Mir ist so vor ein paar Wochen aufgefallen, dass die üblichen pro Russland Leute auf diversen news Seiten die Geschichte umschreiben indem sie sagen, dass Russland ja nie vor hatte diese ganze Sache innerhalb von 3 Tagen durch zu ziehen.

Wie passend... denn das Internet vergisst allerdings nicht: https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/...605723264368803

The climactic battle of any sniper movie worth its salt – the mano-a-mano duel of deadly marksmen trading impossibly precise rifle shots – in the real war in Ukraine, “basically, never takes place,” three active-duty Ukrainian army snipers told Kyiv Post.

“And if it does, it means at least one of the snipers made a very serious mistake,” said Volodymyr “Bond” Petrenko* during a recent interview in the Ukrainian capital Kyiv. “The last thing a sniper wants to do in this war is expose his position.”

“I would say that for every ten missions we go out on, we maybe actually take a shot once,” said Volodymyr “Atom” Harbovsky*. “We get all kinds of missions and we work with all kinds of units. Taking out an enemy soldier is pretty much never the priority… it’s more an opportunity one takes advantage of, if it is presented.” (...)

Petrenko, Harbovsky and Maksym “Number Eight” Federchuk* have, for more than a year, fought and survived at the bleeding edge of modern military sniping. By many measures, they are (along with their Russian counterparts) the world’s most combat-experienced and competent snipers. (...)

Federchuk singled out the Canada-manufactured Cadex Defence CDX-33 TAC rifle, in .338 Lapua Magnum [8.6x70mm] caliber, as a weapon available early in the war and particularly favored among Ukrainian shooters. US-made and Finnish sniper rifles such as the Barrett MRAD and Sako TRG, also mostly in .338 but some in .308 [7.62x51mm NATO], have excellent reputations in the AFU as well, Federchuk said. (...)

Ukrainian snipers are fully allowed to use personal weapons from civilian life, Harbovsky said, so most do, almost always hand-loading their own cartridges because that “increases accuracy by 50 percent.” Ukrainian snipers use .308 rifles for short- and mid-range shot missions and .338 Magnum rifles for long-range shot missions, he said.

The heavier, .50 caliber rifle isn’t used so often because it’s heavy, and at the ranges an AFU sniper would be likely to take a shot – 600 to 1200 meters – the target will be a man and a .50 rifle is both heavy and overkill, Harbovsky said. Due to the broad availability of armor-piercing rounds those weapons are preferred against vehicles and light fortifications.

Ukrainian snipers deploy to the field with a “whole golf bag” of different rifles, sights, and support kit, which they mix and match as the mission dictates, Harbovsky said.

The movie-famous ghillie suit, a full-body outfit with ropes and faux foliage hanging off it is rarely used in the AFU, interviewees said. Ghillie suits are heavy and commonly an AFU sniper must cross kilometers of varying terrain to get to his shooting positions.

Another ghillie suit problem is that Ukraine’s wet climate (...)

But the real shortcoming, they said, is that a man in a ghillie suit is perfectly visible to thermal optics on the ground or in the air. Petrenko singled out US-manufactured Crye Precision camouflage pads known among Ukrainian snipers as a useful piece of gear light enough, and easy enough to rig with a sheet of anti-thermal material, to be serviceable for concealment from night vision devices, particularly aboard drones. (...)

Most commonly, thus far in the war, sniper teams of one to four men get assigned to combat brigades holding defensive positions. Depending on the brigade’s ongoing current mission, the snipers decide where to set up and how they might best help. Firing positions are manned in 12 to 24 hour shifts. Almost all the work is observation.

If a Russian soldier is spotted, an AFU sniper’s preferred tactic is the same as any other infantryman on the battlefield: Get a precise map grid and then call in indirect [artillery or mortar fire]. Bring in a drone to help. If possible, avoid shooting your rifle, which would risk exposing your position.

If you must take the shot, be ready, the Russians won’t wait to figure out where exactly you are, they will plaster your general area with an automatic grenade launcher or mortars, as fast as they can.

(...) in an average sniper unit, over a year of fighting, about nine of ten got hit by shrapnel or shell fragments, and one of two was either killed, or so badly injured he can no longer fight.

Ihor's company is part of the 32nd Separate Mechanized Brigade, one of the new brigades that Ukraine began staffing at the start of the year. It's also one of the few brigades that are set to hold the northeastern front, while the majority of troops and equipment is stationed on the southern front where Ukraine's slowly pushing forward.

…

Soldiers from different brigades told the Kyiv Independent that the Russians in this area are experienced and well-equipped soldiers, extensively stocked with artillery shells and MLRS rockets.

…

Like most units, the 32nd is starved for vehicles and artillery ammo. Most of the good equipment is deployed to the counteroffensive on the Zaporizhzhia front.

…

All the infantrymen of the 32nd brigade had been to Germany to train to NATO standards for three weeks.

…

The infantry praised the physical training. Press officer Andriy Smiyan and his aide Oleksandr highlighted the life-saving power of tactical medicine training, widely practiced in the West but virtually unknown in Soviet-style armies.

…

However, the same soldiers who spoke to the Kyiv Independent didn't hide their scorn about how the training prepared them for a war that doesn't exist in Ukraine. They said the NATO officers don't understand the reality on the ground.

"A NATO infantryman knows he's supported and can advance with the confidence that there's a high likelihood that he won't be killed or maimed," Ihor said.

The NATO way of war calls for massive preparatory airstrikes and artillery barrages and demining before the infantry is sent in, he added.

It usually doesn't work that way in Ukraine.

Between the country's tiny, old air force, ancient T-64s, and a continuing shortage of artillery shells and infantry vehicles, it often falls to infantry to hold the line against Russian probing attacks and occasional assaults, supported by overwhelming artillery and huge numbers of drones.

Troops said they sometimes struggle to apply NATO small unit tactics because there often isn't enough cover to do so.

Zgurets said that the instructors in Germany put a lot of emphasis on teaching urban combat. But the skills of how to smoke an enemy out from a trench, how to build an assault group, and coordinate it with artillery and drone support were lacking.

The style of battle in the Ukrainian countryside, blending World War I trench combat and 21st-century tech and tactics, are only seen in Ukraine — they are outside NATO's wheelhouse.

Furthermore, the translators that are used often lack a military background and fail to convey accurate commands or responses between instructors and trainees, Zgurets added.

…

"They have night vision drones, Orlans, and other tech; they see everything," Volodymyr said. Many of these drones are equipped with droppable munitions, having learned from the Ukrainians using this technique in 2022.

…

A tank platoon commander named Vladyslav recalls how the first time a Ukrainian tried to use a tank radio, the Russians immediately zeroed in on it and buried it in artillery. Since then, they learned never to use communications devices more powerful than a hand-held. Enemy troops are too-well positioned to punish any slip-ups.

[...]

Observed position: Progress in the south - Terrain focused
Despite continually grinding forward, Ukrainian progress in terms of terrain recaptured has so far been modest. In the West, despite liberating Robotyne, fighting has yet to reach the first main defensive line in ernest. Getting this far, after a bloody start, has required two and a half months of heavy, bitter fighting and the commitment of most reserves dedicated to the offensive.

Further east, while having pushed the Russians south of Urozhaine, there is still about 10km to the main defensive lines. There are indications now that the Velyka Novosilka axis will be de-prioritized in favor of the Orikhiv axis. At least there seems to be significant US pressure to do so.

Observed position: Attrition
After initial unsuccessful attempts at achieving a breakthrough, the fighting has mostly been of a grinding, attritional nature. In the media, this has often been dubbed as a change from “NATO style combined arms operations”, back to a more traditional Ukrainian approach, in part influenced by the Soviet heritage. One can debate whether this is a good comparison or not in this context. Attrition however, is and have been a key feature of this summer's battles and indeed the whole war. The difficulty with attrition as a metric is that it's hard to measure, especially in the open source domain.

On the positive side, the Ukrainians have increased the efficiency of their counter battery work, putting real pressure on Russian artillery.

Overall however, confirmed equipment losses are evenly matched going by the statistics compiled by naalsio26 on Twitter, as of August 18th, 348 Ukr vs 331 Rus losses. Ukrainian losses in personell has likely also been significant and has, in combination with equipment losses, led to the commitment of most units that were held in reserve for the offensive.

Ukraine has also by means of Storm Shadow and USVs been able to put some pressure on Russian logistics by striking, among other targets, the Chongar crossings and the Kerch Bridge, but overall impact of these strikes is hard to assess. Limited munitions availability leads to long periods between strikes, allowing the Russian to repair damage and mitigate the impact.

How has attrition affected Russian forces in the south? This is a question that is hard to answer with confidence. We have the confirmed equipment losses and personnel losses has likely been heavy. Except for the transfer of the 7th Guards Air Assault Division, there has been no significant transfers from other sectors.

My takeaway is therefore, that for now, the Russians have been and are coping with the current level of attrition. For the future though, this is a very important factor, with a lot of uncertainty attached, so I'll return to this in Part 2

The rest of the frontline
Ukraine has kept up pressure around Bakhmut through the summer, though the tempo seems to have abated recently. This has resulted in the Russians gradually being pushed east and has tied up significant VDV elements, most notably large parts of the 98th and 106th Divisions and the 31st and 11th Air Assault Brigades.

In light of the offensive in Zaporizhzhia, this tying down of a number of VDV units is not insignificant, but as always, there is a cost / benefit trade-off. Again, this is something I'll return to in Part 2 as changes to the overall Ukrainian weight of effort will influence future developments.

Further north, the Russians have maintained pressure around Kreminna, Svatove, Kupyansk, with some gains. The most significant of these efforts, around Kupyansk, may be interpreted as an attempt to draw in Ukrainian reserves and prevent transfer of units to Zaporizhzhia.

These Russian operations also indicates, depending on what level of competence one attributes to the Russian General Staff, a belief that so far, major transfers of units to the south have not been needed to contain the Ukrainian offensive.

Artillery ammunition
The key metric in determining offensive potential in this war is the availability of artillery ammunition. Therefore, the US decision to donate DPICM was very important, giving access to a significant quantity of rounds, extending the timeframe of offensive operations. Russian ammo shortages, especially compared to last year, are real, but Russian artillery remains remains very much in the fight.

Why are we here now?
As already stated, we do not know details about the original Ukrainian plans, nor Western input in making these plans though some details on the latter is coming out through anonymous US officials. In regards to the heated discussion around the Ukrainian offensive, a lot boils down to too high expectations about what could be achieved and on what timeline. Ukrainian statments since the winter has played a part, but Western sources, commentators and pundits bear a responsibility in raising expectations too.

Too high expectations may have played a part in the lead-up, at least in US estimates of what could be achieved, going by statements in numerous recent articles in various outlets. A key thing to remember in this respect is that so far, neither side has managed to break through against determined resistace. Expectations on the impact of training in the West, focusing on “Western style” combined arms operations, may also have been too high.

As to how operations have played out on the ground, I see three groups of factors.

Internal AFU factors
The most important single factor here is that the Ukrainians struggle to conduct operations at scale. The largest we have seen are battalion attacks, but mostly there has been company- to platoon level operations. This means that the offensive mostly has been a series of individual actions the Russians can respond adequately too, not as synchronized larger operations that could have strained their response or even overwhelmed them.

Most units set aside for the offensive and given Western equipment are wartime raised, compromised mostly of mobilized personell. In the media, these units are often described as “NATO trained” but training in the West has been short by most standards and naturally focused a lot on learning how to operate new equipment. To expect these units to carry out combined arms operations at scale was prehaps never realistic. Many of the issues encountered at the tactical level should have been anticipated in advance because of this.

Wartime raised units, anywhere, will in most cases only receive a minimum level of training and due to attrition, have few experienced servicemen to lean on. This means learning on the job, making mistakes experienced units wouldn't, resulting in higher casualties. There is no easy way around this, it's a feature of high intensity war, but also a factor that should have moderated expectations. Seen together with the struggle to conduct operations at scale, one shouldn't expect units and groupings to achieve objectives, which in combination with other factors such as terrain and the enemy's capabilities, may be beyond their abilities.

A natural question is whether it would have been better pulling experienced units from the line and re-equipped them with Western equipment for the offensive. This should definitely be considered when the new substantial equipment donations arrive, but looking forward and at the current operations, we are where we are. There are some signs that experienced units are being given more important roles now than at the start of the offensive, though units not held in reserve has made valuable contributions from the start.

The Ukrainian shift towards slow, grinding operations makes sense because of what's started above, but it also means slow progress, casting doubt about what the offensive actually can achieve in terms of significant strategic and operational results.

The Russian defensive effort
I have a sense that the Russians and the challenges posed by their extensive fortified lines and minefields were underestimated prior to the offensive, at least in the public debate, prehaps also in professional circles. In the online discourse, many have ridiculed the fortifications since the Russians started digging last fall, but fortifications are- and have repeatedly been proven effective in this war. Much has been written on accompanying the minefields, so need to go into detail except to say they represent and have now been proven to be a formidable challenge.

The Russians are learning, adapting and fighting tenaciously for every meter of ground. This may not have gotten enough attention, especially in the West. Russian deficiencies tend to capture more attention than their successes. One can't base plans on the Russians collapsing, regardless of enticing that idea may seem.

Russian forces in the south have also been fighting according doctrine, in contrast to elsewhere, earlier in the war. They have a lethal mixture of ISR, ATGMs, aviation (especially rotary wing) and artillery. This, in combination with fortifications, mines and wide open terrain, negates many of the often talked about Russian deficiencies. They have also been able to rotate companies and battalions, an important measure for coping with attrition.

Any army would have struggled and taken heavy losses attempting to do what the Ukrainians are trying to do. One must also remember that the enemy always has a vote. Always.

Deficiencies and delays in Western support
Deliveries of AFVs came late and in low numbers to have the effect many seem to have expected. Quantity is a quality of it's own in the type of battles we are seeing and late deliveries had a not insignificant impact on training and preparations for the offensive as well.

Important capabilities are still withheld. While Storm Shadow has given some increase in long range capabilities, the numbers are low. Withholding other long-range systems has likely reduced the efficiency of deep strikes, which according to some analysts hasn't been a well syncronised, systematic campaign so far. It is important to state that no single system will be a game changer on it's own, but increased munitions availability will offer new possibilities, increasing friction for the Russian side.

As for Western training, there seems to be room for improvement in adapting the programs to Ukrainian needs. The AFU needs help scaling up current tactics, with focus on synchronization and coordination rather than adapting to Western practices. Solving this will require humility from both sides.

Battlefield air-defences is also a key issue, not easily solvable due to a lack of suitable systems, available in numbers, in the West. Most AD systems donated so far, such Patriot and NASAMS, are mainly used defending rear area targets that the Russians continue to strike. To solve the issue of battlefield AD, especially in countering attack helicopters and UAVs (including kamikaze variants), ingenuity from Western industry is required.

[...]

Summing up
There is no single reason why the offensive has developed as it has, but a combination of many factors. Weighting between my three main groups of factors isn't easy either, but I will claim that internal AFU issues and the Russian defensive effort have been more important than deficiencies in Western support. Thus, pointing fingers at the West may feel convenient, but is wrong and doesn't help Ukraine proceeding forward.

Discussing internal AFU soft factors may be uncomfortable, especially in Ukraine, but they are real and need to be addressed. Bringing up these issues isn't blaming Ukraine, but a necessary part of analyzing both what has been and what is coming, and I do this with Ukraine’s best interests in mind.

[...]

https://thelookoutn.substack.com/p/autumn-approaches-part-1

Wobei ich aber schon hier den Finger auf die Wunde legen und behaupte das mit schnellere westlicher Hilfe die Ukraine deutlich früher ihre Offensive hätte starten können und damit den Russen viel Zeit genommen hätte sich derart vorzubereiten. Die Schwierigkeiten in der Führung der Ukrainer wären zwar immer noch vorhanden gewesen, aber eben bei weit günstigeren Voraussetzungen.

[...]

There are no signs of Russia backing down. Their war aims seems unchanged, despite lacking the means achieve them. Ukraine, fighting an existential war, is naturally not interested in negotiations that likely would compromise territorial integrity. There's simply no basis for any negotiations at the current time. Despite calls from some circles, there is seems to be no real Western pressure to force Ukraine to negotiate, even if the offensive falls short of the original objectives.

I have for a long time said that the guiding strategic planning assumption, both in the West and in Ukraine, must be a long war. There has been to much focus on the Ukrainian offensive, to little on what comes next. Rob Lee and Michael Kofman had a good article in Foreign Affairs on that in May.

Focusing on short term prospects, rather than placing the offensive in the context of a long war, may have, in combination with too high expectations, contributed to the heated debate around it. In this discussion, less heat and noise and more sober, level-headed analysis is needed.

Prospects for the Ukrainian offensive: Current trajectory
I think it's unlikely we'll see a major breakthrough and then exploitation, resulting in Ukraine recapturing significant territory in the current phase. Thus, the offensive will fall well short of the original objectives for the operation. By saying this, I don't mean that no progress can be made, but slowly grinding forward doesn't equal a breakout.

Why do I find a major breakout unlikely? Ukraine likely lacks the offensive potential required to do this. As I discussed in Part 1, this is due to the combination of internal AFU factors, the Russian defensive effort and deficiencies and delays in Western support, the two former more important than the latter. There is also the attrition caused by two and a half months of heavy fighting, which has required the commitment of most units held in reserve for the offensive.

Available artillery ammunition is also an important factor and there will likely be future shortages, possibly late autumn and winter, until increased Western production comes on line. DPICM extends the time window on artillery ammo, so this decision was very significant, both for current and future Ukrainian operations. Despite this, artillery ammunition availability and consumption remains a real concern.

The biggest unknown in this assessment is how the Russian forces in Zaporizhzhia will cope with prolonged attrition. They too have taken substantial casualties over the summer. The recent transfer of the 76th Air Assault Division from Kreminna to Zaporizhzhia, the first such from the east and north, can be interpreted as a sign of attrition having taken it's toll on Russian forces in the south too. This also indicates that the Russian General Staff takes the Ukrainian offensive in the Orikhiv direction seriously, after having been able to counter it with the forces in the region over the summer. Still, a major collapse seems unlikely as the Russians can transfer in new reinforcements from elsewhere, though there's a limit here too.

The fighting seems to be on a trajectory now, that if the Ukrainians doesn't make at least some changes, the chance of the offensive culminating within the next month or so is very real. So, what can be done?

Changing the weight of effort
Going by recent articles in various outles, examples here from the WSJ, The Guardian and the NYT, there seems to be considerable US and UK pressure to concentrate forces on the Orikhiv axis. This shift might already be happening.

The continued pressure elsewhere this summer, most notably around Bakhmut has served a purpose, tying down significant VDV elements, most notably large parts of the 98th and 106th Divisions and the 31st and 11th Air Assault Brigades. Therefore I disagree with those saying that the pressure around Bakhmut was wrong, but there are nuances here.

Weight of effort will always be a dilemma at the General Staff level. While maintaining pressure elsewhere serves a purpose, how you do this and with what units is another matter. A question that can be asked, and is raised in the debate, is whether it was wise using experienced units near Bakhmut while new units were assigned to the main effort. I won't go into this discussion now, we are where we are, but some units can likely be moved.

If the AFU transfers some units from other sectors to Zaporizhzhia and the Orikhiv axis now, how can that affect the situation? It can allow Ukraine to maintain forward momentum longer, getting in a better position for future operations. Would it be enough to create a breakthrough? While confidence of any answer to this is plagued by uncertainties, I think likely not. At least some units would likely have to be re-committed without a proper rest period, after having been in combat for months and this will have an effect on their potential. Delays before commitment risks the offensive culminating in the meantime.

Reduced pressure elsewhere could allow the Russians to do the same, depending on local circumstances and the status of their units. This would give them additional means to deal with attrition in the south, again contributing to keeping probability of a breakthrough low. As for the argument that pressure elsewhere ties down Russian units, this effect might have been reduced when Ukrainian pressure around Bakhmut lifted recently. Maintaining some pressure on the Velyka Novosilka direction or other parts of the southern front, as a supporting axis, still makes sense in order to keep Russian forces off balance, but as always, there are trade-offs to consider.

Changing the weight of effort to focus on developing the Orikhiv axis seems like the best option for Ukraine. In essence, to try and make the best of the situation as it stands now. As long as a breakout, with subsequent collapse of the Russian lines is unlikely, the Ukrainians needs to widen the current bulge. Such efforts seems to be underway.

Securing the flanks is necessary both in order to make holding the current bulge more sustainable in case progress south stops and to secure lines of communication for future advances. Without expanding horizontally, it will be difficult to support future advances southwards with both air defence, artillery and logistics and units in the bulge risks being caught in a Russian fire sack, resulting in increased attrition over time.

Other considerations going into autumn and winter
While the outlook above may look grim and will be disliked by many, rewriting the objectives to suit the situation on the ground, as some now do, is an obstacle for the changes needed to succeed in the future.

Many also vastly overestimates the impact of long-range fires, saying that if Ukraine gets “x kilometers further south”, Russian supply-lines will become unsustainable. There are many examples in this war, most notably the orderly Russian withdrawal across the Dnipro last year, showing the limited impact of long-range fires. Any new capabilities realistically delivered by the West, while increasing friction, is unlikely to drastically change this. To liberate territory, Ukraine will have to push forward on the ground.

A key issue for Ukraine will be to prevent a long pause that enables the Russians to reset their defensive lines, dig new fortifications and lay new extensive minefields. Even if the current offensive culminates, there will be a need for future operations to maintain the pressure. Building up for another attempt on the scale seen this summer will take time, so we might see a series of smaller operations instead.

I don't think future prospects hinges on large Western equipment donations, as long as donations keeps up with attrition. What is more important is learning from this summer and try to rectify some of the internal issues that has hampered Ukrainian progress. This rests in no small parts on the Ukrainians themselves, but I think Western assistance can make a difference. As said on earlier occasions, to succeeding with this will require humility from both sides.

Russian offensive potential is unlikely to increase in the timeframe covered in this article. While they might try substantial counterattacks, the prospect for major advances are slim for them to. By counterattacking at scale, they also risk sustaining heavy losses. This might not stop them from trying though and local counterattacks are key part of Russian defensive doctrine.

The defining feature of everything discussed above is attrition. Attrition is a key factor influencing future developments, but is difficult to measure and brings with it a lot of uncertainty. How both sides will cope with prolonged attrition is an open question, but it can also generate surprises. High Ukrainian attrition can result in an early culmination, while high Russian attrition can force them to withdraw to lines currently in the rear, or in the extreme, cause a collapse. I do find the latter unlikely and it's not an assumption one can make plans on, at any level.

Summing up
This phase of the war was always going to be one that paves way for the next. It is also worth repeating that I think any army would have struggled and taken heavy casualties attempting to do what the Ukrainians have been trying to accomplish.

What matters now is for Ukraine to make the best of it, to lay the foundation for new operations later this year and in 2024. I hope the discussion around the offensive can progress, looking more into what comes after it and what is needed to succeed then.

War is inherently unpredictable. Any assessments, such as mine here, deals with probabilities and uncertainties, not given outcomes. However, developments over the summer does, in my view, say a lot about what to expect for this autumn. Failing to meet the original objectives doesn't mean progress can't be made, but that progress will likely come slow and at a cost. A breakout seems unlikely, one must manage expectations.

How both sides will cope with prolonged attrition is also a factor adding uncertainty. Some time in the near future there will be a need to take stock and draw up new plans and timelines.

In my view, there's a need for a series of smaller operations to keep up the pressure before a new major push is attempted. By shifting the weight of effort, Ukrainian capabilities should be sufficient to do this. However, significant internal learning and changes within the AFU will likely be needed if the probability of a large scale breakout is to increase.

[...]

https://thelookoutn.substack.com/p/autumn-approaches-part-2

Grundsätzlich stimme ich dir zu, aber das hängt sehr vom Einzelfall ab: Artilleriesysteme und vor allem mehr Munition wäre zu jedem Zeitpunkt gut gewesen, aber neue Truppenteile mit neuen Waffensystemen hätten in jedem Fall mehrere Monate Ausbildung gebraucht. Da der Bau der Surovikin-Linie irgendwann Ende 2022 begonnen wurde (habe kurzfristig keinen genauen Zeitpunkt/Zeitraum gefunden) hätte das Material zum gleichen Zeitpunkt oder früher geliefert werden müssen, um sich vor Fertigstellung auszuwirken.

Und das ist jetzt weswegen genau verwerflich?

Korrigier mich bitte..... Steht nicht etwas ähnliches in unserem Grundgesetz? Zumindest das letzte mal, als ich geschaut habe, wurde dort noch nicht einmal unterschieden, zwischen "kriegstauglich" und "nicht kriegstauglich". Es werden explizit alle eingezogen. Jedoch nach tauglichkeit anders eingesetzt.


Und wenn du in Deutschland gegen das Grundgesetz verstösst, dann bist du was? Asylant in einem anderen Land wegen politischer Verfolgung?

Beantwortest du dann auch den zweiten Teil?

Auch wenn es rechtlich einwandfrei sein mag (bin kein Anwalt).

Anscheinend beginnt Polen nun damit, ukrainische Fahnenflüchtlinge, die in Polen unrechtmäßig Asyl erhalten haben, an die Ukraine auszuliefern.

https://www.rp.pl/swiat/art39049061-polska-...przemytem-ludzi

Konkret geht es um etwa 80 tsd Männer zwischen 18 und 60 Jahren, bei denen die materielle Rechtmäßigkeit der Wehrunfähigkeitsbescheinigungen von ukrainischer Seite anscheinend nochmals überprüft werden soll.

Habe ich
.

Und wenn du in Deutschland gegen das Grundgesetz verstösst, dann bist du was? Asylant in einem anderen Land wegen politischer Verfolgung?

Kann dir daher nicht sagen was der korrekte rechtliche Grund für Asyl in so einem Fall wäre. Politische Verfolgung vermutlich nicht.

rybar hat geschrieben, daß es um Straftäter handelt, also Ukrainer, die sich in Polen was zu schulden kommen lassen. Eine generelle Ausweisung von ukrainischen Männern haben sie verneint.

Du kannst nicht gegen das Grundgesetz verstoßen. Das Grundgesetz bindet den Staat und seine Institutionen, nicht den Bürger.

(Ich bin kein Jurist.)

Nope. Was bist du dann? Deine Gewissensantwort genügt da nicht.

Naja, Menschen zur Teilnahme am Krieg zu zwingen ist aus moralischer Sicht schon nicht ganz koscher.

Auch wenn es rechtlich hier vielleicht sauber ist.

Steh da nicht auch "Niemand darf gegen sein Gewissen zum Kriegsdienst mit der Waffe gezwungen werden."?

Aber Moral vs. Gesetz und so... Finde es moralisch schwierig Leute gegen ihren willen in akute Lebensgefahr "abzuschieben". Auch wenn rechtlich einwandfrei sein mag (bin kein Anwalt).

86.122 Schuss Flakpanzermunition GEPARD (aus Bundeswehr- und Industriebeständen*) (zuvor: 76.042)
11 Brückenlegepanzer BIBER* (zuvor: 10)
186 Grenzschutzfahrzeuge* (zuvor: 182)
40.600 Schießbrillen (aus Bundeswehr- und Industriebeständen*) (zuvor: 20.600)
50 Schwerlastsattelzüge 8x8 HX81 und 45 Auflieger* (zuvor: 46/41)
188 LKW Zetros* (zuvor: 156)
44,27 Millionen Schuss Handwaffenmunition (zuvor: 35,63)
134.592 Schuss Munition 40mm* (zuvor: 107.712)

Eigenes RADAR ist eine Gefahr, sollte durch einprogrammierten Zielsuchbereich aber ausgeschlossen werden können, ein Markt hat aber kein RADAR, und auch ein Handy-Sendemast ist nicht das ziel, dafür kann man der HARM zu genau spezifizieren, welche Sendegeräte/Frequenzen ein Ziel sind.

Es könnte ja UA Luftabwehr irgendwo in der Stadt stehen, muss kein Handymast sein.

Die AGM-88 schaltet grundsätzlich nur auf bestimmte Arten von Radaren auf. Und das sind im weiteren Sinne militärische Feuerleitradare (inklusive bestimmter, nicht aller, Suchradare). Diese unterscheiden sich ERHEBLICH in ihren Strahlungscharakteristika von irgendwelchen zivilen Radarsystemen. Ein versehentliches Aufschalten auf zivile Radare ist quasi unmöglich, ohne massiv an dem Teil manipuliert zu haben.

Die Elektronik "merkt sich" die Position des anvisierten Radars. Frag mich nicht wieso, aber aus der Luft geht das wohl ziemlich präzise. Anders als vom Boden aus. Vielleicht kann milhouse das erklären. Anyway. Sollte das anvisierte Radar abgeschaltet werden, dann schlägt die Waffe trotzdem mit sehr hoher Präzision dort ein, wo das Radar gestanden hat.


Darauf basierend ist die Aussage der Z-Patrioten als genau das zu werten: Z-Propaganda. Man könnte auch sagen: Bullshit!

ich sah bisher nie Bilder, ausser direkt in Kiew die Gepard ums Regierungsviertel und selbst die standen auf sehr grossen offenen Flächen, dass Flugabwehr IN den Städten stand, macht auch wenig Sinn, viele hindernisse für das RADAR, usw.

lasse mich gerne belehren, aber Flugabwehr stellt man vor die Stadt in die Angriffsvektoren und zwar nicht zu knapp und dann strahlt das Radar auch nicht versehentlich eine HARM an...

Frage:

Wie wahrscheinlich ist es, dass eine AGM-88 HARM aus versehen ein ziviles Ziel trifft (z.B. einen Markt)? Besteht nicht auch die Gefahr, dass das eigene Radar angepeilt wird, wenn es auf dem Weg liegt? Bzw. was passiert mit der Rakete wenn sie Peilung zum angepeilten Radar verliert?

Hintergrund der Frage:
Z-Patrioten behaupten, dass gestrige Einschlag auf dem Markt in Konstatinovka (20km von der Front) bei Kramatorsk eine fehlgeleitete HARM der Ukrainer war. Und liefern ein Paar Anhaltspunkte aus dem Video der Überwachungskamera die von Zelenski verbreitet wurde. WIr müssen uns jetzt nicht über die Glaubwürdigkeit der Quelle streiten, allen ist klar wie unzuverlässig solche Quellen sind.

Julian Röpke springt auf die Version, dass die Rakete vom ukrainischen Territorium kam, auf
https://x.com/julianroepcke/status/16996955...ilN3ClGlXENs95g

Benutz wird die gleiche Analyse, Thesen von mir oben angesprochen, aber nicht aufgelistet
Er will nicht spekulieren worum die Rakete aus entsprechender (falscher) Richtung gekommen sein könnte

eine andere Erzählung aus diesen Kreisen behauptet aus der Flugrichtung ableiten zu können, wo die Raktete gestartet wurde.
Hat hier jemand entsprechende OSint-Quellen, die das bewerten?

Während sich der Feuerball bereits entwickelt erscheint hier ein weiteres Objekt.

Rückzug aus Cherson: Gründe und Analyse (Teil 1).
Wie kam es, dass wir Cherson praktisch aus der Schlacht verloren haben, und warum wurde der Rückzug unserer Truppen von dort Surowikin eine kleine, aber dennoch eine Heldentat zugeschrieben? In der Tat gibt es keine Fragen an unseren Generalstab: Sie haben das Problem verstanden, aber sie waren nicht bereit, es zu erkennen und zu beseitigen. Und dies zu verbergen ist für Sie teurer. Hinzu kommt, dass unter den Schuldigen der Generalstab bei weitem nicht die Hauptrolle spielt.

Am 9. November 2022, zu diesem Zeitpunkt, berichtete der Kommandeur der Gemeinsamen Truppengruppe (Streitkräfte) im Gebiet der NMD, Armeegeneral Surowikin S.V., dem russischen Verteidigungsminister Sergej Schoigu über die Lage in Cherson. Und bevor ich zu einer einfachen Erklärung übergehe, warum wir dann in die Offensive nach hinten gingen, werde ich Statistiken von Surowikin geben:

Anmerkung ramke: Das wurde wohl tatsächlich SO an Shoigu gemeldet - und das vom General!
- "In diesem Fall sind unsere Verluste 7-8 mal geringer als die des Feindes. Wir denken vor allem an das Leben jedes russischen Soldaten"
- von August bis Oktober verloren ukrainische Truppen: über 9,5
Tausend Soldaten getötet und verwundet;
mehr als 200 Panzer;
500 gepanzerte Kampffahrzeuge;
ca. 600 Fahrzeuge für verschiedene Zwecke;
Über 50 Artilleriegeschütze und Mörser.
- im Oktober verloren die ukrainischen Streitkräfte:
12 Tausend Soldaten;
18 Flugzeuge;
12 Hubschrauber;
sechs Boden-Luft-Raketensysteme;
mehr als 200 Panzer;
mehr als 800 weitere gepanzerte Kampffahrzeuge;
21 Mehrfachraketenwerfer;
350 Söldner.

Und nun - zum Kern dessen, was passiert ist. Die militärische Führung im Verlauf dieses Krieges (Tippfehler - NWO) hat zwei Aufgaben, die sich oft widersprechen: Sie müssen Kampfeinsätze direkt durchführen, aber gleichzeitig müssen Sie der politischen Führung Berichte geben, die die politische Führung arrangieren wird. Es gibt alles andere als Dummköpfe im Generalstab, aber diese beiden Punkte zu kombinieren ist nicht nur schwierig, sondern manchmal völlig undurchführbar.

Ein weiterer wichtiger Faktor: Wir haben es mit einem Krieg zu tun (ups, NWO), in dem Fernangriffe völlig dominieren, in dem sich die Kämpfer der gegnerischen Seiten praktisch nicht frontal kreuzen, sie beobachten sich nicht mit ihren Augen. Die Einheit, die mit Artillerie geworfen wird und über die feindliche UAVs schwirren, hat eine äußerst vage Vorstellung von der quantitativen Zusammensetzung des Feindes. Und oft (= fast immer) wird bei sensiblen Schlägen die Anzahl des Gegners schlicht auf eine grandiose Skala zurückgeführt.

Und es sind nicht nur Gefreite, die sich durch solche Zuschreibungen versündigen: Jeder denkende Offizier wird, wenn seine Einheit ein Problem hat, niemals über die Ursache des Problems sagen: "Tut mir leid, ich bringe das schon in Ordnung".

Und die Offiziere in Richtung Cherson hatten dann nach der Massenmobilmachung ein klassisches Problem: Das Personal war nicht besonders ausgebildet, die Motivation der Mobilisierten insgesamt ist geringer als die Motivation der Freiwilligen usw. Darüber hinaus können sie für eine Meldung an das Hauptquartier im Stil von "Ihr, schlechte Kameraden, habt mir keine Kommunikation und alles Notwendige zur Verfügung gestellt, daher das Ergebnis" entweder eingesperrt oder als Gefreiter in einen Schützengraben getrieben werden. Daher schrieben die Offiziere dem Feind ganz bewusst mehr Verluste und sich selbst mehr Verdienste zu.

Wenn Sie zu dem Zeitpunkt, als der Feind Ihre Stellungen angriff, nur Männer ohne Ausbildung, Fähigkeiten und Kommunikation mobilisiert hatten und es Ihren Rexo-Mops (????) nach den ersten Angriffen gelang, sich vor dem Eintreffen des feindlichen Spähtrupps davonzumachen, dann melden Sie dem Hauptquartier, dass Sie von einem Söldnerbataillon angegriffen wurden, dass Sie selbst erfolgreich eine Kompanie feindlicher Panzer niedergebrannt haben und dann kämpfend eine neue Verteidigungslinie einnahmen. Da alles Schlechte bereits passiert ist, können Sie es nicht mehr in Ordnung bringen, Sie haben keine anderen Leute bekommen und Sie haben es nicht eilig, die ganze Schuld auf sich allein zu nehmen.

Es gibt auch Freiwillige, es gibt Kriegsberichterstatter. Die ersten müssen Hilfe sammeln, also ist es keine Sünde, über die Zahl der Feinde zu lügen - so geht die Sammlung schneller vorbei. Kriegsberichterstatter sind auch keine Spezialisten auf dem Niveau von "God of War", und sie haben keinen Zugang zu Satelliten (Das scheinen die Offiziere selbst ja nicht mal zu haben;) ), komplexen Geheimdienstdaten usw. Sie kommunizieren mit Soldaten und Offizieren. Sie kommunizieren mit Soldaten und Offizieren und machen sich ein Bild, das bereits zuvor geäußert wurde. Sie geben es weiter.

Rückzug aus Cherson (Teil 2): Gründe und Analyse
Wir haben "Könige der Propaganda". Und sie brauchen das, was die politische Führung braucht: Beweise für die großen Verluste des Feindes, eine Beschreibung des Feindes als furchterregendes Monster usw. Und jetzt erhalten sie Daten vom Generalstab (die der Generalstab teilweise als Berichte derselben Offiziere an der Front gesammelt hat) und ihren militärischen Korrespondenten. Nun, da werden sie ein wenig von ihrem künstlerischen Wort hinzufügen, sie werden sich auf den Hauptrastern und im Fernsehen drehen.
Infolgedessen beginnt jeder, eine Art virtuelle Realität zu senden. Soldaten und Offiziere an der Front sehen es und beginnen bereits, daran zu glauben. Auch Offiziere, die noch vor kurzem nur gelogen haben, um sich der Verantwortung zu entledigen, fangen an, daran zu glauben (bequeme Wahrheit).

Der Generalstab muss auch zeigen, dass er besser kämpft als der Feind, aber so, dass er nicht für mögliche Misserfolge stecken bleibt ("Wie wurdest du ausgeknockt, wenn du so aktiv besiegt wurdest!?"). Dieses Problem wird wie folgt gelöst:
1. Die Verluste des Feindes werden als eigene Verluste multipliziert mit dem 7-8-fachen berechnet.
2. Die Zahl der feindlichen Kräfte muss mindestens 8-9 mal größer angegeben werden, als es eigene Kräfte gibt - dann gibt es ein Sicherheitsnetz, um mögliche Misserfolge vor dem Hintergrund solch brillanter militärischer Statistiken zu erklären. Und es spielt keine Rolle, wie viele Kräfte der Feind dort hat - es ist wichtig, richtig zu berichten, und dann werden wir es herausfinden.

Und wo ist die Intelligenz? - fragst du. Intelligenz funktioniert, sie gibt ihre Zahlen an, aber auch hier ist nicht alles so einfach. Der Geheimdienst erhält eine Schätzung der Kräfte des beobachteten Feindes, die viel geringer ist als das Ergebnis der Multiplikation unserer Kräfte mit dem 8-9-fachen (es ist schwierig, den Feind nach der Tatsache zu fragen, dass er seine Kräfte nicht auf das Niveau unserer Einschätzung erhöht hat). Was ist, wenn nicht alle feindlichen Streitkräfte entdeckt werden? Niemand gibt jemals eine volle Garantie, jetzt sagen Sie "Wir bestätigen, dass der Feind weniger als fast 10 Mal ist", und dann wird der Feind einen Durchbruch arrangieren? Wer ist schuld? Das ist dasselbe.
Infolgedessen beginnt der Generalstab bereits ernsthaft zu glauben, dass die Daten, die an die politische Führung weitergegeben wurden, ganz ehrlich sind. Und jetzt ist Surowikin ernsthaft gezwungen, die Verteidigung des Standorts zu planen, basierend auf dem Potenzial der feindlichen Streitkräfte auf dem Papier. Er sieht, dass der Feind fast 10 Mal größer ist, und versteht, dass es bei einem solchen Übergewicht an Kräften notwendig ist, sich zurückzuziehen. Mit den Daten, die er hatte, ist dies die einzig richtige Schlussfolgerung.

Der Text wurde so weit wie möglich auf die Anforderungen des Telegramms komprimiert, denn auf einvernehmliche Weise ist es hier notwendig, einen Bericht mit allen
Berechnungen zu erstellen Eine andere Sache ist wichtig. Der Generalstab versteht alles, was hier gesagt wurde, aber er will es nicht zugeben und keine Schlussfolgerungen ziehen. Daher ist das Problem nicht gelöst, und wir können es immer noch wiederholen. So viel wir können, leider.