Danke, sehr interessant. Sind die "1,500 tons of hydrogen peroxide mixed with kerosene" ein Schreibfehler?

1,5 t Treibstoffe können bei einem Gesamtgewicht von gut 4 t durchaus angehen. Die Nullen müssen nicht sein

Late Putinism – the nature of the state
Putin came to power in 1999-2000 and assumed a legal-rational (‘dictatorship of the rule of law’) legitimation of his political authority. By 2011-2012, a shift was underway, from legal-rational to historical-charismatic (“No Putin, no Russia”) legitimation. By 2020-21, Putin legitimizes his political authority increasingly through national-patriotic mobilization and coercion, and Putin presides over a fully-fledged authoritarian regime and police state. Core characteristics of the regime include:

• an absence of a rotation of power and the presence of an imperial bureaucracy and enlarged military and security service sector;
• a lack of any liberal or democratic impulses or even an authoritarian modernization project, i.e. late Putinism lacks a vision of the future;
• a marketing of external and internal threats to bind a passive, conformist, indifferent and apathetic majority of the population to the state to legitimise the regime and keep it safe;
• the all pervasive presence of the state which manifests itself by praetorian guard capitalism, an economy marked by a low dynamic, reflecting the lack of a law-based state, high levels of raiding, and a disproportionate allocation of resources for prestige state projects;
• securitization of the political space and civil society, resulting in generational gaps where the views of active 18-24 year olds on Navalny and ‘foreign agents’ differ from those − more passive and conformist − in their 50s and 60s, but conservatism is a dominant trend in both generations;
• shrinking opportunities for change in the name of stability, characteristics include the lack of a positive agenda, which is a problem because repression of the opposition and wider civil society is not the same as mobilizing supporters around a compelling vision of the future.

Civil Society

• The regime has criminalized not only political, but also civic activity. As a result, civil society is being politicized, with Navalny a symbol of moral resistance to the regime.
• A broken social contract and high levels of corruption drive the opposition and animate civil society protest. Although Levada surveys indicate that 41% of respondents in 2017 wanted radical change and that in 2019 that number had risen to 57%, this indicates a declaration of a desire for change but not the expectation that change will be forthcoming.
• The State’s response is to try and make Navalny a person of the past by keeping him incommunicado and arresting team Navalny and other non-systemic opposition soft targets. Calibrated responses by the authorities attempt to manage the situation and prevent a mobilization, hardening and crystallization of the opposition.
• Pensions and pandemic (but not yet Putin) rather than economic mismanagement elicit a psycho-emotional opposition to the regime. Putin the president remains, in the eyes of “his” majority, the unquestioned symbol of national unity; Putin the politician—i.e., the specific actions that he takes and the officials whom he appoints—is perceived as fallible. Nevertheless, ‘rational conformism’ results in the Putin majority voting for Putin approved candidates.
• In the upcoming September Duma elections, ‘smart’ voting (direct votes to whichever candidate can beat United Russia) will have the unintended effect of giving the impression of political pluralism in Russia, whereas in fact all systemic opposition parties (and only these parties will be registered) are controlled by the state.

Securitocracy
This strata of law enforcement agencies, prosecuting bodies and the security service are not a monolithic bloc but one within which fluid alignments and rivalries proliferate:

• Institutional factional rivalries exist, for example, between the Interior Ministry and police who resent OMON and the National Guard (NG) – the police resent having had to clean up after NG deployments and having been provided early access to vaccination and preferential equipment;
• The temporary alliances are formed. For example, even alliances forged between NG and FSB, who are in the vanguard of repression, have their limits. An example of this is the FSB’s veto of the NG’s attempts to create its own investigation committee, as this was perceived to encroach on the power of the FSB;
• The newly appointed first deputy director of the FSB, Sergei Korolev, has a very unsentimental view of those above him in the chain of command.

The Orthodox chekist mindset of the securitocracy is one of defensiveness, ever more repressive and non-responsive to public opinion. The managers of the authoritarian system, including or above all the siloviki, do not fear a radical democratic breakthrough resulting from mass protest, but worry about the accumulated friction and costs imposed on them in their role as managers of stability. They feel embattled and defensive and so embrace entrenchment. Managers want to hold on to power and money (not just control but continue to own the country’s resources) at all cost.

Reforms or any kind of modernization (even economic) are not possible under Putin; any modernization puts in question the very foundations of his system. Only small changes are possible from within with the help of relatively young appointees − technocrats controlled by the siloviki, who formulate real political priorities. As Putin has completed the nationalization of elites, technocrats are beholden to and hostages of Putin. Take, for instance, the example of Sergei Kiriyenko, leader of the political bloc and first deputy chief of staff of the presidential administration – he is now bound to Putin for the rest of his career. As a result, an elite conspiracy in the shape of a ‘palace coup’ against Putin is not possible. As the breakup of the FSB would be one of the first reforms in a democratic break-through scenario, Bortnikov, Ivanov and Patrushchev (current and former FSB directors) will resist any regime change until the end.

Disruptive unknowns include regional debt defaults; technological breakthroughs that can undercut Russia’s commodities export business model; and political blunders (such as the Navalny botched Novichok assassination attempt).

Foreign Policy Implications

• Navalny and protests in Russia undercut Putin’s attempts to ease Lukashenka out of power under the cover of constitutional change and reform. Putin is hostage to his rhetoric on western containment and protest as ‘color revolution’. Lukashenka instrumentalises this to his advantage (‘we can’t bow to the street and western security service manipulation’).
• Generally, foreign policy has lost the ability to unify and animate Putin’s majority, but under some scenarios we may see foreign adventurism, especially those involving reactions to perceived external threats:
• If Kyiv launched a military campaign to retake the Donbas, Moscow would feel it had no option but to punch back and that it could use this opportunity to push further. This would be another example of ‘offensive defensiveness’ in response to a perceived existential challenge to Russian credibility.
• If the Belarus opposition turned violent Putin could and most likely would intervene militarily.
• In general, however, there are likely to be only low cost moves useful for public consumption. An example would be Russian anti-piracy operations off the coast of Sudan to demonstrate Russia’s global role.
• Russia is not so ‘post-post imperial’ as Dmitry Trenin and Vladimir Frolov have suggested, focused on rational, non-ideological, pragmatic costs/benefits calculations. Russia is still imperial in outlook. Putin perceives himself as Tsar of Eurasia and seeks to create a quasi-empire out of the non-recognized states on Russia’s periphery.
• Confrontation with the U.S. is the norm; relations with the EU have deteriorated to a record low and will continue to remain there; and offensive cyber operations as well as active measures will continue. Offering concessions to Russia in the name of pragmatic and flexible cooperation will not alleviate Russia’s narrative of western encroachment, encirclement and containment. The West does not have to confirm Russia’s claim to Great Power status as it defines it. Russia’s placing of its own interests above the sovereignty of neighboring states is neither aligned with Western national interest nor its democratic norms and values.

Critical Thresholds and Drivers of Change
As Russians are habituated to the circumstances and rules of an authoritarian political regime, a democratic breakthrough precipitated by street protests is highly unlikely. It is still possible to envisage a more practical and realistic evolution of change – one that can be termed: ‘Medvedev 2.0’, that is, the attempt to achieve authoritarian, top-down reform efforts, but without Medvedev as the post-Putin president. These could be set in motion by:

• a realization within the regime that the absence of reforms creates more instability than stability and that, therefore, reform is needed for regime continuity. Given that the siloviki are rich, cynical, pragmatic and determined to hold onto power, if reform and change is the means through which they think that they will stay in power, then they will go for it.
• fear of trade-technological dependence on China and loss of strategic autonomy as this would restore or enhance pride, prestige, status and power. Reform in such a context would be a means to preserves Putinism and resists Xi-ism.
• intra-elite struggles and factional infighting as the competitive goals of key factions clash: reforms enable a re-division of resources and power.
• generational developments within the siloviki. The current seniors have very different horizons than the 50-something-year-old colonels who now do the heavy lifting in the system, but still have up to 20 years in active service. These younger mid-level managerial strata are all members of the Russian middle class; enjoy stable incomes and predictable career trajectories. They have incentives to undertake reform to maintain their consumption habits and status.
• gradual loss of active support of the population. Reforms could provide safety valves, and new political narrative that can bind Putin’s passive majority to the regime and encourage conformism. The performative politics involved in anti-corruption show trials, for example, can be the answer to the demand that ‘something must be done’.

The Western authors of the anti-Russia project set up the Ukrainian political system in such a way that presidents, members of parliament and ministers would change but the attitude of separation from and enmity with Russia would remain,” Putin wrote. “Today, the ‘right’ patriot of Ukraine is only the one who hates Russia. Moreover, the entire Ukrainian statehood, as we understand it, is proposed to be further built exclusively on this idea.”
…
“I have become increasingly convinced that Kyiv simply doesn’t need Donbas,” Putin wrote in the article. “Because, firstly, the residents of these regions will never accept the rules they tried and are still trying to impose by force, blockade and threats.”

As a result, NATO needs to contest Russia’s strategic intimidation efforts, denying it any options for achieving its desired political effects. Three priorities are to be pursued: fostering state and societal resilience against malicious cyber activities and disinformation, denying Russia the success of a limited attack with conventional forces, and developing countermeasures to negate Russia’s regional nuclear threat.
[…]
After years of restraint in articulating the role of nuclear deterrence, highlighting its importance in such strong terms at the Warsaw and Brussels summits, NATO has sent a clear message to Moscow that any use of nuclear weapons, including to intimidate or coerce, could eventually lead to inflicting unacceptable damage on Russia itself and should thus not be considered.
[…]
For the time being, the U.S. intends to counteract the Russian regional nuclear threat through a limited number of sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) with low-yield nuclear warheads. Additionally, a land-based intermediate-range conventional precision-strike missile is being developed: this could impede Russia’s ability to conduct conventional operations and help defeat its A2AD capabilities.
[…]
At the same time, there is the need to identify an incentive for Russia to seriously engage in arms control negotiations, which should emerge from its own security interests. It is crucial to find political-strategic levers to motivate Moscow to change its general policy towards the West.
[…]
Finally, there is a pressing need to increase NATO’s maritime presence in the Baltic.

Die Spot-Preise für Gas steigen aufgrund hoher Nachfrage und globalisierter Märkte weltweit an. Auch regulatorische Eingriffe wie die CO2-Bepreisung spielen mit rein.
Wer ist daran Schuld laut vielen Beobachtern? Natürlich Putin und Russland.

https://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/nord-stre...52-1d7a5a662c77
https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/gasprei...k/27619878.html
https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/plus23400222...m-Gaspreis.html

Daß der hohe Preis von der EU gewünscht ist, steht so aber nicht in dem von dir verlinkten Artikel.

Natürlich ist er nicht gewünscht. Aber er ist eine Folge von totalen Liberalisierungswünschen der EU Mitglieder. Statt Ölbindung jetzt Börsenbindung und statt langfristiger Lieferverträge mit Preisgarantie, kurzfristige Lieferungen mit unvorsagbaren Preisen. Man wollte es so und fällt jetzt damit auf die Nase. Kapiert nur kaum einer, deswegen schimpft man lieber wegen angeblicher Nötigung durch die Russen. Dabei gefällt den Russen die Lösung momentan ganz gut, weil sie den großen Reibach machen.

Das bestreite ich überhaupt nicht. Ich bestreite, daß man durch die EU explizit hohe Preise gewünscht hat, wie von Rekrat behauptet. Das war zu keinem Zeitpunkt so und wird auch nicht durch seine Quelle gestützt.

Sie machen aber keinen Reibach, weil sie trotz hohem Preis die Liefermengen niedrig halten.

Ungewöhnliche russische Truppenbewegungen nahe der Ukraine
Washington prüft Berichte
Aktualisiert am 02.11.2021 um 09:58 Uhr

Das Pentagon beobachtet ungewöhnliche russische Truppenbewegungen nahe der Ukraine. Auf Videos sind russische Militärzüge sowie mit Panzern und Raketen beladene Lkw-Konvois zu sehen.
https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland...e-17613890.html

Eine Reaktion auf die den Einsatz der neuen ukrainischen Drohnen?

Putin rues Soviet collapse as demise of 'historical Russia'

Putin beklagt erneut den Zerfall der Sowjetunion, " Es war eine Auflösung des historischen Russlands unter dem Namen Sowjetunion" sagte Putin.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-...sia-2021-12-12/
https://tass.com/politics/1374355?utm_sourc...mm_social_share

Putin dürfte damit aktuell auch auf die Ukraine zielen.

1922 sei die Ukraine auf Kosten des historischen Russland zur Sowjetrepublik geworden. Das hätten die Bolschewiken zugelassen; Russland sei faktisch beraubt worden um weite Teile dessen, was heute die Ukraine sei. Aber weil es den Gegnern Russlands nütze, wenn Russland geschwächt sei, habe das nie jemand als Verbrechen an Moskau gewertet. Aus dieser Stelle und vielen anderen Äusserungen spricht der beleidigte grossrussische Nationalist, der weniger der Sowjetunion als dem Russischen Reich nachtrauert.

Deutsche verärgert über die Worte des Vizekanzlers zu Nord Stream 2

Was macht BLÖD TV anders?