ZITAT(techol2002 @ 10. May 2010, 12:14)

"At the same time, numerous IDF tanks were hit by Sagger antitank missiles, wounding many of the tank crewmen."

With the high ground presumably secure, 24 tanks of Brigade 401 began crossing the Wadi al-Saluki. Soon after moving forward, the two lead tanks in the column found their route blocked by a collapsed building. As the tanks searched for another crossing point, a large IED or mine exploded behind them, collapsing the road. At precisely the same moment, a Hezbollah Kornet laser-guided antitank missile slammed into a company commander’s Merkava, killing him and the entire crew. Within seconds, swarms of antitank missiles assailed the tank column. Amazingly, the IDF reported that every single tank crew in the Wadi failed to use the smoke screen system on their tanks to help protect them from the deadly missiles. One of the ambushed tank crewmen recalled, “When the first tank was hit, we knew that the nightmare had begun. You should understand that the first missile which hits is not the really dangerous missile. The ones which come afterward are the dangerous ones—and there always follow four or five after the first. . . . It was hellfire, and have no idea when it will get you. You just pray that it will end at last, that the volley will end and that you will hear on the radio that everybody is OK. But, unfortunately, that is not what we heard when the shooting ended, no sir!”

Pinned down by Hezbollah antitank missiles, direct-fire weapons, and mortars, the infantry soldiers of the Nahal Brigade were hard pressed to lend support to the tank column. “We thought that we were entering the Saluki after the area had been cleaned up, but then the terrorists came out of the houses and hiding places and started shooting at us as if we [were] in a shooting range,” another tank crewman remembered. Incredibly, there was no coordination whatsoever between the infantry and the tanks, and frantic calls from the trapped tank command for artillery and air support were denied by Northern Command due to concerns over fratricide.

By the time the ambush ended, 11 of the 24 Merkava 4 tanks in Wadi al-Saluki had been hit by antitank missiles. Eight tank crewmen and four infantrymen were killed. Although the exact number of wounded is not yet established, both the battalion commander and his deputy in the tank column suffered injuries.

Lessons learned

Modern, mechanized forces are still in peril when committed to fight guerrillas in the middle of a civil war on rugged terrain. The Soviet-Afghanistan war demonstrated that:

1. A guerrilla war is not a war of technology versus peasantry. Rather, it is a contest of endurance and national will. The side with the greatest moral commitment (ideological, religious or patriotic) will hold the ground at the end of the conflict. Battlefield victory can be almost irrelevant, since victory is often determined by morale, obstinacy and survival.
2. Secure logistics and secure lines of communication are essential for the guerrilla and non-guerrilla force. Security missions, however, can tie up most of a conventional force.
3. Weapons systems, field gear, communications equipment and transport which are designed for conventional war will often work less effectively or fail completely on rugged terrain.
4. Tactics for conventional war will not work against guerrillas. Forces need to be reequipped, restructured and retrained for fighting guerrillas or for fighting as guerrillas. The most effective combatants are light infantry.
5. Tanks have a limited utility for the counter-guerrilla force, but can serve as an effective reserve on the right terrain. Infantry fighting vehicles and helicopters can play an important role in mobility and fire support. Mechanized forces usually fight effectively only when dismounted and when using their carriers for support or as a maneuver reserve. Ample engineer troops are essential for both side.
6. Field sanitation, immunization and preventive medicine are of paramount importance in less-than-optimal sanitary conditions. Immediate medical support to wounded combatants is often hard to provide.
7. Journalists and television cameramen are key players in guerrilla warfare. The successful struggle can be effectively aided when championed by a significant portion of the world's press.
8. Logistics determines the scope of activity and size of force either side can field.
9. Unity of command is very important, yet sometimes impossible to achieve.
10. Domination of the air is irrelevant unless airpower can be precisely targetted. Seizure of terrain can be advantageous, but is usually only of temporary value. Control of the cities can be a plus, but can also prove a detriment. Support of the population is essential for the winning side.