliederungen Einstellungen

[Alligator]

Cover me, need to reload Das Bild stammt wohl von der vor Kurzem gestarteten Militärübung in Russland, an der 3 Militärbezirke (südlicher, westlicher und zentraler) beteiligt sind:

Laut Plänen soll der Pantsir in (naher) Zukunft den Tor ersetzen, außerdem soll dieses Jahr die Serienfertigung des Buk-M3 beginnen:

Eine Luftabwehrdivision (6 Starterfahrzeuge) soll dann, dank eines besseren Kommandopostens und Radars, über 36 Zielkanäle verfügen (bei der M2 Version sind es 24, bei der M1 sind es 6).

Der Beitrag wurde von Alligator bearbeitet: 26. Aug 2016, 12:59

[Dave76]

Also, hier noch mal ein paar mehr Hintegrundiformationen zu den Auseinandersetzungen zwischen den US-amerikanischen und libyschen Streitkräften im März 1986 (aus Arabs at War - Military Effectivness, 1974-1991; Kenneth M. Pollack; S. 415ff):

The Libyans had also received advanced Soviet-made SA-5 SAMs and had deployed one battery at Sirte, on the southern coast of the gulf. The SA-5 was the follow-up system to the SA-2 and was a clear improvement over this obsolete design. However, the SA-5 was designed to shoot down high-flying bombers and reconaissance aircraft and, actually, was not very useful against more maneuverable and lower-flying fighters and attack jets. Libyan SAMs and AAA sites were not integrated into a single command scheme, nor could Tripoli coordinate interceptor aircraft with its ground-based air defenses, so the SAMs and AAA were given certain parts of the sky to defend, and fighters would patrol other sectors. Moreover, because of their dearth of technically competent personnel, the Libyan air defense system was rarely manned above 60 percent of its actual requirements and was largely shut down at night. Finally, they had done nothing to improve either the operational readiness of their aircraft, the numbers of their trained pilots, or the skills of those pilots available. Indeed, because of the greater sophistication of the aircraft then in its arsenal, Tripoli may have ha d as few as 100 trained Libyan pilots available.
[...]
Inexplicably, the Libyans suddenly decided to start shooting at the Americans. At about 2:00 P.M. [24. März], two US F-14s flying combat air patrol were targeted by a fire-control radar from the Libyan coast. When the planes were roughly sixty miles away, the Libyan SA-5 battery at Sirte launched two missiles at them. The F-14s were able to outmaneuver the missiles, but the Sixth Fleet began to retaliate. Several hours later, the Libyans launched three more SA-5s and an SA-2 at other US aircraft, all of which missed.
[...]
Libyan air defenses were defeated by tactics even less complicated than those the Israelis had used against Syria four years earlier, as the United States simply flew a pair of A-7 attack jets high along the Libyan coast, prompting the Sirte misille battery to switch on its fire-control radar. Two other A-7s, which had flown in low to sneak beneath Syrian radar coverage, then fired two Shrike antiradiation missiles, which homed in on the Libyan radar signals. Although the Shrikes did not destroy the radar, they hit close enough to scare the Libyans into shutting down the SA-5 site. Four hours later, the Americans attempted the same maneuver, and again the Libyans fell for it by switching on their fire-control radar. This time the Shrikes destroyed the radar, shutting down the SAM battery.

Später dann noch was zu den Schlägen im April 86.

[Alligator]

Also, hier noch mal ein paar mehr Hintegrundiformationen zu den Auseinandersetzungen zwischen den US-amerikanischen und libyschen Streitkräften im März 1986 (aus Arabs at War - Military Effectivness, 1974-1991; Kenneth M. Pollack; S. 415ff):

The Libyans had also received advanced Soviet-made SA-5 SAMs and had deployed one battery at Sirte, on the southern coast of the gulf. The SA-5 was the follow-up system to the SA-2 and was a clear improvement over this obsolete design. However, the SA-5 was designed to shoot down high-flying bombers and reconaissance aircraft and, actually, was not very useful against more maneuverable and lower-flying fighters and attack jets. Libyan SAMs and AAA sites were not integrated into a single command scheme,[...]

Das ist haargenau das, was auch die Sowjets geschrieben haben:

Es gab keine einheitliche Kommandostruktur, die sowjetischen und westlichen Fla-Systeme operierten unabhängig voneinander und ergänzten sich nicht.

Inexplicably, the Libyans suddenly decided to start shooting at the Americans. At about 2:00 P.M. [24. März], two US F-14s flying combat air patrol were targeted by a fire-control radar from the Libyan coast. When the planes were roughly sixty miles away, the Libyan SA-5 battery at Sirte launched two missiles at them. The F-14s were able to outmaneuver the missiles, but the Sixth Fleet began to retaliate. Several hours later, the Libyans launched three more SA-5s and an SA-2 at other US aircraft, all of which missed

Wurde im Beitrag #65 schematisch aufgezeigt und man kann wunderbar anhand des Schemas auch sehen, warum die F-14 den Raketen entkommen konnten.

Libyan air defenses were defeated by tactics even less complicated than those the Israelis had used against Syria four years earlier, as the United States simply flew a pair of A-7 attack jets high along the Libyan coast, prompting the Sirte misille battery to switch on its fire-control radar. Two other A-7s, which had flown in low to sneak beneath Syrian radar coverage, then fired two Shrike antiradiation missiles, which homed in on the Libyan radar signals. Although the Shrikes did not destroy the radar, they hit close enough to scare the Libyans into shutting down the SA-5 site. Four hours later, the Americans attempted the same maneuver, and again the Libyans fell for it by switching on their fire-control radar. This time the Shrikes destroyed the radar, shutting down the SAM battery.

Die Stelle klingt vielleicht etwas komisch und auch der Einsatz der Shrike ist irgendwie seltsam, die Sowjets haben ausschließlich nur die HARM in dem Bericht erwähnt. Während die eine HARM, wie bereits erwähnt, das Feuerleitradar getroffen hat, flog die andere HARM knapp über das Feuerleitradar hinweg und schlug etwa 10-11 km hinter der Fla-Stellung in den Boden ein.

Der Beitrag wurde von Alligator bearbeitet: 8. Sep 2016, 18:42