Ein versöhnlicher Vorschlag: Vielleicht können wir die Position des Anderen auch einfach mal so gelten lassen....

Kosten: Anschaffung und CPFH auf etwa gleichem Niveau
Verfügbarkeit: LM kann die Produktion der F-35A hochfahren, damit ist sie genauso verfügbar

The USAF estimates that the transition time from an F-15 squadron to an F-35 squadron takes roughly 18 months for an active duty squadron and 36 months for an Air National Guard squadron. It estimates that six months or less will be required to transition from the F-15C to the F-15EX.

The transition period takes aircraft out of the USAF inventory, hurting its average readiness rates, which would be contrary to former Secretary of Defense James Mattis's goal of increasing this metric to above 80%.

EDITORIAL: Fighter Math

April 2019
Tobias Naegele
Editor in Chief

An F-15 will never be an F-35.

Today’s Air Force has too few squadrons, people, and planes to meet the requirements demanded by our National Defense Strategy, and the Pentagon’s 2020 budget request doesn’t do enough to address the shortfall.

[...]
The reason this is a hot topic today is that current F-15Cs will be 44 years old in 2030. They can’t make it that long. But buying the F-15EX—a “new, old airplane”—is hardly the solution. That’s a 30-year fix to a 10-year problem.

The wiser course is to buy more F-35s more quickly. Instead of a short-term solution that presents a new long-term liability, accelerating the shift to 5th generation aircraft improves the long-term outlook for the fighter fleet.
[...]
Critics will counter that stealth is expensive and the cost of operating low-observable aircraft remains too high. That’s only true if you look at airplanes as one-for-one replacements. In reality, stealth reduces the number of aircraft needed to accomplish the same mission.

1 F-35A ≠ 1 F-15EX

When one plane can do the job of six or eight or 12—depending on the mission—the cost per desired effect declines precipitously. That single plane, pilot, and maintainer crew will never be as costly as the dozen legacy aircraft and all the people needed to support them.
[...]
The difference between the Air Force “we have” and the Air Force “we need” boils down to this: The Air Force needs 72 new fighters a year to sustain a lethal, fighting force. Until something better is developed, the F-35 is the best plane for the money. Expressed mathematically, we can say unequivocally:

F-35 > F-15EX

Fortunately, the Pentagon does not get the final word. Congress has a chance to do the right thing: Say, “no” to F-15EX. Say, “yes” to more F-35s.

http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive...ghter-Math.aspx

Last fall, the Pentagon’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office recommended that the Air Force buy a mix of F-35s and an in-production fourth-generation fighter — a candidate pool that includes the F-16, F-15, and Boeing’s F/A-18. By mid-October, the Air Force agreed, and picked the F-15.

Nicht verwandt oder verschwägert mit dem Autor ?

Here’s a much better solution: Congress shifts the money from F-15EX to increase F-35A production. Of note, the Air Force’s unfunded priority list for FY 2020 includes an additional 12 F-35As. By increasing F-35 production from 48/yr. to 60/yr. in 2020, then 78-80 beyond 2020, the Air Force could have an additional 108 F-35s by 2023/24 instead of an anemic additional 8 F-15EXs.

the jet is intended t directly replace the USAF's entire F-15C/D fleet. It would have no impact on the existing F-15E Strike Eagle fleet or its planned upgrade pathway that is underway now.

Currently, the F-15C/D force is largely arrayed along America's maritime borders, with five Air National Guard units flying the type. A squadron at RAF Lakenheath in England and two squadrons at Kadena Air Base in Japan round out the full front-line force

it includes a flat-panel glass cockpit, JHMCS II helmet mounted display (HMD), revised internal wing structure, fly-by-wire controls, APG-82 AESA radar, activation of outer wing stations one and nine, advanced mission computer, low-profile heads-up display, updated radio and satellite communications, the highly advanced Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS) electronic warfare and electronic surveillance suite, Legion Pod-mounted infrared search and track system (IRST) and the list goes on.

Speaking at the company's St Louis facility in Missouri, Prat Kumar, Boeing's vice-president and programme manager for the F-15 programme, said that with a live Advanced Eagle production line already running for Saudi Arabia and shortly for Qatar, Boeing could deliver the first aircraft to the USAF "early next year", rather than in 2022 as the service has previously stated.

We could start deliveries in early 2020 if the USAF decides. It is the difference between the USAF planning documents, which are conservative, and what is possible," Kumar told reporters on 14 May.

The USAF requested an initial eight F-15EXs in its fiscal year 2020 (FY 2020) budget request and is expected to request 18 aircraft annually from FY 2021-24. The air force said the USD1.1 billion it requested in FY 2020 for the F-15EX would also procure associated production factory tooling, systems

Sehr interessante Meinung, warum man der F-35 in der weiteren Beschaffung der IAF vorerst den Vorzug gegeben hat und die F-15EX bislang nicht erwähnt. Hier wird spekuliert, dass man auf die sich andeutenden Überschüsse der zweisitzigen F-15 D der USAF aus guten Gründen schielen könnte.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/39756...because-of-this

Verstehe ich nicht - Israel betreibt gerade mal 58 F-15, davon sind knapp die Hälfte Zweisitzer. Wollte man auch die restlichen Lfz durch Zweisitzer ersetzen und ggf. die Flotte etwas ausbauen, bräuchte man deutlich weniger als durch die (derzeit) 144 für die USAF vorgesehenen F-15EX freiwerdenden F-15D.