Das soll kein Bilderthread werden, aber...
Schlottmann: Updated maps and assessment with insets for NW Kyiv, Mykolaiv/Kherson area, and SE Ukraine as of 20 March. Static in N and E. Limited Russian/separatist gains in S still threaten possible encirclement, but this is dependent on remaining Russian offensive potential. List of major changes 1. Added 29th CAA, only one brigade currently deployed 2. Added 49th CAA, identified units through going through previous reports and new vehicle losses 3. Added 47th GTD (~2 BTGs effective), previously on 1st GTA axis 4. Colorcoded separatist forces (pink)
Kofmann: Thoughts on the current state of the war and where things might be heading. About 2 weeks ago I suggested that Russian forces have ~3 weeks before combat effectiveness becomes increasingly exhausted. I think that's generally been right, but we're not quite there yet. The war has broken down into what could imperfectly be called three fronts, and Russian advances have stalled out along two of them. Around Kyiv RU forces are trying to consolidate positions, but I don't think they can make an assault on the city. Kyiv is far from encircled. In the southwest there was a fitful advance around Mykolaiv towards Odesa that had little chance of success given the paucity of forces employed. This has been set back by a UKR counter offensive. I expect little progress there for either side and more of a shifting front. This means we're not going to see an amphibious landing at Odesa, or a Russian march to Transnistria, anytime soon (if ever). At least not in this phase of the war. However, Russian advances towards Kryvyi Rih do threaten UKR lines of communications west of the river.
The area to watch in the coming week is the Russian attempt to encircle UKR forces in the JFO. A slowly progressing pincer movement from the north and south (using Nathan Ruser's map). This is where UKR forces could be in a precarious position. Since inception the Russian military effort has lacked focus. Too few forces, on too many axes of advance, some competing with each other. I think in the next two weeks they are likely to concentrate on UKR forces in the east and the battle for Mariupol. 6/
I suspect unrealistic political aims & timetables have driven an unsound mil strategy. Kyiv, Odesa, Donbas, etc. There's a desperation to show progress. Increasingly it looks as though the Russian mil is focusing on the Donbas, and maintaining along other fronts. Depreciating combat effectiveness sets the stage for either a significant operational pause along most fronts or a ceasefire. This does not necessarily imply a political settlement, but a period to reorganize, consolidate, and resupply. An end to the first chapter of this war.
I think Moscow is searching for something it can use to declare a victory. Taking the Donbas, and having leverage to attain concessions from Kyiv is probably what they're looking to accomplish at this point. This is at best a guess. Much depends on what Putin knows and thinks about the course of the war, and whether he feels pressured at home. Our impression of the war & reality on the ground might be quite different from his. Its not clear he understands what the prospects for Russian success are. Naturally there is uncertainty about the state of Russian armed forces along different parts of the battlefield, its bound to be uneven, and we know even less about the state of Ukrainian forces.
The next chapter in this war could prove even uglier as it will likely turn into a war of attrition, with greater bombardment of civilian areas. Here I am more concerned about the future evolution of this conflict, despite the remarkably poor Russian performance thus far. Generally, I don't see how any military success can add up to something that constitutes a political victory for Moscow. If there is another phase, Russian forces will probably try to compensate for poor performance by inflicting greater destruction. Worth noting, the Russian military is interpreting 'demilitarization' quite literally as a secondary goal in this conflict, going after Ukraine's defense industry and key military infrastructure. It seems they want to substantially degrade Ukraine's military potential. Has the war entered a stalemate? Yes and no. Russian forces may make slow, incremental advances in the Donbas. I suspect UKR military can hold on most fronts and perhaps even counter attack on others. However, attrition is undoubtedly taking its toll on both sides. In general I've tried to be cautious in rendering predictions because I think we don't know if this point in the conflict is near the beginning, the middle, or the end of the war. Few things are as contingent and indeterminate.
J. of the West: 1/ Ukrainian Theater of War, Day 24: There has been little change to the overall strategic situation in the past 24 hrs. Russian forces remain static and appear to be transitioning to defensive operations, signaling a change in the character of the war. Today’s update will focus on the Kharkiv-Donbas area, providing a brief overview of the three critical areas of Kharkiv, the Donets River, and Mariupol. This is meant to set conditions for a more in-depth study of each AO as the war enters a protracted campaign.
Humanitarian Impact. Refugees in various European countries exceeds 4.2 million, with over 1.85 million IDPs, mostly in western Ukraine. Humanitarian corridors continue to be interdicted, blocked, or attacked by Russian forces. Weather assessment. In Donbas region, visibility and wind speed are favorable for VKS and the UAF to execute aerospace operations. Temperatures generally will remain between 10/-5 C, with rain showers latter in the week making river crossings impracticable. Kharkiv and Donbas AO assessments. There has been no change to the situation in eastern Ukraine over the past 24 hours. Russian forces still face difficulty in overcoming Ukrainian defenses on the Donets River, yet they are not an insurmountable obstacle. Kharkiv Area. Russian forces do not possess the material capability, logistical reach, or tactical acumen to assault and seize Kharkiv. The only operationally sound course of action is to contain Ukrainian forces in the Kharkiv area with aviation and UAV strikes. Kharkiv will remain in Ukrainian hands for the foreseeable future. It does not appear the Russians have the desire to conduct a Mariupol-style siege on the city, this is simply beyond the means of the Russian military to do at the present time.
Donets River Line. Russian attacks along the Donets River have failed. Although the Russians can make small-scale tactical assaults and gain some ground, they do not have sufficient combat power to penetrate prepared Ukrainian defenses and push toward Sloviansk. Events on the Donets River Line will be the clearest indication of Russian success or failure in eastern Ukraine. Even if Mariupol falls Ukrainian forces are still in an advantageous position to maintain the Donbas defense, unless the Russians can penetrate south of the Donets
Siege of Mariupol. The Russian & Separatist assault of Mariupol has been a mix of standard Russian practice toward seizing an urban area and siege tactics learned from operations in Syria targeting the civilian population to coerce surrender. The fall of Mariupol is an unfortunate inevitability, that is if the Ukrainian military does not mount a serious counteroffensive to relieve the city. The closest Ukrainian forces are 100km away and would require a serious effort with a considerable number of forces.
Aerospace Assessment. In the Donbas, attack aviation may come to play a larger role to reduce VKS fixed-wing losses as well as allow for reallocation of fixed-wing sorties against higher value political targets. Tomorrow’s update will focus on the Kyiv Area of Operations. I will soon post an in-depth look at the first month of the war, analyzing how the Ukrainian response to the Russian invasion resulted in a strategic victory for Ukraine & why the Russian military has so far failed. These maps have been created by me based off the most reliable information of activity in the Ukrainian Theater of War from a variety of sources. Errors will be corrected as soon as they are identified. Information regarding Ukrainian units are meant to be general, are based on Ukrainian General Staff statements and social media posts, official Ukrainian government press releases, and local news. It does not depict current unit movements.
General aD Ryan: Week 4 of the Russian invasion of #Ukraine. Today I examine what culmination (current or pending) of Russian forces in Ukraine means. Back on 15 March, I wrote that “The Russian campaign, if it has not already, is about to culminate.” In the past 48 hours, there has been a growing consensus that this has either occurred or may occur soon. US doctrine defines culmination as “the point at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause.” But this is not the end of the war, just a pause. Think November 1914, not November 1918 if you want to use WW1 as an example. The waste of human life at the Somme and Verdun all came well after 1914.
Without any substantive breakthroughs in peace negotiations, the war may enter a new phase. Therefore, what does the proposition that the Russians have culminated mean for Russia, Ukraine and the west? First, what might it mean for how Russia may rethink their strategic objectives and how they fight the war? As I have recently written in @smh, it might force Putin to reset his objectives for Ukraine. At a minimum, he will be gathering his small circle of advisors to ascertain what might be achieved after a pause, and what resources would be required. smh.com.au/national/putin… Noting the commitment of over half of Russia’s ground forces so far, this new ‘theory of victory’ may include some form of national mobilisation of personnel and industry. They may also ‘shut down’ one of their fronts in the east or south to reinforce the north.
This would allow them to fix their collapsing tactical and operational logistics system. When picking which part of the Russian military has performed worst in the last month, the Army, the Air Force and the logistic services are all in a close race! An operational pause might also give Putin time to build a domestic constituency for the war. He did not do so before the war. While this would now be a very big task, it is not inconceivable that he could build support for the war among a larger proportion of Russia. Russia may choose a strategy of attrition. While this broadly works in Russia’s favour, it is worth noting that it is fighting alone in a tightening sanction framework. The US & other nations are pouring weapons & resources into Ukraine & can do so for a long time to come.
However, many nations facing worse odds have continued fighting long after it made sense to do so. Just because we think that the resources of the West totally outweigh those available to Russia, it doesn’t mean that this logic is compelling to Putin. Russian forces might therefore settle in for long term sieges of Ukrainian cities (think Sarajevo), without ground assaults to capture them. This would be ‘attrition from afar’ for Russian forces. This might force the Ukrainians onto the offensive against prepared Russian defences. It would require a change of strategy and tactics from the Ukrainians. They have done very well on the defensive so far – how would they perform on the offensive. What if Russia does not choose long-term attrition? They may decide to escalate the war, including attacks beyond Ukraine’s borders on the bases that are supplying Ukraine’s defenders. Or it might target border crossing locations where weapons enter Ukraine. What other options does it have? It might seek a breakthrough with a weapon of mass destruction to destroy a portion of the Ukrainian government and military, or to shock it into submission. Russia has a range of weapons it could use in this scenario. This includes tactical nuclear weapons, radiological weapons, massive drone swarms, destructive cyber-attacks, chemical or biological weapons or EMP weapons. Or a combination of the above.
The point is that although Russia has been out fought and out thought by the Ukrainians, this only makes them – and Putin – more dangerous. What might a Russian pause mean for Ukraine? It provides breathing space for reorganising its defences, training new recruits & getting its people out of threatened cities. It also allows time for the Ukrainian government and military rethink their strategy. It also allows for a build-up of supplies (lethal and non-lethal) by the military for the next series of Russian offensives (they will come) as well as for the Government to stockpile food, fuel and other necessities to keep their society functioning.
Finally, a Russian operational pause would provide time for President Zelensky to rest, think and consult more widely about war termination, and what kinds of agreements would be acceptable with Russia. Wars only end through political agreements. What does it mean for the other nations? It provides time for sanctions to work against Russia. It gives NATO the opportunity to explore a wider range of weapons and supplies to provide to the Ukrainians. Finally, any break in the fighting would allow non-government organisations time to expand support to displaced Ukrainians, and potentially, enter besieged cities to provide aid. It would also permit 3rd parties to explore options for peace negotiations. Any culmination or pause in Russia's Ukraine operations is not cause for celebration. Russia will not give up its aspirations that easily, despite military failures and external pressure. Indeed, the most dangerous phase of the war may be ahead. End.
Nexta: Ukrainian media report that the wife of former MP Kotvytskyy tried to take $28 million and 1.3 million euros out of #Ukraine via #Zakarpattya. The money was found by the #Hungarian border guards and forced to declare it.
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