Moderne Söldner, Sammelthread Einstellungen

[Hugo803]

@kato; Markus11:

Was ein Soldat im Einsatz oder generell verdient tut doch hier gar nicht zur Sache.

Ich fand nur Markus11's Aussage interessant das 6000€ für 6 Wochen langweilige Bootsfahrt mit sehr, sehr, sehr wenig Gefährdungspotenzial "läppisch" ist. Aber jeder hat einen anderen Bezug zum Geld.

[Markus11]

@kato; Markus11:

Was ein Soldat im Einsatz oder generell verdient tut doch hier gar nicht zur Sache.

Ich fand nur Markus11's Aussage interessant das 6000€ für 6 Wochen langweilige Bootsfahrt mit sehr, sehr, sehr wenig Gefährdungspotenzial "läppisch" ist. Aber jeder hat einen anderen Bezug zum Geld.

Schöner Subtext der da mitschwingt.

Zusammen mit:

Viel verstörender empfinde ich das Soldaten in ihrem Arbeitsverhältnis so viel Urlaub haben das sie solche Nebenjobs ausführen können.

könnte ich dir jetzt auch einfach und plump Eifersucht Neid unterstellen. Rhetorisch absolut unfein und auch unfair.

Du siehst es als 6 Wochen nur langweilen und nichts tun an, ich als ein Mensch der Langeweile absolut hasst als 6 Wochen voller möglicher LANGEWEILE und der Möglichkeit erschossen zu werden. Nicht zuletzt die riesen Verwantwortung die man trägt.

Da fallen mir genug andere Berufe mit entweder ähnlicher Bezahlung und/oder Berufe mit mehr Erfüllung ein. So oder so, jedenfalls Berufe mit besserem "Preis/Leistungsverhältnis".

Ausser man sucht, wie in meinem ersten Post geschrieben, gerade das Abenteuer, was die Bezahlung dann angemessener macht.

edit: Rechtschreibung und, äh, die Benutzung der richtigen Worte. Es ist einfach zu heiß.

Der Beitrag wurde von Markus11 bearbeitet: 7. Aug 2013, 14:06

[xena]

Zusammen mit:

Viel verstörender empfinde ich das Soldaten in ihrem Arbeitsverhältnis so viel Urlaub haben das sie solche Nebenjobs ausführen können.

könnte ich dir jetzt auch einfach und plump Eifersucht unterstellen. Rhetorisch absolut unfein und auch unfair.

Das nennt man nicht Eifersucht, sondern Neid.

[Hugo803]

Erwischt! 6 Wochen Urlaub am Stück hatte ich noch nie.

[muckensen]

Link

In den USA hat ein Verfahren gegen die Mitglieder eines Rings von Auftragsmördern begonnen, zu denen auch zwei Deutsche gehören, die bis 2009 bzw. 2010 noch Bundeswehrsoldaten waren. Aufgeflogen waren die Männer durch die Annahme eines Mordauftrags, der von einem verdeckten Ermittler gegeben worden war.

[Almeran]

Das hat mit modernen Söldnern nun allerdings herzlich wenig zu tun.

[muckensen]

Na ja... nun ja. In der Überschricht steht "Söldner", und als solche könnte man die Herrschaften durchaus bezeichnen, nach allem, was sie im Portfolio gehabt haben sollen.

[Camouflage]

Klar, weil ja militärische und schwerkriminelle Dienstleistungen irgendwie schon gleich sind ...

[Almeran]

Na ja... nun ja. In der Überschricht steht "Söldner", und als solche könnte man die Herrschaften durchaus bezeichnen, nach allem, was sie im Portfolio gehabt haben sollen.

Dieser Thread beschäftigt sich allerdings explizit mit 'Söldnern' (die Bezeichnung an sich ist grundfalsch) im Sinne von legalen Scherheits- und Unterstützungsdienstleistungen. Die Herren in dem Artikel sind schlicht Auftragsmörder. Großer Unterschied, egal was in der Überschrift steht.

[Nite]

Wie die Amerikaner versuchen Einfluss auf afrikanische Staaten auszuüben, oder auch Eeben Barlow's rant about the DoS

Friday, November 15, 2013
BLACKLISTED? WHY AM I NOT SURPRISED??

Several senior African government representatives who have recently come through my door have told me that they have been “instructed” and “warned” not to meet or talk with me/STTEP by the “US Government”. But, they also tell me that for too long they have been misled and will now meet with whomever they wish to meet. Like me, they too believe that African governments have a rightful say in terms of who they want to talk to and get advice from and not be dictated to whom - and who not - they may talk to. (See my previous posting titled “HYPOCRISY AND THE POWER OF PERCEPTION”).

[...]

Eeben Barlow's military and security blog

Wobei man anmerken muss dass ich bei Barlow durchaus davon ausgehe dass seine Tätigkeiten mit der politischen Führung Südafrikas abgestimmt sind, welche in ihrem Streben eine Regionalmacht auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent zu werden durchaus konträr zu US-Interessen handelt.

[Nite]

Mal nicht PMCs, sondern das andere Gesicht des Söldnerwesens:
"Frank" - deutscher Söldner auf Seiten der UCK (youtube)

[Desert Hawk]

Blackwater

Söldner wegen Mordes schuldig gesprochen

Weil sie im Zentrum von Bagdad ein Blutbad anrichteten, wurden vier ehemalige Kämpfer des Sicherheitsdienstes Academi (damals Blackwater) vor einem amerikanischen Gericht schuldig gesprochen.

22.10.2014

Vier frühere Mitarbeiter der privaten amerikanischen Sicherheitsfirma Academi (damals Blackwater) sind im Prozess um die Tötung von mindestens 14 irakischen Zivilisten schuldig gesprochen worden. Die Geschworenen an einem Bundesgericht in Washington verkündeten am Mittwoch einen Schuldspruch wegen Mordes, drei weitere Angeklagte wurden wegen Totschlags im Affekt schuldig befunden. Ein Datum für die Verkündung des Strafmaßes stand zunächst nicht fest. Die Angeklagten hatten auf unschuldig plädiert.

Völlig willkürlich abgegebene Schüsse

Die Blackwater-Mitarbeiter hatten laut der Anklage im September 2007 in Bagdad willkürlich in die Menge gefeuert. Einer Untersuchung zufolge wurden dabei 14 Zivilisten getötet, irakische Ermittlungen gehen von 17 Todesopfern aus. Das offenbar unprovozierte Blutbad im Zentrum der irakischen Hauptstadt sorgte für große Empörung und kostete Blackwater seine Aufträge im Irak. Die private Sicherheitsfirma war vor allem mit dem Schutz von Mitarbeitern der amerikanischen Botschaft beauftragt. Nach dem Massaker benannte sich Blackwater zunächst in Xe um, seit 2011 heißt das Unternehmen Academi.

Ein erster Prozess gegen die Beschuldigten war im Dezember 2009 geplatzt, im April 2011 ordnete ein Berufungsgericht in Washington dann die Wiederaufnahme des Strafverfahrens gegen vier Angeklagte an. Der Prozess begann schließlich im Juni. Die Staatsanwaltschaft erklärte in ihrem Schlussplädoyer, die unbewaffneten Zivilisten hätten für die Angeklagten keinerlei Gefahr dargestellt. „Warum feuerten sie auf so viele unschuldige Menschen. Warum?“, fragte Staatsanwalt Anthony Asuncion. „Warum schossen sie auf Frauen und Kinder, die unbewaffnet waren?“

Quelle: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/gesellschaft/bl...t-13224587.html

[Freestyler]

Hatten wir den Artikel in der Vanity Fair über G4S schon?

The Chaos Company
Wherever governments can’t—or won’t—maintain order, from oil fields in Africa to airports in Britain and nuclear facilities in America, the London-based “global security” behemoth G4S has been filling the void. It is the world’s third-largest private-sector employer and commands a force three times the size of the British military. On-site in South Sudan with G4S ordnance-disposal teams, William Langewiesche learns just how dirty the job can get, and how perilous the company’s control. [...]

Vanity Fair

[Nite]

Nigeria’s Fight Against Boko Haram Gets Help From South African Mercenaries

By ADAM NOSSITER
MARCH 12, 2015
DAKAR, Senegal — Hundreds of South African mercenaries and hired fighters of other nationalities are playing a decisive role in Nigeria’s military campaign against Boko Haram, operating attack helicopters, armored personnel carriers and fighting to retake towns and villages captured by the Islamist militant group, according to senior officials in the region.

The Nigerian government has not acknowledged the presence of the mercenaries, but a senior government official in northern Nigeria said the South Africans — camped out in a remote portion of the airport in Maiduguri, the city at the heart of Boko Haram’s uprising — conduct most of their operations at night because “they really don’t want to let people know what is going on.”

He said the mercenaries’ role was crucial, part of a new offensive against Boko Haram after a nearly six-year insurrection. The Nigerian military, under pressure because of a presidential election to be held this month, has recently claimed a string of successes against Boko Haram, boasting about the recapture of a number of towns.

The mercenaries “are in the vanguard in the liberation of some of the communities,” said the official, speaking on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals.

speak on the matter, said he believed the mercenary force was composed of fighters from several countries but mainly South Africa.

The Nigerians’ assertions of making headway follow months in which portions of the country’s territory were lost to Boko Haram, an Islamist militant group that has stormed into villages, killing civilians at random, abducting women and girls at will, and forcing tens of thousands of residents to flee across the country’s northeast.

The war against Boko Haram has become a regional one, with Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Benin agreeing to contribute troops to an 8,700-member force to fight the militants. Attacks by Boko Haram have increasingly spilled across borders in the region, prompting Chad to strike at the group inside Nigerian territory.

According to the senior Nigerian official, the South Africans mercenaries have played a significant role in the recent change of momentum in the military effort against Boko Haram.

“They are on the ground; I have seen them,” he said. “They came in with much more sophisticated equipment than the military. Thanks to their involvement the tide is turning. I believe because of them we will witness a seismic shift.”

South African news organizations have carried a number of reports since January about former members of its armed forces traveling to Nigeria. Some other news reports have said that mercenaries from former Soviet republics have also been enlisted. One South African contractor said in an email to The New York Times that among the foreign fighters were Ukrainian helicopter pilots.

South Africa’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministries did not respond to requests for comment, but in an implicit acknowledgment of the mercenaries’ presence in Nigeria, the South African defense minister has said that mercenaries fighting abroad will be arrested on their return to South Africa.

In Washington, Nigeria’s chief of defense intelligence, Rear Adm. Gabriel E. Okoi, said in an interview on Wednesday that South African contractors had been hired in recent months to help train Nigerian troops. But he said he was unaware of any current or former members of South Africa’s military or security services hired to engage in active fighting against Boko Haram.

Calls and messages to other Nigerian defense officials were not answered this week.

On Wednesday, the death by friendly fire of a South African mercenary in Nigeria was reported by South Africa’s Netwerk24 and Daily Maverick, and there have been several articles in the Nigerian press in recent weeks on the subject. But until now, no senior official in Nigeria has confirmed their presence.

New York Times

[Hummingbird]

Interessant, zumal es südafrikanischen Staatsbürgern verboten ist an derartigen Konflikten teilzunehmen.

[Desert Hawk]

Als Ergänzung nachfolgender Artikel über das "old boys network" in der FAZ...

Kampf gegen Boko Haram

Erfolge mit südafrikanischer Hilfe

Im Kampf gegen Boko Haram hat die nigerianische Armee erstaunlich an Kampfkraft hinzugewonnen. Das liegt auch an der Hilfe durch südafrikanische Söldner. Einige von ihnen haben eine zweifelhafte Vergangenheit.

15.03.2015, von THOMAS SCHEEN, JOHANNESBURG

Die nigerianische Armee hat die islamistische Terrormiliz Boko Haram eigenen Angaben nach aus dem Bundesstaat Adamawa vertrieben. Die letzte von den Terroristen gehaltene Ortschaft, Madagali, sei Ende vergangener Woche ohne eigene Verluste zurückerobert worden, hieß es in Abuja. Insgesamt seien seit Beginn der Offensive vor einer Woche, an der tschadische und nigrische Soldaten teilnehmen, 36 Ortschaften befreit worden. Unabhängige Bestätigungen für diese Behauptungen liegen allerdings nicht vor.

Abgesehen von der Offensive der Tschader und der Nigrer ist auffällig, wie sehr die nigerianische Armee in den vergangenen vier Wochen an Kampfkraft gewonnen hat. Beobachter in Nigeria führen das auf neues Material aus dem ehemaligen Ostblock und aus Südafrika zurück – darunter gepanzerte Truppentransporter – sowie auf offenbar mehr als 100 Söldner, die überwiegend aus Südafrika stammen sollen. Die nigerianische Armee bestreitet zwar die Anwesenheit von Söldnern. Präsident Goodluck Jonathan aber hatte vor wenigen Tagen in einem Interview mit dem Radiosender Voice of America die Präsenz ausländischer „Ausbilder und Techniker“ in Nigeria zugegeben. Anscheinend sind diese Ausländer direkt in die Kämpfe verwickelt.

Südfrkaner versehentlich getötet

Im Bundesstaat Borno, wo Boko Haram besonders stark ist, war nach übereinstimmenden Angaben aus Nigeria und Südafrika am vergangenen Mittwoch ein südafrikanischer Söldner getötet worden, als sein Fahrzeug irrtümlicherweise von einem nigerianischen Panzer beschossen worden war. Die afrikaanssprachige Tageszeitung „Beeld“ in Pretoria gab den Namen des Toten mit Leon Mare Lotz an. Lotz war ein ehemaliges Mitglied der paramilitärischen Polizeieinheit „Koevoet“, die in den achtziger Jahren in Namibia gegen die Befreiungsbewegung Swapo eingesetzt wurde. Die „Koevoet“ war auf das Aufspüren und „Eliminieren“ von Swapo-Mitgliedern spezialisiert und wurde zahlreicher Morde beschuldigt. Die Frau des Toten bestätigte gegenüber der Zeitung den Einsatz in Nigeria. Zuvor habe ihr Mann als Sicherheitsberater im Irak gearbeitet.

Nach Recherchen des südafrikanischen Online-Magazins „Daily Maverick“ arbeitete Lotz seit kurzer Zeit für eine nigerianische Sicherheitsfirma namens Pilgrim Africa Limited, als deren Besitzer ein gewisser Cobus Claassens auftritt. Claassens ist ein bekannter südafrikanischer Söldner, dessen militärische Karriere im Angolakrieg begann, wo er als Kommandeur einer Fallschirmjägereinheit eingesetzt war. Südafrika bekämpfte in den achtziger Jahren die von der Sowjetunion unterstützte angolanische Regierung sowie kubanische Truppen, die zu deren Verstärkung nach Angola verlegt worden waren.

Mitglied der ersten privaten Söldnerarmee

Später schloss sich Claassens der ersten privaten Söldnerarmee der Welt an: der südafrikanischen Firma Executive Outcomes. Executive Outcomes kämpfte sowohl in Angola, wo die Söldner die Ölfelder vor den Rebellen der Unita beschützten, als auch in Sierra Leone, wo die Söldner aus Südafrika die Rebellen der „Revolutionary United Front“ (RUF) aus zahlreichen Landstrichen vertrieben.

1998 aber wurde das Unternehmen auf Druck der südafrikanischen Regierung aufgelöst. Die Regierung war damals besorgt um das Ansehen Südafrikas und stellte die Teilnahme ihrer Staatsbürger an militärischen beziehungsweise paramilitärischen Operationen im Ausland unter Strafe. Doch sind die entsprechenden Strafen äußerst gering. Im Jahr 2004 beispielsweise wurde ein ehemaliger Hubschrauberpilot der südafrikanischen Armee zu einer Strafe von 3500 Dollar verurteilt, weil er im Krieg in der Elfenbeinküste für die ivorische Armee einen Kampfhubschrauber geflogen hatte. Die Geldstrafe entsprach ungefähr dem, was er in der Elfenbeinküste innerhalb von zwei Tagen verdient hatte.

In Somalia wiederum sind gegenwärtig zahlreiche ehemalige südafrikanische Soldaten als Berater und als Sicherheitspersonal beschäftigt, darunter Hundeführer, die auf das Aufspüren von Sprengstoff spezialisiert sind. Diese ehemaligen Soldaten versteuern sogar ihr Gehalt in Südafrika, ohne deswegen Ärger mit den Behörden zu bekommen.

Quelle: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland...e-13481302.html

--------------------

"Klagt nicht, kämpft !"
"Real power can't be given, it must be taken" (The Godfather)

ΜΟΛΩΝ ΛΑΒΕ!

[Desert Hawk]

Und das "Old Boys Network" scheint nun wieder komplett zu sein. Ich hatte mich schon gewundert, warum es auf dem Blog von Eeben Barlow (Gründer von Executive Outcomes) so ruhig geworden ist.

Anbei zwei Artikel von SOFREP.com:

Eeben Barlow Speaks Out (Pt. 1): PMC and Nigerian Strike Force Devastates Boko Haram


(Featured image: Nigerian strike force trained by STTEP approaches an enemy position after softening them up with indirect fire.)

APRIL 1, 2015

Reports have emerged from Nigeria that South African military contractors are on the ground helping the Nigerian military deal some devastating blows to the terrorist organization known as Boko Haram. “The campaign gathered good momentum and wrested much of the initiative from the enemy,” says Eeben Barlow, the chairman of STTEP, a private military company (PMC) on the ground in Nigeria. Their presence has spurred a predictable and all-too-familiar cacophony from hand-wringing policy wonks, politicians, and media pundits lambasting the use of ‘apartheid’-era mercenaries in Nigeria’s bloody war against Islamic extremists.

Boko Haram, the so-called Nigerian Taliban, believes in the imposition of Sharia law and the rejection of Western culture. Their methods are brutal: employing assassinations, bombings, kidnappings, and massacres against civilian populations. Led by Abubakar Shekau, the terrorist organization has murdered thousands of civilians. The Nigerian Army has been at war with the group since 2009.

With a Nigerian strike force trained by STTEP, Boko Haram seems to have finally met their match. “The enemy tried to engage the strike force on several occasions but suffered the consequences of their actions,” Barlow told SOFREP. “It was not uncommon for the strike force to be met by thousands of cheering locals once the enemy had been driven from an area.”

Amid the cries of racist, out-of-control mercenaries running around Nigeria, one thing can be certain. Whoever these private military contractors are, they are very effective at what they do. Clearly, Nigeria isn’t their first rodeo. In an exclusive SOFREP interview, Barlow takes us inside how STTEP initially got involved in the conflict, their tactics, their team members, and exactly what he thinks about those who would call him ‘mercenary’ or ‘racist’ simply because his men effectively kill those who rape, murder, and maim innocent civilians.

Barlow is well known for founding Executive Outcomes, a private military company that chalked up amazing successes in Angola and Sierra Leone against anti-government forces during the 1990s, much to the chagrin of the United Nations, who failed to do the same with multi-billion dollar peacekeeping forces. It came at a price for the men of Executive Outcomes; at times, they were made victims of their own success, as certain governments did not appreciate a commercial enterprise interfering with their foreign policy, even if they were working on behalf of democratically elected governments to bring about stability and conflict resolution.

With Executive Outcomes closing in 2000, and the UN proving itself ineffective, African nations were left without a solution when facing butchers like Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) or more recently, Boko Haram in Nigeria.

In 2006, three South African Defense Force veterans founded STTEP (Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection) to help fill the vacuum left by the departure of Executive Outcomes. The founders of the company then began approaching African governments, albeit in a discreet manner. STTEP refuses to name any clients they may have worked for, other than to say that they work exclusively in Africa. “We work under the radar as far as possible,” Barlow says, “and will never compromise a government or a client.”

Eeben Barlow was approached in 2009 to become the chairman of STTEP and help guide the company. STTEP initially focused on training African military forces, as the training they had received from outsiders (the U.S. or UN, for instance) left much to be desired. The foreigners failed in their foreign internal defense missions due to “poor training, bad advice, a lack of strategy, vastly different tribal affiliations, ethnicity, religion, languages, cultures, not understanding the conflict and enemy,” Barlow told SOFREP. “Much of this training is focused on window-dressing, but when you look through the window, the room is empty.”

In coming installments of this series, Barlow discusses the tactics employed by STTEP and the Nigerian strike force they trained to fight Boko Haram, how STTEP’s contract with the Nigerian Army came about, and the big picture when it comes to African conflicts and how they relate back to the Libyan Civil War and ISIS. Barlow also points out the extreme hypocrisy of those who label him and his employees ‘racist mercenaries.’



About the Author
Jack Murphy is an eight year Army Special Operations veteran who served as a Sniper and Team Leader in 3rd Ranger Battalion and as a Senior Weapons Sergeant on a Military Free Fall team in 5th Special Forces Group. Having left the military in 2010, he graduated from Columbia with a BA in political science. Murphy is the author of Reflexive Fire, Target Deck, Direct Action, and numerous non-fiction articles about Weapons, Tactics, Special Operations, Terrorism, and Counter-Terrorism. He has appeared in documentaries, national television, and syndicated radio.

Quelle: http://sofrep.com/40608/eeben-barlow-south...boko-haram-pt1/

Eeben Barlow Speaks Out (Pt. 2): Development of a Nigerian Strike Force



APRIL 6, 2015

Over the past several months, South African private military contractors have been training a Nigerian strike force and have integrated them into their unit during combat operations against Boko Haram.

STTEP, a private military company (PMC) on the ground in Nigeria, was asked for assistance and was subcontracted to the Nigerian government by a primary contractor after they’d heard good things about the company’s reputation. Arrangements like this are fraught with difficulties, as disagreements can and do arise between the primary contractors, the subcontractor, and the host nation. This relationship has proven fruitful thus far, however; recent battlefield successes speak for themselves. The chairman of STTEP, Eeben Barlow, reports, “Our relationship with the Nigerian government and the Nigerian Armed Forces is very good, and as fellow Africans, they recognize the value we have added thus far at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.”

In mid-December of 2014, STTEP was contracted to deploy to Nigeria. Their mission was to train a mobile strike force to rescue the Chibok school girls kidnapped by Boko Haram. When the terrorists abducted over 250 schoolgirls, it drew international media attention and put the ‘Nigerian Taliban’ on the map. Michelle Obama responded to the kidnapping with a perfectly ineffective social-media campaign driven by the Twitter hashtag #bringbackourgirls.

An advanced party of South African military veterans working for STTEP landed in Nigeria by early January of 2015. Instead of social-media activism, they held a selection program for the elite Nigerian military unit they were to train while the main body of STTEP began to arrive. “It is a mobile strike force with its own organic air support, intelligence, communications, logistics, and other relevant combat support elements,” said Barlow. He declined to name the unit they were training, but an open source investigation strongly suggests this unit is the 72 Strike Force.


Strike Force members conducting urban warfare training

By the time the main body of STTEP contractors arrived, the selection process for the Nigerian strike force was complete and training was able to commence immediately. “We built it from scratch,” Barlow explained, “and were able to, in a very short space of time, get it combat ready. The results this force achieved, along with the support of the Nigerian Army, are indeed remarkable.”

STTEP trained the Nigerian strike force in mounted and dismounted tactics with an emphasis on operational flexibility, which was tailored toward the unit’s specific mission. “I think we sometimes gave them [Nigerian military] gray hairs, as we were forever begging for equipment, ammunition, and so forth,” Barlow said as they conducted training in a remote area. “But, the credit in this instance goes to the chief instructor and his men, who implemented the training.”

The South Africans trained their Nigerian counterparts in the tactics, techniques, and procedures that they had practiced and refined on the battlefield since South Africa’s conflicts in the 1980s, including Barlow’s concept of relentless pursuit (which will be explored in a future article).

Meanwhile, Boko Haram was experiencing an increase in operational tempo and achieving successes in their area of operations. The militants captured Gwoza and established a base there in August, followed by the border town of Malam Fatori in November and Baga in January near Lake Chad. By early January of 2015, Boko Haram was estimated to have control over 20,000 square miles of territory.

With this in mind, STTEP’s mission quickly transitioned from training a rescue unit to training a rapidly deploying mobile strike force, and mentoring those they trained in the field. “By late February, the strike force conducted its first highly successful operational deployment,” Barlow said.

The prevailing sentiment about groups like ISIS and Boko Haram is that they are Islamic fanatics—end of story. But this explanation may be intellectually lazy. Nigeria faces a stark north-south divide. While southern Nigeria received a large amount of foreign direct investment (FDI), the north did not—resulting in a substantive economic disparity within the country. “Whereas FDI is positively related to the oil sector, it is negatively related to agriculture and manufacturing,” concludes Adegbemi Babatunde Onakoya of Tai Solarin University of Education in Nigeria. The map below shows where Nigeria’s oil fields are in the south, while their agrarian base is based in the north.



Driven by poverty and the quest for power, “Boko Haram are a bunch of armed thugs who have used religion as the glue to hold their followers together, and who use murder, kidnapping, and terror to force cooperation from the local population,” Barlow said. “Boko Haram feeds off terror generated by kidnappings, murder, rape, infrastructure destruction, IEDs, and so forth. They are very effective when it comes to attacking innocent civilians. Murder, rape, and beheadings are common tactics they use to instill fear and force cooperation.”

The next installment will explain Barlow’s approach to tactics. While the enemy employed terrorist tactics against civilians, STTEP used the concept of relentless pursuit against the terrorists.



About the Author

Jack Murphy is an eight year Army Special Operations veteran who served as a Sniper and Team Leader in 3rd Ranger Battalion and as a Senior Weapons Sergeant on a Military Free Fall team in 5th Special Forces Group. Having left the military in 2010, he graduated from Columbia with a BA in political science. Murphy is the author of Reflexive Fire, Target Deck, Direct Action, and numerous non-fiction articles about Weapons, Tactics, Special Operations, Terrorism, and Counter-Terrorism. He has appeared in documentaries, national television, and syndicated radio.

Quelle: http://sofrep.com/40623/eeben-barlow-speak...n-strike-force/

[Desert Hawk]

Teil 3...

Eeben Barlow Speaks Out (Pt. 3): Tactics Used to Destroy Boko Haram



APRIL 7, 2015

When asked about the tactics that STTEP mentors their Nigerian counterparts to use, Eeben Barlow, the company’s chairman, replied, “The strike force was never intended to hold ground. Instead, it operated on the principle of relentless offensive action.” Barlow has previously indicated that this tactic is key to waging an effective counterinsurgency.

In the doctrine Barlow advocates and made use of in Nigeria, relentless offensive action means immediately exploiting successful combat operations to keep the heat on the enemy. This strategy relies of the synchronization of every asset brought to the battlefield, and applied on multiple fronts against Boko Haram. One of those tactics includes the relentless pursuit of enemy forces.

In most recent conflicts, the enemy uses guerrilla hit-and-run techniques, striking when and where he chooses, hoping that the media will act as a force multiplier by replaying news stories about the attack over and over again. Barlow’s approach emphasizes turning the tables on the enemy by running him to ground, exhausting him, and then killing him with overwhelming firepower. Barlow’s key points to utilizing relentless pursuit include:

• Troops eating while on the move
• Combat tracking the enemy at a high rate of speed
• Having the ability to leap-frog ahead of the enemy via helicopter
• Utilizing communications
• Emphasizing aggression
• Maintaining proficiency in night operations
• Outgunning the enemy

The tactical employment of relentless pursuit involves light infantry moving at high speed with the minimum amount of equipment needed to accomplish their task. Combat trackers follow the spore left by the enemy. “Good trackers can tell the age of a track as well as indicate if the enemy is carrying heavy loads, the types of weapons he has (this is identified when locating enemy rest points), if the enemy is moving hurriedly, what he is eating, and so forth,” Barlow points out in his explanation of this lost art.

Once the enemy’s direction is determined, troops can leap-frog forward, carried by helicopters or riding in armored vehicles the way SADF Koevoet trackers did during South Africa’s border war. Once those troops become tired, they are quickly replaced with a fresh squad. The enemy is pursued relentlessly during both day and night. Once spotted, enemy forces are engaged at the soldier’s maximum effective firing range with RPGs, machine guns, sniper rifles, or 60mm mortars.

“Troops need to develop their aggression level to such a point that the enemy fears them. Aggressive pursuit is aimed at initiating contact as heavily with the enemy as possible,” Barlow wrote on his website about relentless pursuit. “We did not develop the strategy to destroy the enemy,” Barlow elaborated. “This was done by the Nigerian Army division commander in the area of operations who gave us his intent, guidelines, and restrictions.”

STTEP then developed the tactical application for the strike force in order to support that strategy. It was then the Nigerian military’s responsibility to consolidate the terrain taken by the strike force. “Holding ground was the responsibility of the division where we operated, as was the exploitation of operational and tactical gains.”

STTEP also brought an air wing to the table with its package of trainers, advisors, and mentors. The air wing is an organic asset of the strike force and takes its orders from the strike force commander. The pilots fly a variety of missions to include CASVAC, MEDVAC, resupply runs, transporting troops, and even providing air support for the strike force. For instance, the air wing was “given ‘kill blocks’ to the front and flanks of the strike force and could conduct missions in those areas,” Barlow said. This means that the air wing dropped ordnance to create blocking positions, which would prevent the enemy from escaping the operational area that the strike force was patrolling in, essentially isolating the objective area.

As would be expected, all of this is also supported by an intelligence package. “We have our own small intelligence component that liaises with the Nigerian Army, but that has also extended its tentacles to focus on target-relevant intelligence. This ‘section’ coordinates all incoming information and intelligence and gives its intelligence product to the Nigerian Army for action,” Barlow says. A small team that focusing on targeting intelligence is the sort of task that former SADF Recce soldiers would excel at.

The hard work of the strike force and their South African partners has paid off. In late March, Boko Haram had their headquarters in Gwoza recaptured by the Nigerian military.


About the Author
Jack Murphy is an eight year Army Special Operations veteran who served as a Sniper and Team Leader in 3rd Ranger Battalion and as a Senior Weapons Sergeant on a Military Free Fall team in 5th Special Forces Group. Having left the military in 2010, he graduated from Columbia with a BA in political science. Murphy is the author of Reflexive Fire, Target Deck, Direct Action, and numerous non-fiction articles about Weapons, Tactics, Special Operations, Terrorism, and Counter-Terrorism. He has appeared in documentaries, national television, and syndicated radio.

Quelle: http://sofrep.com/40633/eeben-barlow-speak...roy-boko-haram/

[Cuga]

Danke fürs Posten, schön mal wieder etwas von ihm zu hören.

[Desert Hawk]

Wegen Totschlags im Irak

Blackwater-Söldner zu hohen Haftstrafen verurteilt

Ein Mal lebenslänglich und drei Mal 30 Jahre Haft: In Amerika sind vier ehemalige Söldner der privaten Sicherheitsfirma Blackwater verurteilt worden. 2007 hatten sie im Irak um sich geschossen und 14 Menschen getötet.

13.04.2015


Ein ehemaliges „Blackwater“-Mitglied vor dem Gericht in Washington

Fast acht Jahre nach dem Tod 14 irakischer Zivilisten in Bagdad hat ein amerikanischen Bundesgericht vier ehemalige Söldner der privaten amerikanischen Sicherheitsfirma Blackwater zu hohen Haftstrafen verurteilt.

Einer der Männer erhielt wegen Mordes lebenslänglich, die drei anderen jeweils 30 Jahre Haft wegen Totschlags. Das berichtete die „Washington Post“ am Montag. Bereits im Oktober waren die vier in Washington schuldig gesprochen worden.

Das Verbrechen hatte 2007 weltweite Empörung ausgelöst. Die Wachmänner hatten damals am belebten Nissur-Platz in Bagdad das Feuer auf eine Menschenmenge eröffnet. Dabei waren nach Angaben des Gerichts insgesamt 14 Iraker getötet und weitere 18 verletzt worden.

Der Irak hatte damals von 17 Todesopfern gesprochen. Die Wachleute hatten behaupteten, sie seien angegriffen worden. Unter den Toten waren auch Frauen und Kinder.

Quelle: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland...t-13536690.html

[Desert Hawk]

South Africa's ageing white mercenaries who helped turn tide on Boko Haram

Battle-hardened soldiers, many of them paramilitary leftovers of the apartheid regime, have pursued private wars simply to put bread on the table

David Smith Africa correspondent

Tuesday 14 April 2015 07.00 BST


One of several images distributed on social media purportedly showing South African contractors in armoured vehicles in Nigeria. Photograph: Twitter

Leon Lotz was once a member of the Koevoet – “crowbar” in Afrikaans – a paramilitary police unit created by South Africa’s apartheid regime to root out guerrillas in what is now Namibia. Thirty years later, something persuaded him to take up arms again in a foreign country. He was killed in March, apparently by friendly fire from a tank in northern Nigeria. Among the most striking facts about Lotz was his age: 59.

A wealth of media reports, witness accounts and photos on social media suggest that he is not the only white mercenary who helped turn the tide against the Islamist militant group Boko Haram in recent weeks, allowing Nigeria to hold a relatively peaceful election. Whether as technical advisers or frontline combatants, some are said to have come from the former Soviet Union but about 300 are reportedly from South Africa and nearing retirement age.

Who are the members of this dad’s army, willing to risk death abroad and prosecution at home to fight someone else’s war? What is their motivation? And are they welcomed by those they are ostensibly helping?

South Africa has a chequered history of exporting soldiers of fortune. Most belong to a generation of soldiers who felt cast aside when the Berlin Wall fell, Nelson Mandela was released and South Africa’s military needs were drastically reduced. Robbed of the only role they were trained for and unable to find alternative work, they felt alienated under a black government and pursued private wars to put bread on the table.

“Very often it’s a money issue – they haven’t done well and they need to make some,” said Jakkie Cilliers, executive director of the Institute for Security Studies in the capital, Pretoria. “It’s not ideological and it’s not the gung-ho image one has from the film Blood Diamond. This is the only skill these guys have. Most of them are in their late 50s or early 60s and trying to make a late bit of income before they’re past it. In five years’ time it won’t be an issue.”

Cilliers recently took part in an Afrikaans radio programme during which three or four mercenaries phoned in. “They said things like: ‘I’m trying to help my kids. My lifestyle is quite crappy. I’m trying to put the grandkids through school.’”

Over the past two decades such private military contractors (to use the respectable term) have gone into battle in Angola, Sierra Leone, Iraq and Afghanistan, and been linked to a failed plot to smuggle Muammar Gaddafi out of Libya.

According to those who have hired or worked alongside them, they are highly professional, skilled and battle-hardened by the South African border wars, in which they often fought alongside black comrades. The popular image of mercenaries as hard-drinking, womanising buccaneers is half a century out of date although, having grown up under white minority rule, they carry some of its baggage.

One source, who did not wish to be named, said: “Are the guys in Nigeria likely to be racist? Yes, they came from the apartheid era and no one has pressed the delete key. But they are very professional guys who get the job done.”

Several hundred South African mercenaries are still active, according to one estimate, despite the threat of criminal prosecution back home. Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, the defence minister, has said any deployment to Nigeria would be illegal under laws passed in 1998 and toughened in 2006. “They are mercenaries, whether they are training, skilling the Nigerian defence force, or scouting for them,” she was quoted as saying. “The point is they have no business to be there.”

One man who knew many of them is Simon Mann, an old Etonian former SAS officer who achieved infamy in 2004 with a bungled coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea. “I think they are very effective,” the 62-year-old said. “They certainly know what they’re doing. They’re getting on a bit now but there’s no reason why they can’t have a group of guys beneath them leaping around.”

Mann, the son of a South African mother and British father, co-founded a private military firm that fought on the government sides against rebels in Angola and Sierra Leone in the 1990s. At its peak, Executive Outcomes employed about 1,500 South African mercenaries, some of whom are alleged to be in Nigeria today.


Simon Mann, centre left, the leader of a group of foreign mercenaries arrested in Zimbabwe on charges of trying to topple the president of Equatorial Guinea, leaves court in Harare in 2003. Photograph: AFP/Getty Images

Mann recalled: “We had a large number of South African National Defence Force (SANDF) people being told that, because the African National Congress was coming to power, it was being dismantled. Some were literally being told: ‘Your pension is being torn up.’ They were pissed off and looking for work. We had something like three interested for every place we had: we were inundated.”

Mann estimates that although four-fifths were black, the officers were white, reprising the hierarchy of the pre-1994 army. “The white solders were very good and thoroughly liked and respected the black troops, but nonetheless they were white Afrikaner South Africans with everything that entails. I wouldn’t imagine it’s changed much. A leopard doesn’t change its spots.”

More than 70 South Africans were involved in the Equatorial Guinea fiasco, among them the pilot Crause Steyl, who had been working for Mann for a decade and earning $10,000 to $15,000 a month. Recalling the mercenaries he flew into war zones, the 50-year-old said: “They never spoke about exactly what they do. They kept to themselves and never walked around bragging about it. They were reserved, low-profile people. I don’t think they were getting paid more than the average British soldier. My understanding is about $400 a day.”

South Africans assisted the controversial US security company Blackwater in Iraq, Steyl added, and were now willing to do dirty work in Nigeria that western powers shirked. “The South African mercenaries are giving Boko Haram a hiding. These guys are in their 50s, but for a pilot or tank driver it doesn’t really matter. There’s going to be no Boko Haram. It boggles the mind that Britain and America promised to help Nigeria but never did.

“But the South African government doesn’t want them to exist. They wish them off the planet. When they come back from Nigeria, it will try to prosecute them and put them in jail. Because the colour of these men is white, it makes laws that stop them earning money off shore. How wrong can you be? There is now reverse racism and it’s difficult for white people to get a job.”

A recurring theme is a sense of grievance and resentment among ex-soldiers who perceive today’s South Africa as loaded against them, even though statistics consistently show that the white minority still enjoys disproportionate access to education, jobs and wealth.

Tom Wolmarans, an apartheid-era policeman, said: “There’s no work for white people in South Africa. Are they going up for money? Yes, it has a role to play because they must make a living. That’s all they can do; they are trained to do it. Some of them were laid off to early retirement. People with a hell of a lot of experience. Good soldiers.”

Wolmarans, now a ballistics expert who testified at the murder trial of Oscar Pistorius last year,said he knew two men who had gone to Nigeria to provide military training. “They are good guys, brilliant soldiers, and they do good work up there. If you look at what’s happening with Boko Haram, it’s because of the influence of good soldiers who are training people to do their job. They get results.”

South Africans retain some unique selling points to African governments, according to Helmoed Heitman, local correspondent of Jane’s Defence Weekly. They were more used to being in a scrap than American or European forces, who often came with “gold-plated” equipment, he suggested, and white South Africans were often more at ease fighting alongside black comrades than European troops would be.

“Most of the guys I know were not particularly racist or fighting for white minority rule,” he said. “They have no problem working with black guys and don’t have a racial hangup. Most people in Africa have long since realised this. What they look for is someone with real shooting experience. The old SANDF are not always liked, necessarily, but they are highly regarded.”

And the image of drunk, depressive adventurers was old hat, Heitman argued. “That may have been true of mercenaries in the sixties. The ones I know are pretty serious soldiers and family men. They’re not ones for boozy parties. There are some among them who were having booze and parties in the past but now they’re in their 50s and 60s and serious guys.”

Quelle: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/...e-on-boko-haram

Der Beitrag wurde von Desert Hawk bearbeitet: 16. Apr 2015, 10:29

[Desert Hawk]

Eeben Barlow Speaks Out (Pt. 4): Rejecting the Racial Narrative


APRIL 8, 2015, JACK MURPHY


(Featured image: Strike force members unloading ammunition.)

Like Executive Outcomes in the 1990s, STTEP faces an uphill battle against a media narrative that has accused the South African contractors of being white, racist mercenaries who helped prop up apartheid. STTEP’s chairman, Eeben Barlow, scoffs at such a notion.

“Some in the media like to refer to us as ‘racists’ or ‘apartheid soldiers’ with little knowledge of our organization,” Barlow says. “We are primarily white, black, and brown Africans who reside on this continent and are accepted as such by African governments—but as usual, us palefaces are outnumbered in the company.” Although seldom stated in the press, Executive Outcomes primarily hired black Africans, as does STTEP.

Leashing the dogs of war?

“In the dying days of apartheid, a stream of white South African ex-soldiers sought to ply their trade in conflicts abroad,” writes the Economist. “These soldiers of fortune, with experience drawn from subjugating the black majority, were an embarrassing export for the post-apartheid rulers of South Africa.”

The Economist promotes a highly agenda-driven point of view, one in which there is little more to the South African contractors aside from being white racists. But, even the STTEP’s detractors have to admit that, “Sometimes foreign mercenaries have been saviors—for instance in Sierra Leone, when a privately hired helicopter-gunship crew helped to save the capital, Freetown, from falling into the hands of hand-chopping rebels in 2000.”

Like many others, the Economist piece references South Africa’s 1998 Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act, which attempts to regulate South African private military companies. Many in the press reference this law as being enacted to specifically shut down Eeben Barlow and Executive Outcomes in the 1990s. “I wrote about this in my book,” Barlow says, referencing his memoir, “and Executive Outcomes had a South African government license to operate—something no journalist wanted to mention.”

Barlow continued, “It is ironic that when the West uses companies such as ours, they are PMCs. When African governments use an African company with a record of success in ending conflicts and wars, we are labelled ‘mercenaries.'”

The press is far from color blind

The press reported on the death of Leon Lotz, a former Koevoet operator in the South African special police combat tracking unit, however, the second STTEP employee killed in the same friendly fire incident was barely mentioned anywhere. But why?

The second employee, killed in the same vehicle as Lotz, is identified only as ‘Nangombe.’ Apparently, the liberal sensitivities of the mainstream media are such that the deaths of white contractors are reported as being the deaths of white racist mercenaries, while the deaths of black Africans working for the same company are almost never mentioned, the previously mentioned Economist article being an exception.

Vanguard and the Washington Post are two examples of media reports that reference Leon Lotz but don’t even mention the black contractors killed alongside him. “STTEP’s black team members share the same views, hardships, joys, and sorrows as we do. But, as we have learned, black deaths are almost irrelevant to those outside our company,” Barlow told SOFREP.

This is the great hypocrisy of the media machine. They pick and choose which facts to report. In this case, they only report the facts that confirm the assumptions of the journalists writing them. To report about blacks going into combat alongside whites would undermine the racial narrative they have constructed, be it through ignorance or outright lies.

“Such nonsense reporting is aimed at trying to exploit race within the company when in fact, the opposite is very evident,” Barlow explained. He also pointed out that the press hardly even mentioned the Nigerian soldiers injured in the same friendly fire incident.

Who serves in STTEP?

The true makeup of STTEP is multi-racial, with white contractors being outnumbered by blacks. Digging a bit deeper, the truth is much more interesting than the false narratives spun by the press. “We primarily recruit South Africans and Namibians who either fought with us or against us in our periods of conflict,” Barlow said, referencing South Africa’s border wars in the 1980s. STTEP actually employs reformed communist guerrillas who fought against the South African Defense Forces.

Times change, and reconciliation is possible. Barlow has incorporated some of these men into his team, “However, we have also recruited several ex-SANDF members and ex-servicemen from other nations, as we need to carry over our knowledge and approach to them,” Barlow told SOFREP. Barlow noted that the lessons learned by his men now need to be passed on to the modern South African military veterans from the South African National Defense Force.

STTEP does have standards to enforce. Even back in the days of Executive Outcomes, at least one employee had to be let go because it was discovered that he was using company logistics lines to smuggle diamonds. “We recruit by word of mouth, and anyone who transgresses our code of conduct, who does not follow our ethics, or is unable to fulfill his role, is immediately dismissed.”

STTEP’s code of conduct is as follows:

• Behave in a legal, moral, and ethical manner
• Exercise honesty, integrity, and due diligence in all tasks and responsibilities
• Comply with all national laws and regulations as well as local laws
• Respect all customs, traditions, and religions
• Safeguard government and client confidentiality
• Never compromise the trust placed in them
• Refrain from accepting or offering any improper gifts, favors, or services
• Refrain from discrimination of any kind involving national origin, race, religion, gender, age, sexual orientation, or disability

Yet, the race card is just too tempting for the press to let go of. Barlow rejects the racial narrative entirely: “Had we been the so-called racists some media whores insist on calling us, do you think any African government would even want to speak to us? I very much doubt it.” The South Africans of STTEP often find themselves pigeonholed by the media as being soldiers of the apartheid.

“We find this labeling quite hypocritical,” Barlow said, “as we never read of Bush or Blair’s ‘anti-Muslim’ armies or soldiers, nor are U.S. ex-military personnel referred to as ex-‘Republican’ or ’Democrat’ soldiers.” Having whites in Nigeria doesn’t look good, but do we prefer Boko Haram instead? Does the effective solution also have to be politically correct for polite society? If so, the war will never end.

African governments wake up

Interestingly, the United States offered a JSOC contingent to the Nigerian government to aid in rescuing the Chibok school girls, the initial task STTEP was contracted to complete, only to be rejected by President Goodluck Jonathan. More than once, Barlow has seen that when his company becomes successful in defeating anti-government forces, outside powers begin pressuring the countries he is contracted in to cease working with him and his company.

“The U.S., for example, recently used AFRICOM to pressure a potential client not to use us, and even went so far as to make veiled threats against that potential client. What conclusion can one draw from this?” Barlow asks. However, it appears that many African governments have woken up to the poor advice they have been given by third-party interlopers and are now much more accepting of the idea of working with companies like STTEP.

“Africa must, after all, start taking control of its destiny instead of having to rely on others,” Barlow insists.

About the Author
Jack Murphy is an eight year Army Special Operations veteran who served as a Sniper and Team Leader in 3rd Ranger Battalion and as a Senior Weapons Sergeant on a Military Free Fall team in 5th Special Forces Group. Having left the military in 2010, he graduated from Columbia with a BA in political science. Murphy is the author of Reflexive Fire, Target Deck, Direct Action, and numerous non-fiction articles about Weapons, Tactics, Special Operations, Terrorism, and Counter-Terrorism. He has appeared in documentaries, national television, and syndicated radio.

Quelle: http://sofrep.com/40675/eeben-barlow-speak...cial-narrative/

Der Beitrag wurde von Desert Hawk bearbeitet: 18. Apr 2015, 10:21

[Desert Hawk]

Eeben Barlow Speaks Out (Pt. 5): The External Drivers of Nigeria’s War

APRIL 13, 2015 JACK MURPHY


(Featured image: Strike Force member in Nigeria mans a MRAP mounted machine gun while a Gazelle helicopter delivers close air support on an objective.)

The second part in this series began to lay out a few of the internal drivers for Nigeria’s conflict with Boko Haram. The religious aspect is not to be overlooked, of course, but often it is poverty that attracts people to radicalism with religion acting as the rhetoric. While Islamism is a powerful movement in the Middle East and parts of Africa, at the end of the day, conflicts are fought by actors attempting to maximize the amount of power they have over a given piece of terrain. This chapter of the series will take a closer look at some of the external drivers for this conflict.

While there were plenty of motivating factors behind Nigeria’s conflict, there were also external ones such as the Libyan Civil War and the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. As the Nigerian Army, with the help of South African contractors, put Boko Haram on the ropes, Abubakr Shekau pledged his allegiance to ISIS. Interestingly, there is also a power struggle within two factions of Al-Shabab in Somalia. One faction wants to remain aligned with al-Qaeda while the other wants to pledge allegiance to ISIS.

“It did not require a nuclear physicist to predict that the collapse of Libya would result in the proliferation of weapons and conflict across North and West Africa,” Eeben Barlow, the chairman of STTEP, told SOFREP. Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment, and Protection (STTEP) provided training and combat support to a Nigerian strike force from January to March of 2015. “It is also no secret that Boko Haram has been the beneficiary of some training and equipment from ISIL,” Barlow continued. “Prisoners have told us that Boko Haram is and has been supplied and supported by ‘Europeans’ who have arrived in their safe areas by helicopter.”

What anti-government force maintains helicopters—which would allude to a state sponsor—is unknown. As usual, there are more questions than answers.

The inadvertent impact of American support in Syria

SOFREP has previously reported on American support for the Free Syrian Army (FSA). A number of covert programs have been underway for several years to arm and train members of the FSA. One such program involves transporting FSA members from Aleppo to an airfield in Turkey, where they are then flown to a Gulf state. Once there, they receive training from Americans, including how to use the TOW missile system.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QwQmO1YoR1M

The mission to vett alleged moderate rebels in Syria has been ongoing, sparking a few turf wars between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Army’s Intelligence Support Activity as contractors working within an Alternative or Compensatory Control Measures (ACCM) program were deployed to find viable partner forces in Syria. An ACCM allows information and operations to be compartmentalized on a need-to-know basis. In this way, the various participants in the program have no idea that they are working as a cog in a much larger machine.


The frontline of the Kurdish war against ISIS in northern Syria, where SOFREP reported from in November.

However, this vetting process has not been particularly effective. Accounts gathered on the ground in Syria by SOFREP this November indicate that the FSA will fight alongside ISIS, Al-Nusra, or Assad’s forces depending on which way the wind is blowing that day. It is not uncommon for them to ally with one Syrian faction during a battle and then align against them in the next battle. Furthermore, the FSA has been infiltrated by the Assad regime, meaning many groups of returning fighters will be set up to be killed after they return to Syria following their American training abroad.

Barlow explains how American support of the FSA inadvertently ends up fueling other conflicts:

“The so-called FSA is not a large homogenous grouping of anti-government people in Syria. It is a fallacy to even call it an ‘army,’ as there are several groups of armed gangs roaming Syria, doing what they please under the banner of the FSA. They are supported with funds (very large amounts) and training, and at times, equipment. When FSA rebels cross into Iraq, they become ISIL (alternate acronym for ISIS) members. This mess was, again, not considered. With the link between ISIL and Boko Haram, some of this training has made its way back to Boko Haram and other anti-Western groups in Africa. I would certainly not be surprised if some of the funding for the FSA has ended up with Boko Haram, as they certainly had money to purchase their ‘technicals.'”

Technicals are pickup trucks with machine guns mounted to the bed—the preferred mobile weapons platform in many parts of the world.

While the conflicts in the Middle East and West Africa may seem separate from one another, “one cannot view these groups as ‘isolated’ and ‘independent’ groups, as they all serve a larger interest,” Barlow says. “Before I am viewed as some conspiracy theorist, people need to understand the conflicts, the threat networks, the geo-politics and interests associated with those conflicts. The adage ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’ has long lost its relevance, and in many instances, it should be replaced with ‘my enemy’s enemy is my enemy.'”

During the 2011 Libyan Civil War, massive arms depots built up by the Gaddafi regime were captured by rebel forces. “Any sane human being would have been able to predict that the collapse of Libya held numerous disadvantages in terms of weapons proliferation,” Barlow continued. “The impact of this collapse will be felt by Africa, the Middle East, and Europe in years to come.”

“The West assisted and trained ‘rebels’ in the now ‘democratic’ Libya. Some of these rebels originated from Nigeria, but in the haste to destroy Gaddafi, no vetting or checks were carried out on who the rebels truly represented or where their loyalties lay,” Barlow said. “As is well known, many of these ‘fighters for democracy’ have found themselves in other conflicts on the side of the Islamist forces. Some of the Nigerian ‘freedom fighters’ from Libya made their way back to Nigeria. It is also a fact that weapons from Libyan and Malian arms depots made their way to Nigeria.”

These weapons were then smuggled or even openly transported from Libya to other conflict zones in North, East, and West Africa. Transportation by ancient trans-saharan trade routes has existed for several thousand years. As can be seen in the map below, one of these traditional trade routes leads straight to Lake Chad—Boko Haram territory.



The smuggling is conducted “largely by coerced and co-opted members and supporters of the enemy. In some instances, it has been by helicopter delivery to the enemy’s strongholds. We are unaware of any African-based anti-government force that flies around in helicopters,” Barlow said. “The weapons consist mainly of small arms, machine guns, explosives, and shoulder-launched anti-tank systems. However, unless the enemy is totally destroyed, it is only a matter of time before more sophisticated weaponry makes its way into Nigeria.”

War never occurs in a vacuum, but modern telecommunications infrastructure such as cellular-phone networks and the Internet allow geographically dispersed forces to align with one another when they have a common interest—groups like Boko Haram, ISIS, and Al-Shabab.

“Our focus was and will always remain Africa,” Barlow told SOFREP, “so we dig deep to understand conflicts and their drivers on our continent.”


About the Author
Jack Murphy is an eight year Army Special Operations veteran who served as a Sniper and Team Leader in 3rd Ranger Battalion and as a Senior Weapons Sergeant on a Military Free Fall team in 5th Special Forces Group. Having left the military in 2010, he graduated from Columbia with a BA in political science. Murphy is the author of Reflexive Fire, Target Deck, Direct Action, and numerous non-fiction articles about Weapons, Tactics, Special Operations, Terrorism, and Counter-Terrorism. He has appeared in documentaries, national television, and syndicated radio.

Quelle: http://sofrep.com/40700/eeben-barlow-speak...s-nigerias-war/

[Desert Hawk]

Eeben Barlow Speaks Out (Pt. 6): South African Contractors Withdrawal from Nigeria

APRIL 17, 2015 JACK MURPHY


(Featured image: The strike force prepares for an early morning advance into enemy territory.)


The South African contractors of STTEP trained and served alongside the Nigerian Strike Force in combat against Boko Haram starting in January of 2015, putting a significant dent in the terrorist organization and helping to pave the way for Nigerians trapped behind enemy lines to participate in democratic elections in late March. With their three-month contract expiring, STTEP made a controlled withdrawal from Nigeria and had all of their employees returned home by late March.

Once it was determined that their contract would not be extended, “It then became a matter of withdrawing our employees in groups whilst a skeleton crew remained in place to ensure all equipment was handed back to the army in a controlled and orderly manner,” STTEP’s chairman, Eeben Barlow, told SOFREP. “The Nigerian Air Force flew our men to a large city from where they departed Nigeria.”

When asked if STTEP successful fulfilled the services stipulated in their contract with the Nigerian government, Barlow answered, “As our contract was of a mere three month’s duration, I think we achieved the best we could with very limited resources.” The South African contractors were initially brought on to help the Nigerian military rescue the Chibok school girls who were kidnapped by Boko Haram terrorists, but as the enemy made significant advances in northern Nigeria, STTEP had to adjust their approach at the request of the Nigerian government. They were now to train the strike force to conduct “unconventional mobile warfare,” Barlow said (these tactics are detailed in a previous article). “I can only commend the training team for achieving what they did in a very short space of time,” Barlow said.

But when it came to turning the tide against Boko Haram, Barlow made it clear that, “The credit goes to the Nigerian Army, who were supported by the strike force we trained. The strike force was a force-multiplier in the area of operations.”

The strike force plowed into enemy-held terrain while the Nigerian Army sent in infantry to secure the strike force’s rear areas and sure up any gains made. As far as the punishment that the Nigerian forces dolled out to the enemy, Barlow said, “I do know that the enemy lost many of their technicals and that they suffered heavy casualties.”

But considering the impressive performance of the South African contractors and their host-nation counterparts in the Nigerian strike force, the question becomes why their contract was not extended for a further three months. While Boko Haram has been put on the ropes, they have yet to be crushed and permanently defeated.

“Obviously we, as a sub-contractor, were not privy to the decisions made regarding the contract, and we accept whatever decision the client-government makes,” Barlow said. Had the contractors overstayed their welcome, the media reports about out-of-control mercenaries would have been accurate, but the South Africans had no interest in camping out in mega-FOBs in Nigeria or occupying their host’s country.

The impact of the Nigerian elections

One factor contributing to the contractors’ withdrawal may have been the elections themselves. “The end of our three months coincided with the elections, and as is now known, a change of government. This obviously changed the political and military landscapes. With this change in government comes a change in many things, one of course being if STTEP is required or not,” Barlow said.

Another issue may have been the pressure African governments are subjected to by the international community for employing South Africans to help resolve their security issues. “Much of this pressure originated locally from the South African print media by apparent under-control journalists publishing misinformation on the company’s activities, even to the extent of claiming we were driving main battle tanks (MTBs) into battle!” Barlow is no stranger to media smear campaigns against the companies he has worked for, as Executive Outcomes came under the same pressure for their role in the Angola and Sierra Leone conflicts in the 1990s.

International institutions and academics have no shortage of consternation when it comes to the use of certain types of private military companies. Most of these individuals were educated to believe in the Westphalian system, in which the state has the only legitimate monopoly on the use of force. Of course, there have always been huge exceptions to this rule since the current global order was established, but that doesn’t seem to deter them much. Besides that, STTEP was contracted by the government of Nigeria! How this differs so much from the myriad of American private military companies who contract in Iraq and Afghanistan is hard to fathom.

If any nation is guilty of outsourcing military tasks, it’s certainly the United States. “The current market maker for modern force is the United States, as it has turned to the private sector in unprecedented ways to support its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Sean McFate writes in his recent book “The Modern Mercenary.”

“For example, the United States has relied on contractors to develop the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, even awarding DynCorp International a contract worth up to $1 billion to train the police.” McFate also references PMCs like Lincoln Group, which came under investigation for running propaganda in the Iraqi press, and Total Intelligence Solutions, which, “runs spy rings for the U.S. government overseas.”

However, some private military companies are more equal than others. Little is said in the British press about Sterling Corporate Services or in the American press about MPRI, as the scandals have mostly focused on Blackwater contractors. Ironically, the same press that cries about the atrocities committed by Boko Haram also goes ballistic when a firm like STTEP effectively helps to cut the same terrorists down to size. Agenda-driven media accounts of Barlow and his activities only exacerbate the situation.

Take, for instance, a recent article published in the Guardian, which was more than likely written in response to part four of this series in which Barlow rejects the racial narrative his company has been accused of by the press. The Guardian article is actually quite an embarrassment for the writer, David Smith, and his editors, who spin a superficial narrative about old white mercenaries fighting for profit in Nigeria. The article cites those who are far removed from the conflict, pointing out that, although they have turned the tide against Boko Haram, they’re still just a bunch of old white racists.

“The South African government has been fed such a false narrative by the South African media that it is possible they requested the Nigerian government not to extend the contract. The media here has tried very hard to turn this into a racial issue with the intent to create as much suspicion as possible,” Barlow wrote. “It is a sad day for Africa when a few in the media want to ensure a continuation of conflict as opposed to an end to it, and want to dictate who a government may use and who not.”

As for the claim that the SADF veterans are getting up there in age, Barlow doesn’t bat an eye. “Yes, many of us are no longer 20-year-olds,” Barlow told SOFREP. “However, we are all mentally and physically fit, and can hack it with our younger-generation employees. But, with our age has come knowledge of conflicts and wars in Africa they have yet to learn, a wealth of experience the youngsters do not have, and a steady hand when things get rough.” While the infantry may be a young man’s game, unconventional warfare requires a different, more mature, type of soldier.

Meanwhile, Nigeria is left to struggle with their internal security dilemmas, first among them being Boko Haram. “The enemy was not annihilated and was able to flee the battlefield with some of their forces intact, and will no doubt regroup and continue their acts of terror to enforce their political and religious philosophy,” Barlow said. “The ending of Boko Haram will be political and economical in nature, as you cannot kill an aspiration.”

The Nigerian government will have to continue to battle Boko Haram on the battlefield, but this effort will have to be done in tandem with political and economic reform in order to create a lasting peace. Barlow acknowledged this reality, arguing that military force is important, but not enough by itself. “Like elsewhere on the continent, the majority of the security problems will continue to be driven by socio-political factors and motivated at times by extremism.”

When it came to the subject of military reform in Nigeria, Barlow offered a few words of advice:

“I would like to see a reorganization of the security forces, including training to enable the security forces to pose an effective and credible deterrent to any bad guys. By reorganization, I mean a redesigning of the order of battle as African armies are merely clones of their pre-independence rulers, making them slow to react, lacking in flexibility, and relying on relative strengths. But all of this will require a refocused strategic vision and threat analysis, coupled to sound advice, training, and the correct equipment. From an equipment point of view, Africa has become the dumping ground of old, obsolete equipment that is purchased on bad advice.”

The future for the Nigerian strike force that STTEP trained is uncertain. Will it continue to operate as a highly mobile direct-action unit, or be disbanded? While STTEP and the strike force took Boko Haram down a few pegs, their final battle remains to be fought. If anything, the contractors and their Nigerian partners have provided the Nigerian government with some breathing room to institute the needed military, economic, and political reforms needed to ensure the Boko Haram is permanently neutered as a threat to the Nigerian people.

Barlow and his men demonstrated in Nigeria that it is possible to chalk up incredible successes against enemy insurgents, a vexing problem set that the American military has failed to adequately address in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere.

“To defeat such an enemy militarily, we must out-think and outsmart him by adopting tactics, techniques, and procedures that are so unexpected and unconventional that he becomes confused and loses his cohesion. That is what we tried to do with the strike force, but three months is a very short time in which to do that effectively,” Barlow said, explaining his approach to warfare—a rejection of conventional thinking that lumps such conflicts into counterinsurgency models. “However, if the Nigerian Army does not annihilate the armed Boko Haram members, the government will not be able to negotiate from a position of ultimate strength or be able to govern in a secure environment.”

About the Author
Jack Murphy is an eight year Army Special Operations veteran who served as a Sniper and Team Leader in 3rd Ranger Battalion and as a Senior Weapons Sergeant on a Military Free Fall team in 5th Special Forces Group. Having left the military in 2010, he graduated from Columbia with a BA in political science. Murphy is the author of Reflexive Fire, Target Deck, Direct Action, and numerous non-fiction articles about Weapons, Tactics, Special Operations, Terrorism, and Counter-Terrorism. He has appeared in documentaries, national television, and syndicated radio.

http://sofrep.com/40865/eeben-barlow-speak...drawal-nigeria/

[xena]

Eine sehr interessante Serie und ein Faustschlag für all die teuren und fruchtlosen offiziellen Befriedungsaktionen...

[Desert Hawk]

Zwei Wochen später hat es auch die FAZ geschaffte einen (schlechten) Artikel zur Thematik zu schreiben...

Befreiung entführter Mädchen

Die neue Schlagkraft der nigerianischen Armee

Abermals verkündet die nigerianische Armee die Befreiung Dutzender Mädchen und Frauen aus den Fängen von Boko Haram. Ihre Militäroperationen finden nun auch im Rückzugsgebiet der Islamistengruppe statt – offenbar mit Hilfe südafrikanischer Söldner.

30.04.2015, von THOMAS SCHEEN, JOHANNESBURG


Soldaten der nigerianischen Armee patrouillieren bei Chibok.

Die nigerianische Armee hat nach eigenen Angaben etwa 160 weitere Geiseln aus der Gewalt der Islamistengruppe Boko Haram befreit. Es handele sich um etwa 60 Frauen und 100 Kinder, sagte ein Militärsprecher am Donnerstag. Bei den Gefechten mit Boko-Haram-Kämpfern im Nordosten Nigerias wurden demnach eine Frau und ein Soldat getötet sowie acht Geiseln und vier Soldaten verletzt.

Erst am Dienstagabend hatte die Armee die Freilassung von mehr als 200 minderjährigen Mädchen sowie 93 erwachsenen Frauen verkündet. Bei den Befreiten soll es sich nicht um die 219 Schulmädchen aus Chibok handeln, die im vergangenen Jahr verschleppt worden waren und deren Schicksal auf der ganzen Welt für Anteilnahme gesorgt hat. Vielmehr sollen die Befreiten aus der Region am Tschadsee stammen, die bis zu der Militärintervention der tschadischen Armee im Februar unter der Kontrolle der Islamisten stand. Wie viele Mädchen und Frauen die Terroristen im vergangenen Jahr entführt und zwangsverheiratet haben, ist nicht bekannt.

Die Mädchen und Frauen sollen im Naturschutzgebiet Sambisa Forest südlich von Maiduguri, der Hauptstadt des Bundesstaates Borno, festgehalten worden sein. Maiduguri gilt als Hochburg von Boko Haram. Die nigerianische Armee teilte mit, sie habe drei befestigte Lager der Terrorgruppe in Sambisa vernichtet und dabei die Geiseln entdeckt. Der Wald von Sambisa ist mit 60.000 Quadratkilometern zweimal so groß wie Belgien und dient den Islamisten seit langem als Rückzugsgebiet. Die Schülerinnen von Chibok waren eine Zeitlang in diesem Wald vermutet worden. Zuletzt aber will eine frühere Geisel aus Maiduguri, die fliehen konnte, rund 90 der vermissten Schülerinnen in der Stadt Gwoza gesehen und gesprochen haben. In Gwoza befand sich das frühere Hauptquartier von Boko Haram, das vor wenigen Wochen von der nigerianischen Armee zurückerobert wurde. Die Islamisten hatten die Mädchen auf ihrer Flucht mitgenommen.



Dass die nigerianische Armee ihr Operationsgebiet auf den Wald von Sambisa ausdehnt, ist bemerkenswert. Seit Beginn der Offensive im Mai 2013 in den drei Bundesstaaten Borno, Adamawa und Yobe hatte sie sich nicht dort hineingewagt. Die neue Schlagkraft ist nach Einschätzung von Beobachtern in Nigeria vor allem dem Einsatz südafrikanischer Söldner geschuldet. Es handelt sich um Veteranen aus dem Angola-Krieg in den achtziger Jahren, die heute alle weit über 50 Jahre alt sind. Die Rede ist von „mehreren hundert“ Söldnern, unter denen auch ehemalige Soldaten aus Osteuropa sein sollen. Fest steht, dass es sich bei den geschätzt 100 Südafrikanern um ehemalige Mitglieder des aus dem Angola-Krieg berüchtigten „32. Battalion Buffalo“ und der in Südwestafrika (dem heutigen Namibia) eingesetzten Polizeisondereinheit „Koevoet“ (Kuhfuß) handelt. Beide Einheiten waren auf das „Aufspüren und Vernichten“ von gegnerischen Truppen im Busch spezialisiert und nahmen dabei wenig Rücksicht. Nach der Auflösung dieser Einheiten fanden viele ihrer Mitglieder ab 1989 neue Arbeit bei der ersten privaten Söldnerarmee der Welt, Executive Outcomes, in Südafrika. Executive Outcomes wurde 1999 auf Druck der südafrikanischen Regierung aufgelöst. Seit 2006 ist es für Südafrikaner zudem strafbar, sich an paramilitärischen Einsätzen im Ausland zu beteiligen.

In Nigeria scheint die Söldnerfirma aus Pretoria wiederaufzuleben. Die maßgeblichen Akteure sind dort nach übereinstimmenden Angaben die Südafrikaner Eeben Barlow und Cobus Claassens. Barlow war Kommandeur der Aufklärungseinheit des „Buffalo Battalion“ und einer der Gründer von Executive Outcomes. Claassens wiederum gilt als eine der Schlüsselfiguren bei dem Einsatz von Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone 1995. Beide betreiben in Nigeria offenbar private Sicherheitsfirmen.

Nigerianische Regierungsvertreter haben den Einsatz der Südafrikaner inzwischen zugegeben, wenngleich dabei nur von „Training“ für die eigenen Soldaten die Rede ist. Informationen aus Maiduguri, wo die Söldner am Flughafen stationiert sind, zeichnen ein anderes Bild. Demnach sind die Piloten der dort eingesetzten Kampfhubschrauber sowohl Ukrainer als auch Südafrikaner. Zudem sollen die Südafrikaner die Kommandoaktionen gegen Stützpunkte von Boko Haram anführen, deren Erfolge die nigerianische Armee stets für sich beansprucht. Das amerikanische Online-Magazin „Special Operations Forces Situation Report“ (Sofrep) will kürzlich ein Interview mit Eeben Barlow geführt haben, in dem dieser seinen Vertrag mit der nigerianischen Regierung beschreibt: „Wir verstehen halt ein oder zwei Dinge vom Krieg im Busch.“ Der Direktor des südafrikanischen Institute for Security Studies, Jakkie Cilliers, hält die Söldner in Nigeria „für eines der letzten Relikte der Apartheid“. Gleichwohl erkennt er ihre militärische Kompetenz an: „Das sind Cowboys, die es lieben, ihre Knarren zu schwingen. Aber ehrlich gesagt: Die sind richtig gut darin.“

Quelle: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland...rBildJumpTarget

[Freestyler]

Nicht moderne Söldner, sondern Söldner alter Art wie sie im Buche stehen: Die VAE setzen ca. 800 kolumbianische Söldner im Jemen ein, insgesamt dienen wohl bis 3.300 ehemalige kolumbianische Soldaten und Polizisten in den Sicherheitskräften der VAE.

So restriktiv, wie die VAE und die anderen Golfstaaten bei der Vergabe ihrer Staatsbürgerschaften sind, bezweifle ich jedoch, dass die Söldner und ihre Angehörigen wie in dem Bericht beschrieben automatisch die Staatsbürgerschaft der VAE erhalten...

Edit: Na sieh mal einer an, wir hatten das Thema vor ein paar Jahren ja schonmal

Der Beitrag wurde von Freestyler bearbeitet: 27. Oct 2015, 17:25

[Nite]

Und in Anlehnung an Desert Hawks letzten Beitrag: im Moment geistert durch die Presse dass die Südafrikaner wohl zurück in Nigeria sind.

[Freestyler]

Die New York Times hat mittlerweile auch einen Artikel zu den kolumbianischen Söldnern im Jemen publiziert:

Emirates Secretly Sends Colombian Mercenaries to Yemen Fight
The United Arab Emirates has secretly dispatched hundreds of Colombian mercenaries to Yemen to fight in that country’s raging conflict, adding a volatile new element in a complex proxy war that has drawn in the United States and Iran. It is the first combat deployment for a foreign army that the Emirates has quietly built in the desert over the past five years, according to several people currently or formerly involved with the project. The program was once managed by a private company connected to Erik Prince, the founder of Blackwater Worldwide, but the people involved in the effort said that his role ended several years ago and that it has since been run by the Emirati military.

The arrival in Yemen of 450 Latin American troops — among them are also Panamanian, Salvadoran and Chilean soldiers — adds to the chaotic stew of government armies, armed tribes, terrorist networks and Yemeni militias currently at war in the country. Earlier this year, a coalition of countries led by Saudi Arabia, including the United States, began a military campaign in Yemen against Houthi rebels who have pushed the Yemeni government out of the capital, Sana.

It is also a glimpse into the future of war. Wealthy Arab nations, particularly Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the Emirates, have in recent years embraced a more aggressive military strategy throughout the Middle East, trying to rein in the chaos unleashed by the Arab revolutions that began in late 2010. But these countries wade into the new conflicts — whether in Yemen, Syria or Libya — with militaries that are unused to sustained warfare and populations with generally little interest in military service.

“Mercenaries are an attractive option for rich countries who wish to wage war yet whose citizens may not want to fight,” said Sean McFate, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of “The Modern Mercenary.”

“The private military industry is global now,” said Mr. McFate, adding that the United States essentially “legitimized” the industry with its heavy reliance on contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan over more than a decade of war. “Latin American mercenaries are a sign of what’s to come,” he said.

The Colombian troops now in Yemen, handpicked from a brigade of some 1,800 Latin American soldiers training at an Emirati military base, were woken up in the middle of the night for their deployment to Yemen last month. They were ushered out of their barracks as their bunkmates continued sleeping, and were later issued dog tags and ranks in the Emirati military. Those left behind are now being trained to use grenade launchers and armored vehicles that Emirati troops are currently using in Yemen.

Emirati officials have made a point of recruiting Colombian troops over other Latin American soldiers because they consider the Colombians more battle tested in guerrilla warfare, having spent decades battling gunmen of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, in the jungles of Colombia.
The exact mission of the Colombians in Yemen is unclear, and one person involved in the project said it could be weeks before they saw regular combat. They join hundreds of Sudanese soldiers whom Saudi Arabia has recruited to fight there as part of the coalition. In addition, a recent United Nations report cited claims that some 400 Eritrean troops might be embedded with the Emirati soldiers in Yemen — something that, if true, could violate a United Nations resolution restricting Eritrean military activities.

The United States has also been participating in the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen, providing logistical support, including airborne refueling, to the nations conducting the airstrikes. The Pentagon has sent a team to Saudi Arabia to provide targeting intelligence to the coalition militaries that is regularly used for the airstrikes.

The Obama administration has also in recent years approved the sale of billions of dollars’ worth of military hardware from American contractors to the Saudi and Emirati militaries, equipment that is being used in the Yemen conflict. This month, the administration authorized a $1.29 billion Saudi request for thousands of bombs to replenish stocks that had been depleted by the campaign in Yemen, although American officials say that the bombs would take months to arrive and were not directly tied to the war in Yemen.

The Saudi air campaign has received widespread criticism from human rights groups as being poorly planned and as having launched strikes that indiscriminately kill Yemeni civilians and aid workers in the country. Last month, Saudi jets struck a hospital run by Doctors Without Borders in Saada Province in northern Yemen, and in late September the United Nations reported that 2,355 civilians had been killed since the campaign began in March.

On the other side in Yemen is Iran, which over the years has provided financial and military support to the Houthis, the Shiite rebel group fighting the coalition of Saudi-led Sunni nations. The divisions have created the veneer of a sectarian conflict, although Emirati troops in southern Yemen have also been battling members of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the Sunni terrorist group’s affiliate in Yemen.

Dozens of Emirati special operations troops have died since they arrived in southern Yemen in August. A single rocket attack in early September killed 45, along with several Saudi and Bahrani soldiers.

The presence of the Latin American troops is an official secret in the Emirates, and the government has made no public mention of their deployment to Yemen. Yousef Otaiba, the Emirati ambassador to Washington, declined to comment. A spokesman for United States Central Command, the military headquarters overseeing America’s involvement in the Yemen conflict, also declined to comment.

The Latin American force in the Emirates was originally conceived to carry out mostly domestic missions — guarding pipelines and other sensitive infrastructure and possibly putting down riots in the sprawling camps housing foreign workers in the Emirates — according to corporate documents, American officials and several people involved in the project.

A 2011 intelligence briefing for senior leaders involved in the project listed Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Somali pirates and domestic riots as some of the biggest threats to Emirati stability. The troops were told that they might one day be called for foreign combat missions, but until the deployment to Yemen the only external missions they were given were to provide security on commercial cargo vessels.

Those missions were rare, and soldiers involved in the project describe years of monotony at the desert camp, housed within a sprawling Emirati military base called Zayed Military City. They rise every day at 5 a.m. for exercise and military training — including shooting practice, navigation and riot control. A number of Westerners, including several Americans, live at the camp and serve as trainers for the Latin American troops.

But by late morning the sun burns so hot at the windswept complex that the troops move into air-conditioned classrooms for military instruction. The troops live in typically austere military barracks, hanging their laundry out the windows to dry in the hot air. There is a common computer room where they can check their email and Facebook pages, but they are not allowed to post photographs on social media sites. Meals are basic. “It’s the same food all the time, every day,” one member of the project said several weeks ago. “Chicken every single day.”

The Emiratis have spent the equivalent of millions of dollars equipping the unit, from firearms and armored vehicles to communications systems and night vision technology. But Emirati leaders rarely visit the camp. When they do, the troops put on tactical demonstrations, including rappelling from helicopters and driving armored dune buggies.

And yet they stay largely because of the money, receiving salaries ranging from $2,000 to $3,000 a month, compared with approximately $400 a month they would make in Colombia. Those troops who deploy to Yemen will receive an additional $1,000 per week, according to a person involved in the project and a former senior Colombian military officer.

Hundreds of Colombian troops have been trained in the Emirates since the project began in 2010 — so many that the Colombian government once tried to broker an agreement with Emirati officials to stanch the flow headed to the Persian Gulf. Representatives from the two governments met, but an agreement was never signed.

Most of the recruiting of former troops in Colombia is done by Global Enterprises, a Colombian company run by a former special operations commander named Oscar Garcia Batte. Mr. Batte is also co-commander of the brigade of Colombian troops in the Emirates, and is part of the force now deployed in Yemen.

Mr. McFate said that the steady migration of Latin American troops to the Persian Gulf had created a “gun drain” at a time when Latin American countries need soldiers in the battle against drug cartels.

But experts in Colombia said that the promise of making more money fighting for the Emirates — money that the troops send much of home to their families in Colombia — makes it hard to keep soldiers at home. “These great offers, with good salaries and insurance, got the attention of our best soldiers,” said Jaime Ruiz, the president of Colombia’s Association of Retired Armed Forces Officials. “Many of them retired from the army and left.”

The New York Times

Das hört sich schon nicht mehr so glamourös an wie in dem Artikel aus El Tiempo weiter oben und auch ein wenig so, wie historisch Söldner oft angeworben wurden: mit falschen Versprechungen über ihren Einsatz, ihre Verpflegung usw.

Der Beitrag wurde von Freestyler bearbeitet: 26. Nov 2015, 11:36

[Hummingbird]

The Blackwater of Jihad
A consortium of elite, well-paid fighters from across the former Soviet Union are training jihadis in Syria. Their business model could go global.

By Rao Komar, Christian Borys, Eric Woods

https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/10/the-wo...lhama-tactical/