Bergkarabach-Konflikt, ausgelagert aus den PuG-News Einstellungen

[Fennek]

Einige Zeitungen berichten über eine schleichende Eskalation des Bergkarabach-Konfliktes in Armenien/Aserbaidschan im Schatten all der anderen Konflikte. Die Präsidenten Azerbaidschans und Armeniens trafen sich am Wochenende in Bern zu einem ergebnislosen Krisengipfel unter Vermittlung der OSZE, im direkten Vorfeld ist es diesen Monat wohl zu deutlich heftigeren Schusswechseln an der Grenze gekommen als üblich. Es gab scheinbar Panzer- und Artillerieeinsatz von aserbaidschanischer Seite, dem Vernehmen nach zum ersten mal überhaupt seit dem Waffenstillstand 1994.

Militärisch finde ich seltsam, dass Russland sich als Schutzmacht Armeniens versteht, aber in den vergangenen Jahren fleißigst Waffen an Azerbaidschan verkauft hat. T-90, BMP-3, Msta-S, TOS-1A, S-300. Azerbaidschan hat sich in den vergangenen Jahren fast jedes moderne (Land-)Waffensystem gekauft, dass die russische Rüstungsindustrie anbietet, und Russland hat eifrig verkauft. Das ist doch kurios, wenn praktisch der erklärte Zweck dieser Waffensysteme der Krieg gegen einen Verbündeten des Verkäufers ist. Dazu sei gesagt, Aserbaidschan hat auch bei anderen Anbietern fleißig einkaufte.

Schweres Geschütz im Karabach-Konflikt
Berg-Karabach Keine Entspannung zwischen Armenien und Aserbaidschan

[Glorfindel]

Bellingcat hat einen Artikel über die Kämpfe von Anfangs April veröffentlicht. Ein paar Passagen:

On April 2nd, Armenia was caught off guard. (...) the large scale indiscriminate bombing of civilian populations in villages on the frontline changed the character of the conflict.

despite the potential firepower both countries have at their disposal, the war has been contained to the battle arena near the frontier villages. Both countries are bound by doctrines to ensure that the war does not draw in their reserves or, more importantly, major regional and global powers. For this reason, Armenia did not strike any key infrastructure behind the Azerbaijani frontline – a last resort in Armenia’s defense posture. Azerbaijan similarly limited its bombing to the frontier villages, and reports confirm that Stepanakert was not hit.

Azerbaijan successfully entered the outskirts of the village of Talish on the first day of fighting, with Karabagh’s conscript soldiers holding the front against Azerbaijan’s superior Special Forces. (...) Azerbaijan’s low-level tank incursion into the region tested Armenian anti-tank skills. Bellingcat has information that anti-tank battalions were utilised by Karabagh, as a number of Karabagh’s fatalities have been linked to various Special Forces for the battle of the heights overlooking Talish from the North and North East. (...) Nevertheless, the Azerbaijani military offensive was quickly slowed down. Karabagh’s forces began taking control of the battlefield and, by April 3rd, the area around Talish had come back under their full control. However, they were still far from their goal of regaining all the lost posts, and the fighting continued in this battlefield until April 4th.

The withdrawal of Karabagh forces to the second line was a deliberate strategy aimed at opening up a clear firing ground for high precision artillery strikes into Karabagh trenches now occupied by Azerbaijani Special Forces. Forfeiting parts of the first line allowed them to secure the second lines and to ensure effective rebuff of Azerbaijani attacks and oncoming troop movement. Subsequently, trenches in Karabagh now occupied by Azerbaijan came under heavy fire from the Armenian side. So, while Karabagh’s armed forces lost up to 8 posts within the first two days of fighting,[vii], Azerbaijani Special Forces came under heavy bombardment in the newly seized trenches and were soon under siege as they were surrounded by Karabagh armed forces. Karabagh used carefully planned flanking tactics to ensure heavy losses against a more powerful opposition. This clearly explains the huge material and personnel losses on the Azerbaijani side.

By the end of April 4th, the Karabagh forces had pushed back the Azeri offensive and were in control of most of the posts lost during the first 2 days of fighting. The tactic of retreat, bombardment and flanking employed by the Karabagh forces ensured that the conscript Karabagh army was able to hold off the major initial thrust from Azerbaijani Special Forces, with Karabagh Special Forces following through to begin sweep up operations and retake seized trenches and villages.

Another issue for Karabagh has been the overwhelming number of volunteers from Armenia and the Armenian diaspora heading to Stepanakert join the war effort, creating a potential logistical nightmare for the Karabagh forces and for the state. As a result, volunteer recruitment was quickly limited to highly trained individuals and groups.

Das irgendwelche Freiwillige, welche sich melden, eher ein Problem sind als irgendwie nützlich, ist absolut verständlich. Afaik haben die Streitrkräfte von Berg Karabach auch keine allgemeine Mobilisierung von Reservisten angeordnet.

The Karabagh government has admitted to the loss of two “unimportant” posts, though Bellingcat has determined that an unknown number of other posts are still under Azerbaijani control. Bellingcat’s analysis also deduces that the Southern post of Lele Tepe[xv] is a vital strategic point for Karabagh, which means that gaining this post has been a strategic victory for Azerbaijan, providing its forces with open ground of one kilometre in length from which to fire into Karabagh in future battles.

https://www.google.ch/maps/place/F%C3%BCzul...#33;6m1!1e1
Die bisherigen vordersten Linien der Aseris sollen sich rund hundert Meter südlich der Anhöhe befunden haben.

While the battle plans of both countries were sophisticated and well executed, the loss of personnel was greater than anticipated, especially on the Azerbaijani side. The ratio of Azerbaijani human and material loss versus territorial gain was high, especially in the light Azerbaijan only partially achieving in its goal of taking strategic posts.

By day 4 (Anmerkung: 5. April), Azerbaijan had lost all but two posts from their initial thrust. Azerbaijan’s military offensive and strong tactical planning were offset by a sophisticated defensive response by Karabagh forces. April 4th (müsste vermutlich 5. April heissen)was the last day of heavy fighting, with Karabagh forces managing to disengage artillery and grad strikes and concentrating their efforts on retaking the two remaining posts.

Diese beiden Posten konnten dann nicht mehr zurück erobert werden, weil der Waffenstillstand in Kraft trat. Zu dieser Lala Tepe-Anhöhe ist zu sagen, dass es sich tatsächlich um eine dom
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-wor...aghs-frontline/

Der Beitrag wurde von Glorfindel bearbeitet: 13. Apr 2016, 09:23